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ABSTRACT
QUANTITATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESSES IN CHILDREN
May, 1977
John J. Clement, A.B., Harvard University
Ed.D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard Peelle
Exploratory clinical interviews were conducted with third and
fourth grade students as they attempted to solve quantitative story
problems. Models of individual students' cognitive processes are de-
veloped that account for many of the diverse phenomena observed in
the interview tapes.
Observed phenomena include: acted-out solutions; counting-based
solutions; solutions via. a number sentence; immediate solutions; solu-
tions via written symbol algorithms; use of drawings; and spontaneous
activities related to inverse, commutative, associative, and distribu-
tive principles. Although some of the students' solution approaches
seem related to standard methods taught in school, others do not.
Several kinds of intuitive solutions to story problems ordinarily
solved via division or multiplication are reported from students who
have never studied these operations in school. These solutions involve
practical actions and suggest that the students possess a practical know-
ledge base which could be tapped as a foundation for learning arithmetic
concepts in school. The study also examines spontaneous occurrences
of solution approaches that are often referred to as heuristics, such
as: solving a problem in pieces; using more than one approach to attack
vi
a problem; generating related problems; and using a convergent trial
and error approach.
Some general features of the models of cognitive processes proposed
to account for these phenomena can be summarized as follows: Piagetian
and neo-Piagetian concepts such as assimilation, disequilibrium, intern-
alized actions, cognitive structures, and parallel structure activity
are utilized in these models and are related to specific instances of
observed behavior. Other concepts utilized include: competition for
dominance, external and internal assimilation, chaining, and recursion.
Several types of cognitive structures are discussed, including written
symbol algorithm structures, counting-based structures, and practical
action structures. These last structures organize actions such as shar-
ing objects or cutting an object in half. A method of diagramming is
used which allows one to model cognitive structure interactions in a
student as they occur in time.
The protocol analyses suggest that these children have knowledge
structures which are active and semi-autonomous in the sense that their
structures aggressively assimilate problem situations, generate related
cases, dominate other structures, drive explanations, and influence per-
ceptions. Many of the reasoning processes modelled take the form of
structure interactions that are spontaneous rather than being governed
by established, hierarchical procedures. Structures are shown interact-
ing in a manner similar to the way different species interact in
an eco
system—conflicting with each other; cooperating with each other;
and
interacting with the environment.
It is suggested that the intuitive knowledge structures
and reason-
vii
processes discussed can be tapped as starting points for building
mathematical ideas in the classroom. This approach may help students
develop a knowledge of mathematics that is applicable to real-world
problems as opposed to merely being an isolated set of rules for
manipulating symbols on paper.
vi ii
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND RELATED RESEARCH
Introduction
One part of current movements toward process-oriented education
is a concern that problem solving skills should be a part of the know-
ledge that each student takes away from school. Approaches to meeting
this goal at the elementary school level have ranged from open-ended
student design projects (Lomon, 1971), to attempts to suggest specific
heuristics for mathematics problems (Polya, I9U 8 ) and for problems ex-
pressible in computer languages (Papert, 1972; Peelle, 197M •
One approach to teaching problem solving that has been with us
for some time is the assignment of story problems (’word problems') in
mathematics (at all grade levels) and in the sciences (at the secondary
and college levels). Yet teachers often complain that although most of
their students are successful in learning arithmetic algorithms, many
are relatively unsuccessful in applying them in story problems. The
cause for this seems to be more than a minor instructional difficulty,
and an easy solution has not emerged in classrooms. It is extremely
difficult to isolate steps in the problem solving process, diagnose
the approach students are using, and give them some new techniques or
steer them toward problem situations where they are led to improve
their approach. In other words, not much is known currently about
how
to teach students to solve story problems or how to teach
them to solve
quantitative problems in real life. This investigator believes
that
this situation is a reflection of the primitive state of our
knowledge
2of problem solving processes and of our knowledge of intuitive approaches
children use in problem solving. This belief provided a motive for the
present study.
Issues discussed . A major goal of this study is to describe know-
ledge structures and reasoning processes in children that come into play
in the context of solving quantitative story problems. Because of the
complexity of the phenomena, a clinical study of story problem solving
is a unique challenge, since so many key issues must be investigated to-
gether, such as: the nature of verbal comprehension; the nature of basic
number ideas; the nature of arithmetic ideas, both informal and aca-
demic, as they exist in children; the problem of how mathematical know-
ledge is used appropriately in a practical situation; and the more gen-
eral issue of how internal knowledge structures interact adaptively in
children whose solutions include trial starts, setbacks, and recoveries.
These are some of the issues discussed in the present study.
The protocols included in this study were chosen to carry out two
particular purposes: l) to give the reader a feeling for a 'horizontal'
range of phenomena to be observed in the story problem solving behavior
of children at this age (discussed in Chapter III); and 2) to make a
'vertical' cut toward a deeper understanding of the processes involved
in one particular type of problem solving behavior—where solutions are
acted out explicitly using blocks or drawings (discussed in Chapter V).
This last type of solution was judged to have the most potential for for
mal analysis leading to insights about intuitive mathematical
understand
ing. Thus in Chapter III an attempt is made to present
protocols that
of observational and theoretical concepts, andintroduce a wide range
3in Chapter V an attempt is made to extend these concepts and use them
together to explain three particularly transparent protocols at a deeper
level
.
Finally
,
Appendix F contains a short study of patterns in responses
to oral arithmetic problems that a student solves without using pencil
and paper. The study shows how met,hods used in the analysis of story-
problem solutions can bo extended to the domain of arithmetic problems.
An Initial mode l . If the process of solving story problems is ob-
served to fit the following very general model (called the Id nea r Mod el )
:
Step a) Recognizing the words in the problem by reading or
listen! ng;
b) Comprehend i ng F.he problem situation, thinking about
its relevant aspects;
c) Translating the situation into an appropriate number
sentence
;
d) Solving the number sentence using arithmetic operations;
— then it will be steps b) and c) that this study will attempt to exam-
ine in detail. In other words., a central question from which to start
is, "What happens between the time a Btudent begins to comprehend a
problem situation and the time he has set up an appropriate equation to
solve on paper (or in his head)?" This provides an initial orientation
for the study.
But in fact, this question turns out to be t.oo narrow, because it
is based on the assumption that all story problems are solved via num-
ber sentences. It will be shown that this Is not always the case,
and
new questions will have to be proposed and discussed. The investigator
did, however, begin the study with the above question. This
illustrates
the fact that when one is engaged in exploratory clinical research, the
questions asked must often be reframed in terms of the new phenomena
observed and in terms of the new theoretical concepts developed.
Developments in cognitive theory
. The present study has a sur-
rounding context of developments in cognitive psychology and epistem-
ology. Jean Piaget’s work has had a profound impact in these areas,
partly because he has shown how very different the child's knowledge
structures and reasoning patterns are from the adult's. It can be ar-
gued that his theories constitute the beginnings of a new paradigm in
the sense of Kuhn (1962) in the field of cognitive psychology because
they treat knowledge as an active process and because they describe
thought processes in terms of a biological metaphor.
This study draws heavily on the conceptual framework of Piaget.
However, Piaget has been more interested in explaining long-term pat-
terns of cognitive development in children than in explaining cognitive
functioning in detail over short periods of time (as in a 10 to 300
second problem solution). In the present study Piagetian and neo-
Piagetian concepts will be applied to this second domain, and additional
new theoretical concepts will be constructed as needed.
On another front, a growing number of theorists have embraced a
computational or information processing metaphor for cognition. This
approach has been stimulated by research in artificial intelligence
techniques. The present study contributes to the empirical base of pro-
tocol data against which such theories can be tested. Thus, the
empir-
ical observations of human problem solving behavior included
here may
eventually be used by others to test the adequacy of theories
origin-
5ating in the field of artificial intelligence for explaining problem
solving behavior in children.
Characteristics o f the study
. This study was carried out with
four additional goals in mind that ordinarily are not emphasized in edu-
cational research. First, an attempt is made to model internal thinking
processes in the child. Attention will not be restricted to studying
relationships between observable variables; concepts will be introduced
which model unobservable mental processes. Second, the study is con-
cerned with building qualitative models which can account for qualita-
tive features of behavior rather than testing quantitative hypotheses.
The investigator feels that there are so many phenomena in creative
problem solving behavior of children that lack even a qualitative ex-
planation, that quantitative modelling in this area is premature at
this time. The third goal is to maintain intimate contact with the
phenomena as the conceptual model is developed. One wants to keep the
theory from "taking off on its own" away from the reality of the real
behavior of children. Rather than determining which established ideas
a child has mastered, one wants to describe the ideas of the child
—
including ideas that lie outside of the realm of 'acceptable' mathe-
matics. Therefore one always starts with detailed transcripts of taped
interviews and one's models are only judged successful inasmuch as they
can be shown to fit these protocols in all their detail. Fourth, one
wants the models, if not to explain, at least to be compatible with
deeper
phenomena of cognitive life—problems of consciousness, awareness, un-
derstanding, readiness, purposiveness, surprise, spontaniety, and
creat-
ivity. At the very least one wants to avoid cognitive
models which seem
6to preclude the existence of these phenomena, and at best one can hope
to add to our appreciation of one or more of them.
Related Clinical Research
In this section clinical studies relevant to story problem solving
are discussed. Emphasis is given to studies whose findings are drawn
upon in the current study. In the final sections of this chapter key
Piagetian and neo-Piagetian concepts are surveyed in order to set the
stage for an attempt in the present study to apply and extend these con-
cepts in the analysis of problem solving protocols.
There has been very little clinical research done in the area of
children’s solutions to mathematical story problems. However, this
study will draw on research from several partially related areas.
Clinical research on elementary concepts of quantity includes the
classic work by Piaget ( 1952a) in which he discusses the development of
the concept of number as a synthesis of the ideas of classification
and seriation. A central experimental finding reported in this work is
that most children below age 6 or 7 do not believe that the number of
objects in a set is conserved when the set is transformed by spreading
or gathering.
In addition to their better known results with conservation and
seriation experiments, it is interesting that the authors were aware
of (but did not emphasize) another issue - namely, the special psychol-
ogical status of small numbers:
. in the case of small sets- two, three or four-
there is already simultaneous perception of the whole
and of the elements. . . Apart from these privileged
7examples, which give rise to what might be called the
intuitive numbers 1 to 5, numbers that still adhere
to the objects numbered and are perceptual rather than
operational, children at the first stage cannot perform
enumeration and addition one as a function of the other.^
Subsequent studies, discussed in Klahr (197*0 have supported the exis-
tence of special or 'intuitive' numbers. The main experimental find-
ing has been that subjects can recognize very quickly the number of dots
printed on a card in a random pattern when the number of dots is less
than U or With more dots than this threshold level, the time taken
to determine the number of dots rises sharply (approximately in propor-
tion to the number of dots). With small numbers of dots, the time taken
to recognize the number of dots is practically the same as that for a
single dot. The interpretation given for these findings is that small
groups of objects seem to have a special perceptual status in that
their number is immediately apprehended without the need for counting.
Clinical studies of solutions to numerical arithmetic problems have
been reviewed by Erlwanger (197*+)- He finds, however, that these studies
are predominantly nomothetic--that is, aimed at general findings apply-
ing to a certain polulation of children—rather than idiographic—that
is, describing the detailed behavior of particular children in particu-
lar situations. It can be argued that the latter type of study has a
greater potential payoff for applications to instruction that is indi-
vidualized to the needs of particular children in particular situations.
Erlwanger reports on clinical interviews that investigate the
conceptions
used by Uth, 5th and 6th grade children in solving written
arithmetic
1Jean Piaget, The Child's Conception of Number (New York:
W.W. Norton
and Co., Inc., 1952a), p. 200.
8problems. He pays particular attention to their beliefs about mathe-
matics as a subject and their beliefs about how one learns mathematics.
The study concerns 6 children in an individualized instruction program
where worksheet pages were prescribed several times weekly for each
student. Its findings are disturbing because it shows that the chil-
dren in the program were overly dependent on rules for manipulating pat-
terns of symbols on paper and suggests that there was very little rela-
tionship between these rules for doing paper-and-pencil mathematics in
school and their intuitive ideas about quantities.
Ginsburg (1972, 1975a) discusses the informal analysis of clinical
interviews as a step toward better means of diagnosing students' dif-
ficulties in arithmetic. Witz and Albert (to appear) discuss several
levels of analysis of a single interview concerning the multiplication
of two rational numbers. They attempt to model the way in which a sud-
den insight on the part of the subject allows him to given an extended,
effective explanation of a mathematical relationship. Skemp (1971)
provides an informal and readable theoretical account of the struc-
ture of mathematical concepts that he believes are accessible to chil-
dren.
Driver (1973) develops a method for mapping intuitive conceptions
that 7th graders use to understand simple physical systems such as two
carts pushed apart from each other by a compressed spring. These 'con-
ception maps' allow Driver to explicitly identify structural changes
that occurred in several subjects during the school term. She discusses
factors in the 'discovery-oriented' classroom that encouraged or pre-
vented the growth of their ideas. Some of the most powerful
conceptions
9possessed by the students were of the form 'an increase in A leads to
an increase (or decrease, as the case may be) in B'
,
for example, 'a
stronger spring leads to faster cart motion.' These are called semi-
quantitative conceptions. They can be linked together into complex
conceptual frameworks by which the student understands a complex physi-
cal system. The conceptions are called semi-quantitative because var-
iables that are size-ordered but not metricized are involved (as in,
'more weight means more friction.') Quantitative conceptions (as in,
'twice the weight means twice the friction') are modeled by assuming
the additional role of a logico-mathematical structure (such as 'linear
proportion'). Thus, Driver documents situations where secondary school
students coordinate mathematical conceptions with intuitive physical
models of real apparatus. She investigates structural change by dia-
gramming students' conceptual frameworks.
In the area of clinical studies of problem solving that concern
other than pure arithmetic problems, Polya (19^8, 195*+, 1962) provides
studies of heuristics which are not clinical studies proper, but which
do provide extensive hypothetical examples of more advanced problem solv-
ing techniques. These include heuristics such as working backwards, gen-
erating related problems and analogies, breaking a problem into sub-
problems, use of recursion, and drawing a figure. Wickelgren (197*0
gives a very reasonable account of these heuristics, written from the
point of view of a researcher in the field of artificial intelligence.
Innovative education approaches dealing with problem solving hern
-
istics have been developed in the context of learning to program com-
puters by Papert ( 1972a, 1972b) and Peelle (197*0. Davis ( 1975a, 1975b)
10
provides an analysis of an extended tutoring session with a 7th grade
algebra student and discusses factors which influence the use or non-use
of problem solving heuristics.
Information processing theories of intelligence have recently
played an increasingly prominent role in cognitive psychology. In this
approach certain kinds of knowledge units are thought of as procedures,
which accept symbolic input data and control responses that vary accord-
ing to the input. The procedure concept serves to move one toward
thinking of knowledge as a process and away from thinking of knowledge
as a collection of static facts. In addition, certain information pro-
cessing models such as Winograd (1972), Arbib (1975), and Minsky (1975)
have provided interpretations for the role of context in recognition
processes. In these interpretations the recognition of an object or
of a word is not equivalent to the simple input of a stimulus. Rather,
higher level processes activated by previous events actively tune the
lower level perceptual processes to be sensitive to likely upcoming
events. As will be seen later on, Piaget's concept of assimilation en-
tails a similar notion.
Newell and Simon (1972) propose a theory of adult human problem
solving based on an information processing approach. This theory
assumes that the problem solver works with conceptions of an initial
state of affairs, a goal state or success condition, a set of possible
intermediate states, and a set of operators or ’moves' which can change
the situation from state to state. Given a knowledge of this state
space and set of operators, the problem solving activity can
be de-
scribed as a search for a chain of operators that takes one
from the
11
initial state to the goal state. This approach has been described for-
mally as an artificial intelligence technique by Nilsson (1971).
Newell and Simon wrote computer programs to simulate the protocol
behavior of university students solving problems in logic proofs, chess,
and arithmetic puzzles called cryptarithmetic
. Their models of thought
processes emphasize a subject’s deliberate, rational decisions made on
the basis of analyses of ends and means.
Their study shares with the present one the characteristic of
"analysis by synthesis" - that is, that protocols are analyzed by
attempting to synthesize a model that can account for the behavior.
However, in their model knowledge takes the form of procedures and
static, symbolic logical expressions which are retrieved from storage
and manipulated.
In contrast, the present study focuses on 3rd and U th grade chil-
dren; a biologically oriented model is used in which knowledge takes
the form of semi-autonomous, activatable, cognitive structures which
can compete and cooperate as they remain active in parallel through time
and which can control and anticipate the effect of the subject's ac-
tions. This approach allows one to model the less rational and more
spontaneous thought processes of younger children.
Paige and Simon (1972) propose an information processing model for
cognition during story problem solving in secondary and college students.
They claim that the model accounts for portions of the students' be-
haviors, but note that it cannot account for behavior such as the use
of diagrams. This model is based on data from students who were
given
a story problem and asked to write an algebraic equation (or set
of
12
equations) for it. Unfortunately, because they limited the students to
this method, they do not discuss other spontaneous processes the stu-
dents may have used.
In summary, there has been very little clinical research on chil-
dren solving mathematical story problems, but clinical research in re-
lated areas suggests that such studies might be very valuable. Re-
search on early number concepts indicates that number is not an innate
idea but that it must be constructed gradually from active experience.
Very small numbers, however, seem to have a special psychological status.
A key study of children’s approaches to written arithmetic problems by
Erlwanger (197^ ) exposes the disturbing extent to which children can
develop elaborate symbol manipulation techniques without grasping an
underlying foundation of intuitive mathematical concepts. But
more work is needed to investigate the nature of intuitive mathematical
understanding. As Ginsburg puts it:
..we begin with these assumptions:
-We know little about children's understanding of
academic mathematics.
-We need to construct a cognitive theory of chil-
dren's mathematical understanding.
-This must be done in an exploratory way.
-Two methods likely to be of use for this kind of
research are naturalistic observation and the
clinical interview. 2
Ginsburg also believes that informal as well as academic conceptions
need to be investigated in the same way.
In this context a detailed clinical study of story problem solving
appears to have potential for making a contribution to research.
A
^Herbert Ginsburg, "The Case of Peter: Introduction and Part
I,
Journal of Children's Mathematical Behavior 2:1 (Winter, 1972
1
:
p. 6U
.
13
major goal in teaching mathematics is to foster competency in practical
applications. In asking a child to apply his knowledge of mathematics
in a practical context, one suspects that the child may need to use
his intuitive knowledge of mathematical relationships more than he
might in standard arithmetic problems. The study of story problem
solutions, then, may give one a better understanding of intuitive know-
ledge structures that are more fundamental than expedient rules for
manipulating written symbols in arithmetic.
Key Piagetian Concepts
The present work will draw on some of Piaget's theoretical con-
structs and extend others to explain sections of problem solving proto-
cols in detail. In this section several key concepts from Piaget's
theory will be reviewed briefly, including the concepts of a biological
model for cognition, patterns in play, cognitive structure, assimilation,
accommodation, disequilibrium, action-oriented knowledge, internalized
action, and the symbolic or semiotic function. Certain neo-Piagetian
concepts from other researchers will also be discussed.
A biological model for cognition . Pi aget was trained as a biol-
ogist, and his theory of cognitive functioning is linked to several
biological concepts. Mental processes are thought by Piaget to obey
the same fundamental laws of organization as other life processes, such
as laws of adaptation and the maintenance of equilibrium: "In short,
at its point of departure, intellectual organization merely extends bio-
logical organization. It does not only consist-as accepted by a reflex-
ology entirely impregnated with empirical associationism-in an ensemble
of responses mechanically determined by external stimuli and in a corre-
lative ensemble of conductions connecting the new stimuli with old re-
sponses. On the contrary, it constitutes a real activity, based upon an
appropriate structure and assimilating to the latter a growing number of
external objects." Two basic complementary topics of study in biology
the. structures and functions of the organism. Correspondingly, Piaget
studies the structures and functions of the mind.
In studying cognitive structures one studies their form - one tries
to describe different 'species' of stable ideas. One aims for the goal
of compiling a general catalogue of the most important kinds of know-
ledge structures that people possess, for example: Piaget's studies of
knowledge structures (schemes) in infants beginning with the grasping
and sucking reflexes and progressing to the general notions of space,
time, objects and causality, studies of knowledge about different phys-
ical phenomena of all kinds at all ages; studies of moral concepts;
etc. There are 'families' (my use of a biological term) of ideas with
different general forms at different ages, and these are catalogued.
In studying mental functioning , on the other hand, the goal is to
construct a theory of how the structures work - how they interact with
the world and with each other and how they grow. In developing a theory
capable of modelling cognitive processes during story problem solving
we will find it necessary to describe both the individual structures
that become involved and the ways in which the structures function to-
gether.
->5 —
Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence rn Children , (New York, W. W.
Norton, 1952), p. ^09-
15
When one says that Piaget's theoretical model is a biological model
one means not only that his training was in biology but also that the
fundamental units of his model are actually given life-like properties.
For example, the concept of assimilation is a biological one referring
to the way that living organisms absorb nutrients from the environment
and put- them to use. The way in which they put them to use is one that
actually transforms the absorbed elements. The cognitive assimilation
concept emphasizes the idea that sensory input is transformed as it is
interpreted by the structures inside the organism. This biological meta-
phor contrasts with a view of naive empiricism according to which items
of information are received and stored away intact. It says that one
only really pays attention to information that resonates with some kind
of knowledge one already has; otherwise, it can go in one ear and out
the other, so to speak. Similarly, with an animal absorbing nutrients,
unless there is a structure (in the form of an organ) within the animal
that can put a nutrient to use and built it into the body in some way,
then that substance will simply pass through the body and not affect it.
Also, biological assimilation is a process that organisms enter into
aggressively during feeding. Cognitive assimilation is at times seen
as an aggressive activity of cognitive structures in the theory— for
example, when an infant's scheme for grasping seeks out new objects to
apply itself to. So one can see how the biological concepts in Piaget's
theory tend to assign life-like properties to cognitive structures.
Patterns in play and the origins of knowledge . Piaget's theory
is in part a product of an interaction between his detailed obseivations
of infants and his knowledge of fundamental concepts in biology. Piaget
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( 1952b) became fascinated with the strong tendency of infants to explore
and play and 'get into' things around them. Yet he found that these in-
teractions with objects were not random in character but were often
simple movements the baby already knew how to do such as sucking and
grasping. He observed that infants would attempt to apply these simple
actions to an object within a certain range of sizes. Certain aspects
of these movements are always the same even for different objects—each
kind of movement constitutes a stable behavior pattern. So a fundamental
question is, what is the source of these consistent patterns in the be-
havior of an infant? Piaget proposed that there must be a stable, in-
ternal, mental structure (or scheme ) which organizes and controls a
movement like grasping or sucking, and which is responsible for the ob-
served pattern in behavior.
Basically Piaget was saying that there are patterns in infant play.
The patterns are simple, but very significant. He accounts for the pat-
terns by postulating the existence of internal cognitive structures.
Piaget also discovered that the infant's activity patterns change grad-
ually over time. They become more elaborate and more skillful and more
varied. So a second question is, what is the source of the changes?
The new patterns are too unfamiliar to be copied from adult actions, so
they must either be innate reflexes that mature and emerge as the in-
fant grows older, or they must be invented by the infant. Piaget's
beautiful observations show that these new patterns appear to evolve
gradually from the modification and combination of old patterns and
that this happens as the child interacts with objects in the environ-
ment. This means that any scheme can be traced back through earliei
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ones to the earliest schemes of grasping and sucking reflexes. Thus
Piaget presents the view that all intelligence evolves from incredibly
simple schemes that are present at birth. Sensory-motor schemes con-
structed during play are seen as building blocks out of which all of
a person’s subsequent knowledge structures are built. This changes
our view of play from that of a random peripheral activity to one of
the "serious business of childhood."
Philosophically then, Piaget's theory takes an intermediate posi-
tion on the nature/nurture issue. On the one hand, nature endows us
with original ideas present at birth in the form of extremely elemen-
i
tary action structures, and the construction of new structures is con-
strained within certain limits by maturational factors. On the other
hand new knowledge structures evolve from old structures only as they
are nurtured during their application to objects in the environment.
Thus both innate and environmental factors play a role, in development.
Structures . For Piaget an individual's knowledge consists of his
available cognitive structures . These are the mental units by which we
organize our experience and by which we control organized actions. In-
stead of starting from the internal symbol as the unit of knowledge,
this model takes internal processes which coordinate actions as its
point of departure. The coherent units of action that we see in the
intelligent functioning of an individual are assumed to be underlain
by stable patterns of activity in the mind called cognitive structures .
Structures then play a central regulatory role in monitoring the flow
of an action in response to continuous feedback concerning its progress.
They can also play a predictive role by anticipating the effects of
18
actions
.
Assimilation
. When a structure focuses the organism on a certain
object or event or situation in the environment and provides an inter-
pretation for that object or event, one says that the structure assim-
ilates that aspect of the environment. We interpret the things around
us by assimilating them to various structures. We comprehend something
outside of us only when a structure inside of us assimilates it. Piaget
uses the infant's act of grasping objects to illustrate the concept of
assimilation—the grasping structure (scheme) assimilates various ob-
jects like a bottle or a rattle or a ball when it is active. Thus for
the child, these objects can be treated as equivalent, as if they be-
longed to a kind of functional category— 'graspable things.' In this
view then, two entities are functionally equivalent when they are assim-
ilated by the same structure. Several kinds of autonomy on the part of
the internal structure are implied: if a first attempt at grasping a
spoon is missed, the structure will 'try again', and after a success
the structure may seek out another object to grasp. A structure ac-
tively seeks to relate to aspects of the environment that provide a
context for its functioning. Thus, we refer to the act of assimilation
rather than to a passive reception of information from the environment.
Accommodation and disequilibrium . In the short run then, we have
a set of stable structures through which we act on and understand the
world around us. But in the long run, our views change; structures
become modified with experience through the process of accommodation
.
Accommodation is the process via which mental structures themselves
change and grow. Accommodation is especially likely during periods
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disequilibrium periods when mental structures are in conflict with
sensory input or with one another. This can occur when something unex-
pected happens to us, or when we realize that two of our own ideas are
incompatible. In these cases, accommodation takes place as mental struc-
tures are modified so that they are no longer in conflict.
One can speak of accommodation occurring at several different
levels according to how lasting and how deep the structural change is.
At the shallowest level one can say that every assimilation is accom-
panied by an accommodation reflecting the way in which the structure
must adapt slightly to specifics of the current situation. One can
speak of minor changes in cognitive structures at a second level and
major structural changes at a third. A minor structural change would
involve a small modification or addition to an existing structure. A
major structure change would involve a significant modification of a
structure, or the combining of existing structures to form a new one.
At a fourth level we find long term changes in the form and global or-
ganization of many structures (such as the development of the object
concept). These global changes are ordinarily simply referred to under
the name of cognitive development.
To return to the first level, any situation that a person is in
will be responded to by certain number of active structures that ac-
count for the person's awareness of the situation. Having one's ex-
pectations violated in a situation, for example, can lead to adjust-
ments in the form of changes in the current profile of structure acti-
vity and changes in the current assimilation relations between them.
One can then say that the profile adapts to changes in the situation.
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Often we refer to this kind of adaptation as reasoning. Rut there are
not always significant lasting changes in the component structures them-
selves. In this study these temporary changes will not be referred to
as accommodation. The term accommodation will be used only for the two
middle levels discussed above. The description of reasoning adaptations
will ^ central topic of discussion in this study. The issue of
whether accommodation in the sense of significant lasting structural
change is involved in these adaptations is beyond the scope of this
study. Thus, the strategy is to first try to understand the adaptivity
of structures which can assimilate and cooperate in a variety of ways
without much structural change. One then hopes that this understand-
ing can eventually be used as a foundation from which to attack the
problem of structural learning.
Action-oriented knowledge . Piaget emphasizes the role of action-
oriented knowledge as the most powerful and fundamental form of know-
ledge. The knowledge of how one can change things is seen as more
powerful and fundamental than the knowledge of how things are. When
one thinks of any type of knowing, one tries to think of it as an in-
ternal activity or process, not as an object-like 'piece of knowledge.'
Piaget takes action-organizing structures rather than symbols as the
fundamental components of knowledge.
With regard to the view of sensory-motor schemes as the most ele-
mentary building blocks of knowledge, the term sensory-motor implies
an integration between motor output and perception. An action is thought
of as a unified whole that involves the coordination of both muscle
movements and perceptual feedback. Thus, the relationship between
in
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ternal structures and the environment is thought of as a proprioceptive
process involving perceptual and motor processes that function simul-
taneously.
Internalized action
. Cognition that takes place without exterior
actions develops only gradually, according to Piaget. In the first year
of life most thought is expressed as action—thinking is_ acting. Grad-
ually action structures begin to be internalized
—
it is no longer al-
ways necessary for a structure to function by interacting directly with
the environment. Instead, a structure can function without the pres-
ence of the external situation it would ordinarily assimilate. Thus,
the emphasis on thought as action is maintained while accounting for a
gradual transition from sensory-motor to more mature stages of thought.
The symbolic or semiotic function . The symbolic function emerges
only in later infancy after prerequisite action structures have been de-
veloped. Piaget (1969) discusses five types of symbolic functioning in
the order of their appearance developmentally : deferred imitation, sym-
bolic or pretend play, drawing, mental imagery, and verbal evocation.
Thus a great deal of symbolic activity based on sensory motor intelli-
gence goes on before and during the emergence of evocative language.
These forms all share the property that an idea is evoked (a structure
is activated) by something that replaces or 'stands for' the real ob-
ject or situation that the idea (structure) ordinarily responds to. Too
often we restrict ourselves to thinking of symbols as static objects.
but the Piaget emphasizes the fact that actions are the first symbols.
A final point emphasized by Piaget is the fact that children don't just
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acquire the use of symbols from adults, they spend a large amount of
time constructing private symbols of their own.
Neo-Piagetian Research
Witz and Easley ( 197 5 ) provide an overview of their recent program
of research on children's thought processes. Their work is character-
ized by its concern with:
1. detailed micro-analysis of children's ideas from tape re-
corded interviews;
2. diagramming techniques for clearly representing cognitive
structure complexes;
3. extensions of Piaget's basic theoretical constructs includ-
ing a generalized notion of cognitive structure, dynamic (time
varying) properties of various types of structures, and con-
ceptions of the semi-autonomous activity of structures oper-
ating in parallel;
U. development of a methodology for structural analysis to
insure that:
a. theories of cognitive functioning are held account-
able to protocol data;
b. the theorist is encouraged in the difficult process
of going beyond his or her own preconceptions.
Easley and Witz have reacted vigorously against the tendency to
interpret children's thinking in terms of established concepts. In-
stead, they encourage an "anything is possible" attitude when trying
to discern the nature of a child's (or adult's) ideas. They are less
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interested in the question, "What adult concepts or concepts from the
school curriculum does this child understand?", and more interested in
the question, "What intuitive conceptions of his own has this child con-
structed in his interactions with the environment?" They assume that
the child may have conceptions that are completely foreign to the adult
experience.
Microanalysis
. Whereas Piaget has been concerned primarily with
identifying broad categories of structures and forms of reasoning in the
child, Easley and Witz have in addition been concerned with the identi-
fication of specific knowledge structures that children use in partic-
ular situations. Thus when Piaget studies children working with a par-
ticular piece of apparatus, say, a pendulum, he will work toward describ-
ing gross (major) stages in the structures of different children at dif-
ferent ages. A different approach can be taken by doing deeper analyses
on fewer subjects - paying more attention to the detailed sequence of
behavior in each protocol and trying to formulate a detailed theory of
the way a particular child's structures unfold, come into play and inter-
act during the interview. We might take the study of the great families
of living things and their branching evolution as a metaphor for the de-
velopmental perspective of Piaget, whereas the microanalysis perspective
of Witz and Easley is more like the study of the behaviors of specific
species within an ecosystem. The present study was done from the per-
spective of microanalysis.
Microanalysis techniques are used in several studies (Witz, 1973,
Knifong, 1971; Witz and Goodwin, 1971) in which the child plays with a
simple hook balance, a beam with evenly spaced hooks on it that
can tip
2h
from one side or the other depending on the configuration of washers
placed on the hooks. These studies concern and 5 year olds, and
one of their main features is the extent to which they expose the pro-
found differences between a child's view of a piece of apparatus and an
adult's view. For example, some children do not know that placing a
washer oh one side of an empty balance beam will make that side go down.
Some will actually say that it will go up. Relatively few children at
this age will display a knowledge of the way one can put washers symme-
trically on the beam to make it balance.
Elementary, action-oriented knowledge structures . One of the most
intriguing findings of these studies is that distinct patterns can be
identified in the ways the four-year-old children play with the balance.
These patterns show that although they do not have adult conceptions of
the balance, children at this age do have ideas of their own about the
apparatus. An example of one conception a child might have of the
balance could be summarized verbally by the statement: "When you hang
washers anywhere on the beam while holding it, and especially if you
hang the washers near the end of the hooks, then if you let go, they
will crash and fall off!" Of course, the child is incapable of making
such a complex statement, but as an approximate description of his ideas,
it reflects something this child does many times with the balance in
the course of an interview. The orientation of the child to the balance
as something one can act on and use to make something interesting happen
is apparent. The same child, in a different frame of mind might display
a second view of the balance: "With or without weights on the hooks,
if you touch the end of the beam slightly, it will bob up and
down for
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awhile and then stop." These appear to be extremely simple notions,
but the point is that they describe ideas in the child that account for
actual patterns of consistently repeated behavior. And despite their
simplicity, they do represent a basic form of understanding of the
balance that allows the child to predict and anticipate the results of
pertain actions on it. They embody a primitive form of if-then relation-
ship, and involve relations between schemes that resemble the 'and'
and 'or* conjunctions of logic.
We now summarize some specific findings from the 3 works concern-
ing the balance interviews cited earlier:
1. Patterns in the behavior of 3-5 year olds using the hook-
balance were identified. These often took the form of an
action (like putting weights on one side of the beam) accom-
panied by anticipatory comment ("It will crash."), followed
by a reaction to the effect ("I told you so.").
2. These patterns were taken to indicate the presence of cogni-
tive structures in the child called activity elements. These
structures constitute the child's knowledge of the balance
—
knowledge of the form: "If I do action A, then effect B will
probably occur." (Structures of this kind are called 'activity
elements' and can be diagrammed as relational representations,
using the notation [A—CB ] •
)
3. This is an important step forward because this research iden-
tified the specific form of a type of natural knowledge struc-
ture available to young children. The "Do A then Expect B
structure is a simple but powerful form of knowledge that pre^
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edes the advent of concrete operations described by Piaget
as occurring at ages 6-8.
b. However, as knowledge structures, activity elements retain
the Piagetian emphasis on action-based knowledge, since they
represent knowledge about the effects of specific actions.
Their form is therefore closer to a [Chosen Action -*• Expected
Stimulus] association than a [Stimulus +• Determined Response]
association
.
5. An activity element [A
—
C B ] represents a form of knowledge
that can account for intentional, goal -oriented behavior. If
B becomes a desired effect, then A is a means of achieving the
effect.
6. Systems of schemes which tend to become active together were
identified in children by Knifong (1971 ) and Witz (1973). These
groups of schemes form a species of cognitive structure called
a framework . A significant characteristic of frameworks is
their ability to dominate the child's thinking over a period
of time. During these periods activity stems from, to put it
informally, "one way of thinking about the apparatus." Ques-
tions from the interviewer are also assimilated by (interpreted
in terms of) the currently dominant framework. Shifts from
one framework ( point-of-view ) to another are also identified
over longer periods of time.
The fact that these kinds of organized knowledge structures were
identified in the ^ year olds studied, even though they are very ele-
mentary structures, is important in itself. For some of Piaget's most
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influential findings have come from experiments which show striking
gains in knowledge of children as they reach the age of 6 to 8 years
the emergence of concrete operational structures that account for data
in the conservation experiments. These findings unfortunately are ex-
pressed most dramatically as proof that there are some extremely basic
things that children don * t know before 5 or 6 years of age, such as the
conservation of number and continuous quantity, etc. Unfortunately this
can leave one with the impression that the younger children know very
little and therefore that there are few knowledge structures worth study-
ing at this age.
This is what Seymour Papert (1972) calls standing Piaget on his
head, that is, interpreting the conservation tests as showing how
much there is that young children do not know, when in reality they of
course also show the incredible intellectual leaps that children take
on their own during the course of cognitive development. But research
such as the balance beam interviews succeeds in revealing kinds of know-
ledge that younger children do have, not just the adult ideas that they
lack. Thus it appears that the 3-5 year old child is certainly not
a "blank slate", but the conceptions of children at this age can be so
different from adult conceptions, that it makes the identification of
natural conceptions an exciting and serious challenge.
Informal vs. formal knowledge . This challenge also applies to
the study of mathematical conceptions in older children. Ginsburg (1975)
reviews research indicating that children possess two systems of informal
mathematical knowledge before they enter school, a natural mathematics
system, and a system of counting and related procedures. This work
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supports the notion that children are far from being "blank slates"
mathematically when they enter school. From a Piagetian perspective,
since these pre-school conceptions are what the child will assimilate
school mathematics to, that is, since the child will try to make sense
of school mathematics in terms of these conceptions, it becomes all-
important to identify what they are as a guide to pedagogy. The current
study deals with somewhat older children in the 3rd and Uth grades. But
it seems unreasonable to assume that the natural processes of knowledge
construction that produced the two informal systems mentioned above
would cease to operate as soon as the child enters school. On the con-
trary, it is quite possible that students continue to develop mathema-
tical conceptions of their own either independently or in conjunction
with ideas learned in school. So it will be the task of the current
study to remain as open to new ideas as possible in analyzing the pro-
tocols. One should remain open to the possibility that a student's
mathematical ideas may not conform to adult concepts or concepts pre-
sented in the curriculum. To enable the reader to participate in this
process, unedited transcripts will always be included. In this way
the reader can attempt to develop alternative interpretations of his
own to account for the protocol data.
Structure activity and parallel processing . Another ongoing research
project described in Witz and Easley (1975) is the A— 1 project. This
project is also an attempt to analyze patterns in play - in this case
using video tapes of a single 8 month old boy playing with various kinds
of objects. Part of the challenge of this project derives from the fact
that at this pre-conceptual , pre-language stage the child's world
is
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so completely different from the adult's that one is virtually attempt-
ing to model the thinking of an alien being. The researchers model in
excruciating detail the complexes of interconnected sensory-motor schemes
that are responsible for his simplest play behavior such as reaching out
and grasping a rattle, or getting an object to put in his mouth. This
modelling is done at a precise enough mathematical level to specify the
simulation on a computer of behavior determined by scheme activity. Thus
the play behavior of this 8 month old child is currently being simulated
on the PLATO IV computer system at the University of Illinois. A major
aim of the project is to model the way sensory-motor schemes interact
in detail for a particular child and to do this in a way that allows
for the inherent spontaniety in the play. Phenomena to be accounted
for observed on the tapes include
: patterns of repeated actions,
attention shifts, resumption of a specific activity after an interrup-
tion, organization of action sequences such as dropping an object be-
fore trying to pick up another one, anticipations such as the effort
that will be required to pick up a heavy object, and memory of the posi-
tion of recently fixated objects in the room. A distinctive character-
istic of the A-l model is that various structures function in parallel
in a relatively autonomous manner, as opposed to being part of a strict
hierarchical control structure. Thus there is a distributed locus of
control in the system.
The model of cognitive functioning used in A-l consists of several
levels of perceptual and action-governing schemes. A scheme at the
lowest level might control the act of grasping a small object - involv-
ing the simultaneous coordination of a motor action and the necessary
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kinesthetic, tactile, and visual feedback. A higher level structure
would control the coordinated act of locating an object, reaching for
it, grasping it, and bringing it to the mouth for sucking. This higher
level structure does not exist in the newborn infant and must be con-
structed over many months of gradual development. Lower level struc-
tures can act as the substructures of a higher level structure. The
higher level structure is then responsible for the organization of the
actions of its substructures in time - the actions can either be se-
quenced or coordinated simultaneously as required.
A major conceptual innovation in this model is the notion of the
activity of a cognitive structure. Structures are said to be active
over a period of time when they enter into controlling the behavior of
the organism or orient to a stimulus in the environment. Only a small
percentage of existing structures will be active at any given time.
Thus one has a stable collection of dynamic structures that exist con-
tinuously in the child in a dormant state as 'potential-action processes.'
Under certain conditions some subset of these is activated, and once
activated each structure has a built in property causing it to remain
active for a certain period of time on the order of seconds or minutes,
depending on the type of structure. Once activated, a structure's ac-
tivity will remain high for this period and then die out, unless it
is reactivated. This characteristic produces some of the same proper-
ties that a central short term memory area does in other theories. In-
stead of referring to 'the data currently in STM,' one refers to 'the
set of structures that are currently active.' Also, in combination
with the assimilation concept, the concept of an active state for
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structures provides a theoretical explanation for the fact that stimuli
are context dependent
,
since a new stimulus tends to be assimilated by
structures that have been recently activated by contextual stimuli.
This theory implies that perception depends not only on the new exter-
nal stimulus, but also on the set of structures that are currently ac-
tive internally.
The simultaneous activity of different structures is necessary
partly to account for the simultaneous coordination of motor actions,
such as moving a held object and tracking it visually at the same time.
But parallel activity allows one to begin to model another effect as
well - the ability to be aware in some sense of a number of aspects or
objects in the environment at the same time and to 'keep track' of them.
This means, for example, that if there is a change in the position of
an object that is not being focused on currently, but that is in the
visual field, then the computer simultation of the child may respond
by looking at the moving object even though it currently engaged in some
other activity. Thus there is a 'sea' of ongoing internal activity in
the child that interacts with a 'sea' of influences in the environment.
Structures in A-l interact by influencing each other continuously
along a multitude of established links. In this context 'influence'
means that one structure, when active, may excite or inhibit the ac-
tivity of another structure to which it is linked. For example, a
higher level structure will excite two of its lower level substructures
with the correct (perhaps overlapping) timing in order to produce an
effective action. Structures not directly connected to one another
will sometimes both share a common substructure. This means that
po-
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tent ially all of the structures can be linked indirectly in countless
ways. If the activity of one structure excites another structure suf-
ficiently
,
then the second structure will become active. So, activity
can spread from one part of the system to another spontaneously without
being directly controlled by the subject. This provides a mechanism
that one can use to begin to account for spontaneous behavior.
Thus, in A-l there is a distribution of initiative throughout the
vase collection of cognitive structures within the organism, at both
higher and lower levels. This means that structures will often be ac-
tive simultaneously, and makes conflict between active structures pos-
sible, leading to the suppression of activity in many of the structures
that could be active in a given situation. Simultaneous activity makes
possible the cooperative integration of structure activities in time.
These possibilities will be examined later in the context of story
problem solutions.
Later on it will be shown that some of the theoretical conceptions
in the A-l model can be fruitfully adapted to explain mathematical be-
havior in older children. In conclusion, some key concepts from the
A-l model are
:
1. Structures are activated and then stay active for a certain
period of time.
2. Activity of substructures can be integrated by a higher level
structure in sequential or parallel fashion.
3. Different structures can be active simultaneously in
parallel
U. Structures can excite or inhibit activity in other structures
5. Structures, although influenced by other structures,
have a
large degree of autonomy
.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY I
In this chapter
,
a discussion motivating the use of exploratory
clinical interviews for this study will be given
,
followed by a de-
scription of the exploratory clinical method used, the setting, the sub-
jects, and transcript notation.
Studying the Conceptions of the Child
If one subscribes to a "blank slate" model of the learning process,
then one ordinarily subscribes to a view of the educational process as
the attempt to transfer a body of knowledge from the curriculum to the
mind of the student. The present study begins by assuming that Piaget's
constructionist model of learning is a more valid view. This model
states that cognitive development is the product of a 'bootstrapping'
process—that significant new knowledge is constructed from old know-
ledge as the old knowledge is actively applied by the student to new
situations in the world. If the teacher's role is to facilitate this
process of knowledge construction, then it becomes crucial for educators
to know something about the forms of knowledge children have and the
ways in which these forms of knowledge interact with each other in dif-
ferent situations. What a child's forms of knowledge are is always
an open question because the child is assumed to play an active role in
the construction of his or her knowledge, and the outcomes of this pro-
cess are never entirely predictable.
A major goal of the present study is to describe informal knowledge
structures and reasoning processes in children that come into play in
the context of solving quantitative problems. It is interesting to note
that this study would be irrelevant for an educator subscribing to a
blank slate model—there the educator only needs to "know his subject"
i.e. the body of knowledge to be transferred to the students. The stu-
dents' worthwhile knowledge is assumed to be a copy, or partial copy,
of this formal body of knowledge, and therefore no study of alternative
forms of knowledge possessed by the students is required. In the view
presented here one does not assume that the logical exposition of a cer-
tain area of mathematics is identical in form with the knowledge struc-
tures children develop in that area. The child's view may be concrete,
practical, or inconsistent while the view of the discipline is abstract,
logical, and consistent. So it is assumed here that one cannot describe
a child's knowledge of mathematics by simply circumscribing a subset of
standard topics in arithmetic that the child has mastered.
The goal of studying the child's own conceptions also conflicts
with the practice of claiming to measure children's knowledge by using
tests. In using tests one ordinarily tries to determine the presence
or absence of some segment of knowledge that has been previously defined.
In an exploratory clinical interview, on the other hand, one tries to
identify the form of the child's own ideas, whether or not they cor-
respond to pre-defined ideas in a curriculum or anywhere else. In the
constructionist point of view one assumes that certain ideas of the
child may never have been defined before . This view derives from a
recognition of each individual child's creative potential and from an
that children construct ideas ofacceptance of the Piagetian position
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their own. The exploratory clinical interview is then a kind of hunt
both for ideas of the child that are unfamiliar to the investigator as
well as for those that are familiar.
Much of Piaget's work (especially with pre-school aged children) has
served to expose previously unknown forms of self-constructed ideas in
children. But the common emphasis in interpretations of his work has
been centered on conservation tests and other kinds of tests where the
typical cognitive structures identified are now familiar. This emphasis
on testing tends to obscure the exploratory role of the clinical inter-
view in uncovering ideas in children that have not been previously iden-
tified. It also tends to bring one back to the blank-slate assumption
that it is only worthwhile to look for the presence of established aca-
demic ideas or reasoning processes in children.
But this investigator feels that this assumption must be rejected
in order to gain new insights into the nature of intuitive mathematical
conceptions or reasoning processes. In this kind of exploratory study
when one investigates a child's ideas one tries not to make the prior
assumption that they will conform even to the most basic tenets of es-
tablished mathematics or logic. Instead, one starts from what the child
says and does in the interview, and tries to remain completely open in
working toward a description of the child's ideas and reasoning processes.
The word "tries" is used here because in one sense the investigator's
knowledge of mathematics (and his practical approaches to problem solv-
ing) is his own worst enemy in this endeavor. It is all too easy for
the investigator to fall unknowingly into the trap of assuming that
a
child solving a story problem is using some abbreviated or less
polished
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version of an idea or a process that the investigator would use himself.
The problem here is very similar to the anthropologist's problem
of trying to understand a foreign culture. As he studies a culture
that is new to him, he must constantly fight to avoid making biased
observations. He must learn to see social relations in totally differ-
ent ways' from those of his own culture. He must be extremely open as
an observer and gradually try to get into the point of view of those
in the culture he studies. In a radically different culture he will
have to construct radically new concepts for himself in order to appre-
ciate the relationships in that culture. Similarly, in the study of
young children's ideas one must be prepared to construct totally new
concepts in order to be able to see "through the child's eyes."
Although the findings of this study are tied closely to detailed
protocol data, the study was by no means begun in a theoretical vacuum.
Where applicable to phenomena observed on the tapes, the investigator
has drawn on theoretical concepts developed by Piaget and others re-
ferred to in Chapter 1. In some cases these concepts are extended or
refined, and in other cases new concepts are developed to explain the
observed phenomena. In addition, many of the identified phenomena them-
selves are new and require new labels. Thus, new observational con-
cepts are also developed.
The Exploratory Clincial Interview
In order to develop models of children's knowledge structuies and
problem solving processes, exploratory clinical interviews were util-
ized. In these interviews 3rd and ^th grade students were given
a
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story problem to solve and asked to make comments on their means of
solution both during their work and after reaching an answer. The prob-
lems were elementary story problems constructed by the author. In some
cases the problems were read out loud by the student from a card and in
others the interviewer introduced the problem orally in conversation
with the student. The students were told that they could use pencil
and paper or any of the objects in a box of manipulative materials (in-
cluding numerous counting cubes of different sizes, people pieces, cuis-
sinaire rods, 3x5 cards, and assorted scrap materials). No time limits
were set. When the student made an ambiguous comment or a comment of
interest to the investigator, he would often ask the student to explain
it more fully. Each interview was tape recorded using either audio or
video tape. Sections chosen for analysis were then carefully tran-
scribed from the tape. The interviewer took an active role in encourag-
ing students to comment on their work. For example, if a student moved
his lips silently while counting a group of objects, the interviewer
would ask him to speak out loud. The interviews were conducted in a
flexible manner so the interviewer could follow up on interesting ac-
tivities of the students. The interviewer would often ask a student
what he meant by a particular phrase or would ask him to repeat an ex-
planation he had just given. At all times the interviewer tried to
minimize the problem of suggesting his own ideas to the subject, or
having his own interpretation of the problem become transparent in the
questions put forth.
Talking about the ways in which they solved problems was something
that the students were clearly not used to doing.
Correspondingly the
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investigator's role as someone who was interested more in their solu-
tion processes than the correctness of their answers was a role that
the students became accustomed to only gradually. After the Amherst in-
terviews, an effort was made in the Urbana interviews to acclimate the
subjects to the presence of the interviewer in the classroom. A series
of preliminary interviews were held with most of the students in the
classroom centering on informal discussions. In this way the investi-
gator became more "a part of the scene" to the children in the classroom.
Visits to the classroom were made on two or three mornings per week.
Before problems were given to the child, the children were told
that the investigator was interested in "the different ways that kids
do math problems" and were asked to talk as much as possible about
their ways of doing the problems.
Several questions are kept in mind during such a series of inter-
views :
1. What categories and patterns of behavior can be identified?
2. What theoretical cognitive concepts can explain such behavior?
3. What further problems or topics should be pursued with the
child?
The fact that these questions are not answered before a series of in-
terviews begins is a distinguishing characteristic of the exploratory
clinical study. This means that the investigator does not have the
feeling of security provided by the set procedures of rigidly
controlled
experimental research. In trying to follow up on what the children
do,
the investigator must give up a significant measure of control
over the
direction of the investigation. Although larger questions
like "What
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spontaneous reasoning processes do children use," and "What is the na-
ture of intuitive mathematical understanding", serve as a guiding motive
behind this kind of investigation they are so broad as to be initially
untractable. One must ask narrower, more precise theoretical questions
in order to make progress. But given the decision not to limit oneself
to looking for standard academic mathematical concepts in the students,
and given the fact that one is really exploring territory that is largely
uncharted, deciding what are the relevant theoretical questions to ask
about children’s mathematical ideas becomes a real challenge. Thus the
present study did not start with a well-defined question or set of ques-
tions in the form of testable hypotheses. Key questions about the in-
teraction of internal mathematical structures were not defined before-
hand, but arose in response to interesting sections of protocols.
The constraints on the scope of the study arose gradually in re-
sponse to early observations and to the need to find interview topics
where one can begin to get a handle on modelling the phenomena observed.
These considerations led to the following general constraints:
1. The study was limited to problems ordinarily thought of as
involving discrete whole numbers as opposed to continuous
quantities or fractions.
2. 3rd and Uth grade children were preferred for the study for
several reasons: in the experience of the investigator theie
are more children at this age who will attempt to explain
their solution approach verbally than in 1st and 2nd grades;
challenging problems can be given at this age that still focus
on fundamental arithmetic concepts in the child that
are not
1*0
too complex to be analyzed; and children at this age, espec-
ially in 3rd grade, seem to be more spontaneous—they exhibit
more natural, less school—oriented forms of mathematical be-
havior than older children.
It was found that most children were reluctant at first to con-
struct story problems of their own from scratch. However, they seemed
to enjoy and become more involved in problems where they could contri-
bute some of the details such as the names of the characters or types
of objects being counted. Kathy's protocol in Chapter V illustrates
the use of this technique.
1
The open-endedness of the tasks and of the theoretical and observa-
tional concepts developed makes the task of reporting findings more dif-
ficult. Many more problems were given than were analyzed in detail and
more were analyzed than can be reported here. Including initial ex-
ploratory work, approximately hO students from grades 1 to 6 were in-
terviewed in all and approximately 12 hours of video-taped and 38 hours
of audio-taped protocols were collected. Of these, 25 students were in
the 3rd or Uth grade, and 25 hours of protocol were devoted to solving
story problems, the rest being devoted to arithmetic problems. The
main criterion used for selecting interviews for analysis was the pres-
ence of ample data in the protocol - i.e. enough clues in the form of
statements, drawings, or observed actions to begin modelling the thought
processes underlying the behavior. This is especially gratifying when
the behavior is anomalous or unexpected and the analysis sheds
light
on how the behavior came about.
1
This technique appears to have some potential as a method
of introduc-
ing children gradually to constructing word problems of
their own.
The protocol analyses included in this report were then chosen to
carry out two particular puposes of this study— first, to give the
reader a feeling for a "horizontal" range of phenomena to be observed
in the story problem solving behavior of children at this age (discussed
in Chapter III), and second to make a "vertical" cut toward a deeper un-
derstanding of the processes involved in one particular type of problem
solving behavior—where the solution is acted out explicitly using
blocks or drawings (discussed in Chapter V). This last type of solu-
tion was judged to have the most potential for formal analysis leading
to insights about intuitive mathematical understanding. Thus in Chap-
ter III an attempt is made to present protocols that introduce a wide
range of observational and theoretical concepts, and in Chapter V an
attempt is made to extend these concepts and use them together to ex-
plain three particularly transparent protocols at a deeper level.
Analysis of the Protocols
The analysis process takes the form of a repeated cycle of obser-
vation and modelling activity in which the findings are progressively
refined. Once an interview has been taped, the next step is to make a
detailed transcript of the statements and actions made during the in-
terview. With the aid of the transcript, the tape is then replayed
several times as the analyst attempts to identify important events in
the protocol. Note that the analyst is not making profiles. He does
not start from a checklist of pre-defined categories of behavior to
look for. He starts from raw transcripts and tapes and tries to iden-
tify categories of behavior that appear to be important to the children
h2
Some of these categories will be ones the analyst has used before, but
others will be new. The categories used to describe the behavior take
shape in response to viewing the protocols.
As behavior patterns are identified in a protocol, the analyst
begins to think about models of the subject's cognitive processes
that can- explain the behavior. These models may utilize existing
theoretical concepts or, on the other hand, one or more new theor-
etical concepts may have to be developed. After a cognitive process
is proposed to explain a segment of an interview, the tape of that seg-
ment is replayed several times in order to evaluate the plausibility of
the explanation and to see whether it is compatible with all of the
aspects observable on the tape. Often this evaluation process leads to
new observations of detailed behavior that were not made earlier. These
will in turn suggest revisions in the proposed cognitive process model.
So a cycle of analysis activity is built up leading to a body of theories
and observations which become progressively more refined as the analysis
proceeds
.
This kind of bootstrapping cycle is very difficult to reflect
in a final written report. Instead, in this study, observations are
generally reported first, for each protocol, followed by cognitive in-
terpretations. The reader should not be misled, however, into think-
ing that the analysis process itself proceeds in such a straightforward
manner. On the contrary, the analysis is originally an alternating cycle
of detailed observation and theory construction. The observations and
theories then become progressively more refined as the analysis
pro-
ceeds .
The Setting of the Study-
Interviews were conducted with students from an elementary class-
room ( 3rd and 1+th grade combined) in Amherst, Massachusetts from 9/TU
to 11 / 7 *+ and from another elementary classroom (3rd and Uth grade com-
bined) in Urbana, Illinois from 5/75 to 6/76. Protocols of one subject
from Amherst (Roy) are included in this study and all other protocols
are from Urbana students. Many of the children in the Amherst school
came from families associated with the university community, whereas
children in the Urbana school came primarily from working class fam-
ilies. In both locations students were on individualized schedules,
so that subjects could be chosen throughout the morning as they worked
without interrupting a group lesson. Participation was voluntary at
all times. Every effort was made to do the interviews in a relaxed at-
mosphere. Audio taped interviews took place in a semi-enclosed corner
of the classroom, while video taped interviews took place in a separate
room in the same building. The students typically exhibited some in-
terest in the recording equipment at first, but quickly lost interest
in it and appeared to ignore it.
The Students
The chart on p. shows the age, position in curriculum and
teacher’s overall comparison of mathematics performance with class-
mates for each of the students. (The names of the students given are
pseudonyms.) The age and position in curriculum given are as of the
date of the interview. In choosing subjects the only criterion used was
to avoid exceptional students—the goal was simply to have a
group of
The Interview Subject
Anna
4th grade
9 yrs. , 7 mos.
Barry
l*th grade
10 yrs
. ,
b mos
.
David
3rd grade
8 yrs
. ,
U mos
.
Joey
3rd grade
9 yrs . , 2 mos
Boy
3rd grade
8 yrs
. ,
2 mos
.
Kathy
3rd grade
8 yrs
. ,
U mos
kb
Teacher's Comparison
of Mathematical
Performance with Classmates
Position
in
Curriculum
Average
Average
Well above
average
Below average
Slightly above
average
Well above
average
Completed all
work on multi-
plication and
division in Uth
grade text
Completed work
on division in
Uth grade text
through single
digit divisors
such as: 9^9$
No training in
multiplication
or division
Completed one
chapter on mul-
tiplication
,
working in first
part of chapter
on division in
3rd grade text
No training in
multiplication
or division
No training in
multiplication
or division
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subjects that were not very atypical of American students. Students
with an identified learning disability were not interviewed. Also in-
terviews were discontinued with those few students who were unwilling
to talk about their solution at all or who seemed ill at ease during an
interview. This means that the students interviewed tended to be some-
what less shy and somewhat more confident in verbal expression on the
average than their classmates.
Mathematics Programs in the Students' Classrooms
The mathematics program in the Urbana classroom was organized
around a single textbook which has been used fairly widely throughout
the country. The children were given individual assignments in their
assignment books, typically consisting of a certain number of consecu-
tive problem pages to complete in the text. Students worked at their
own pace. The teacher would occasionally help or tutor students indi-
vidually as time permitted. She would also introduce topics or provide
drill for students in small groups who were at approximately the same
place in the text. Word problem pages in each chapter were assigned
and corrected in the same way as pages of arithmetic problems. Pro-
ject problems in the text (such as making a chart of the number of
children in the class with birthdays in each month) were assigned only
occasionally to the more able students. The more innovative chapters
on such topics as number theory and geometry were ordinarily not
assigned.
Overall the mathematics curriculum could be described as a text-
based program, fairly traditional in content, with an innovative arrange-
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ment for individualizing the pace of work for each student and for
providing some individual tutoring and small group work.
The classroom in Amherst had a very similar program to the one
in Urbana, with the following exceptions. In the Amherst classroom
the teacher would assign pages from several different textbooks rather
than a single textbook. Topics in 'innovative' chapters and individ-
ual 'project' problems were assigned slightly more often, and some
number games and puzzles were used by the children.
Each analysis in the study is accompanied by a transcript. Con-
siderable care has been taken to make these accurate as possible. When
a transcript appears in shortened form in the text, a complete version
is included in Appendix II. Names are abbreviated by single letters,
for example, K. for Kathy and I. for interviewer. In all cases the
interviewer is the author. The following abbreviations are also used:
Transcript Notation
Uh huh: Yes
Uh uh
,
or
Un uh:
No
(Puts block on
table)
Parentheses enclose
actions or gestures
Now, we divide. Comma indicates short
pause or break
It would- work.
Then— it's 3.
Hyphen or period indicates
a pause, two hyphens indi-
cate a pause longer than
approximately 2 seconds
It's (6 s. ) not 3. Pauses approximately 6
seconds
Two tangerines* Asterisk indicates shortened
phrase, which appears in full
in transcript in appendix II
Five
.
Gap in line numbers indicates
shortened section of transcript,
which appears in full in appen-
dix II
Can you add them?
You can't add 5- Underline indicates strong
word emphasis by speaker
148
CHAPTER III
INITIAL PROTOCOL ANALYSES
A Range of Solutions
This chapter attempts to describe the range of different kinds
of approaches that 3rd and Uth grade students exhibit in solving story
problems. This is done through the analyses of 6 interviews. Given
the endless variety of creative behavior in children, no such collec-
tion of approaches could hope to be exhaustive. But the interviews
presented here do open up a large territory of phenomena that need to
be explained. The six protocols are labeled as follows:
(1) Anna- "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
(2) Barry- "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
(3) David- "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
(1>) Joey- "8 Cake Packages" Protocol
(5) Hoy- "Sharing Six Candies" Protocol
(6) Roy- "40 Tangerines" Protocol
In these protocols four basic modes of solution behavior will be iden-
tified:
Mode of Solution Behavior
Formulation of an arithmetic
problem in standard oral form
and/or standard written form
An acted out solution
A counting based solution
Protocols
(1) Anna
(2) Barry
(3) David
{k) Joey
(6) RoyAn immediate solution
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In addition, three general phenomena will be identified:
Misapplication of written
arithmetic algorithms
(2) Barry
Problem is ’misread* to
fit the subject's ideas
( 5 ) Roy
Successive shifts of
approach
(2) Barry
(6) Roy
A second purpose of this chapter is to begin assembling a set of
theoretical concepts for describing thought processes that produce the
behaviors observed. In each of the six protocol analyses a list is
made of specific phenomena observed in the protocol. Characteristics
of the child's cognitive processes are then proposed in a second sec-
tion that help explain or account for many of the given phenomena.
Other phenomena are identified but not explained, and are left as ob-
servations for interpretations by others in the future.
Observation and theory . Wherever a phenomenon is listed, a ques-
tion is implied- "How did this occur?" So even the phenomena that are
not explained in this study play an important role in raising implicitly
formulated questions for later theoretical work.
Note that the study is not concerned with making profiles by start-
ing from a checklist of categories of behavior to look for. The anal-
yses start from raw transcripts of taped interviews and attempt to iden-
tify categories of behavior that appear to be important to the
children.
The observational and theoretical concepts should grow in response
to
viewing the protocols.
These six initial analyses are more formal than almost
all of the
clinical research reviewed in Chapter 2, in the following
-’ en ° e - 1. un
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edited transcripts are exhibited with the analyses; and 2. an attempt
is made throughout the analyses to maintain a distinction between ob-
servations and theory. This last constraint provides a real challenge.
Basically it means that one tries to describe what a subject does (ob-
served behaviors) separately from describing models of his or her
thought processes.
Later in Chapter V protocol number 3 (David) will be reanalyzed
and two new protocols will be analyzed, all more formally than is done
in this chapter
. There diagrams will be used to develop models of cog-
nitive structure interactions as they occur in time and to explicitly
tie aspects of the models to protocol observations.
Use of the terms 'knowledge 1 and 'reasoning . ' In the course of
this chapter, certain general theoretical concepts will be used with
the following meanings:
The phrase cognitive process will be used very generally to refer
to any 'train of thought' that may involve the activity of one or more
internal cognitive structures. A student's knowledge is considered to
be the collection of his or her cognitive structures—a cognitive struc-
ture being a stable mode of internal functioning that, when activated,
can interpret aspects of the environment and/or control behavior. The
phrase 'mode of internal functioning' is used to emphasize the fact
that even perceptual structures are thought of as active processes (anal-
ogous to the way in which the eye actively tracks a moving object).
Higher level cognitive structures consist of organized systems of lower
level structures. The word reasoning is used in a general way to
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refer to competitive and cooperative interactions between cognitive
structures that are not fixed, established modes of functioning. As
will be discussed further, this point of view leads to a metaphor for
cognition where the various cognitive structures play a role that is
more like the complex interactions at many levels between species in
an ecosystem, than the predictable, precise functioning of a machine.
52
(l) Anna - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
A Solution Using a Written-Symbol Calculation
This very short protocol provides what might be termed a 'text-
book case' of a direct approach to solving a story problem via a
written—symbol algorithm. Anna works on the following problem, which
describes a group of children who want to share some stones they have
found in a sack.
Anna's profile
: (5/9/75)
Age: 9 years, 7 months
Grade : U
Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance With
Classmates: Average
Position in Curriculum: Completed all work on multi-
plication and division in fourth grade text
.
Transcript
1 A: (Reads aloud) "Jim and his U friends found a
green paper bag about 2 feet away from a rabbit
hole. Inside they found 15 green stones. They
want to share them equally . How many green
stones should each one get?"
3
2 A: b friends - divided by 15 -- (writes U | 15 ) - M 15
15 divided by four (looks up at wall). -12.
(Writes 3) 3, (writes 12) 12, (writes 3) 3
a remainder of 3 -
They should get 3-
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3 I : How do you know they should get 3?
^ A: I have to divide and make 'em in equal groups,
so they should each get 3.
The problem text contains more information than is needed to solve
it, but Anna seems to ignore this extra information without difficulty.
Like most students her age who have worked on this problem, however, she
interprets the text as designating a total of h poj£ple sharing the stones
rather than 5- The investigator intended the problem to designate 5
people sharing 15 stones, but Anna doesn't seem to see it that way!
This demonstrates that a story problem cannot be assumed to be a neutral,
standard stimulus for all subjects. The subject's perception of the
problem will depend on the form of the structures in the subject that
assimilate the problem. Subjects can vary in their interpretation of
a problem. But this does not mean that one must reject this protocol
as unanalyzable . In a clinical interview approach, different inter-
pretations constitute an interesting finding, as opposed to being
treated as an annoying interference with the research design. Anal-
ysis can proceed on the assumption that Anna is solving the problem
involving four people. It is not clear why Anna uses h people, but
one factor may be that Anna is in the habit of always using the printed
numerals as they appear in a story problem in school. Her interpre-
tation is perfectly acceptable in terms of the purpose of the inter-
view, however, and the interviewer makes no mention of this issue as
the interview procedes.
We can make several observations concerning Anna's solution.
Ob. 1 Anna does not refer to the extra information given in the text.
Ob. 2 Anna writes down a division problem in standard written form.
Ob. 3 She refers to the division problem as she writes it down us-
ing a non-standard word order - "U friends - divided by 15."
(This kind of word order inversion between divisor and divi-
dend is observed frequently in grade school children.)
Ob. U She then says: "15 divided by U," expressing an arithmetic
problem in standard oral form .
Ob. 5 Anna makes a written calculation in the form of a standard
written-symbol algorithm .
Ob. 6 She spontaneously relates a number from her calculation to
the story context
,
saying: "They should get 3."
Ob. 7 She gives a short explanation concerning her approach: "I
have to divide and make 'em in equal groups...," in which it
appears that she relates the division calculation to an action
on groups of objects.
Ob. 8 She does not mention the remainder in reporting the solution.
One often sees solutions of this kind with students who are prac-
ticed at solving story problems in school, and who are faced with a
familiar type of problem involving a familiar mathematical relation-
ship. The student formulates an arithmetic problem in standard verbal
form, and may solve the arithmetic problem 'in her head' or use a written
algorithm as Anna does here.
Standard verbal form is defined as the oral or written expression
of an arithmetic problem in a traditional form used in school
(with or
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without the answer). Examples of standard oral form would be: "15 take
away 6 is "24 divided by 6 equals "6 goes into 24 4 times."
„
15
Examples of standard written form are: 15-6=9,-6,24t6=
,
and
9
6»^. These expressions contrast with statements like, "You have 5 and
put 2 more and then you have 7," "How many 6s are in 24," "3 less than
12 is 9," or "What is the difference between 60 and 70?"
Anna’s solution seems very straight-forward, and appears to corre-
spond well with standard mathematics as it is taught in school. How-
ever, it is difficult to gain much insight into the question of describ-
ing the internal process that led Anna to formulate the problem "15
divided by 4" in standard oral form. This is a difficult question to
attack, partly because this process is so automatic in us as adults
that we take it for granted. In subsequent protocols we will see that
the process is not so automatic in many children, and indeed that en-
tirely different types of solutions are given that do not involve formu-
lating an arithmetic problem in standard oral form. We have some clues
from her statement in line 4, "I have to divide and make 'em in equal
groups...," for which these same processes may be responsible. But
Anna provides us with very little interpretable behavior. Thus we are
not able to say much about the crucial question of how she reformulates
the problem as an arithmetic problem.
The investigator has found this problem of a lack of data for deeper
analysis to be typical when students use a standard algorithm, even in
cases where the interviewer tries to question the student more
about
"how he or she knew to divide." Often the answer contributes
little and
56
is a variation of, "Because it would be wrong. You have to divide to
get the right answer." One approach to overcoming this difficulty
will emerge from some of the protocols yet to be discussed.
(2) Barry - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
The Problem of Applying Algorithmic Knowledge
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This protocol provides a view of a student whose proficiency with
arithmetic algorithms is high, but whose Judgment in applying this
knowledge to a practical problem is poor. Barry works on the same
"Sharing 15 Stones" problem.
Barry's profile
: (5/9/75)
Age: 10 years, 4 months
Grade: 4
Teacher's Comparison of Mathemat ical Performance with
Classmates: Average
Position in Curriculum: Completed work on division
in 4th grade text through single digit divisors
such as: 9|W
Transcript
1 B: (Reads) Jim and his 4 friends found a green
paper bag about 2 feet away from a rabbit hole.
Inside they found 15 green stones. They want
to share them equally. How many green stones
should each one get?
2 Four — (says this to himself) they'd have to
have another friend.
3 I : They would?
4 B: Uh huh. (I: Why?) There - there isn't the
equally stones.
5 I: Show me why there isn't, why you think it isn't.
6 B: 15 isn't a equal number.
1
Gaps in the transcript are indicated by asterisks or gaps in
line
numbers. A complete transcript is included in Appendix IT.
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Barry seems to ignore the extra information without difficulty.
Like Anna, however, he interprets the text as designating a total of
h people sharing the stones rather than 5- The interviewer makes no
mention of this issue as the interview proceeds.
Barry's initial comment, "They'd have to have another friend,"
is a tentative indication that he has some insight into the fact that
the 15 stones cannot be divided evenly among U people but that they
could be among 5 people. (This interpretation is reinforced later on
when Barry proves his prediction using a drawing to show how each of
5 people could receive 3 stones each.) But it is unclear what he means
by 15 not being an 'equal number.' When asked about this, instead of
explaining what he means, he seems to shift to another approach, and
suggests that he could multiply to get the answer.
Ik
15
IT
18
19
20
16 B:
(19s. ) Mmm - I could multiply - U times 15-
You can? You think that would solve the problem
for them?
15-
times U equals,
5 times 5 is 20
zero-
carry the 2
k times 1 is 4 (writes 6) 1
un uh -
60
(Lines show
correspondence
between speak-
ing and writing)
What ' s wrong?
Too high a number.
Too high a number? Why? How do you know?
60? (Looks at I. and smiles)
Observations . Why Barry chooses to multiply 15 by U is not clear,
but he executes the algorithm on paper smoothly and easily.
However,
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he doesn't like the answer he gets, saying that it's too high. How he
decides this is also unclear. So up to this point we have the follow-
ing phenomena:
Ob. 1 Barry does not refer to the extra information in the problem.
Ob. 2 There is an initial period where Barry refers to 15 not being
an 'equal number' and suggests that the problem would be
solvable for 5 people rather than l*. Thus he refers spon-
taneously to a related problem.
Ob. 3 There is a shift away from this approach as Barry refers to
Ob. h
the process of multiplying and then proceeds with a paper-
pencil algorithm.
Barry expresses and solves a multiplication algorithm in
standard form.
Ob. 5 Barry evaluates hi s answer and rejects it
Barry proceeds to divide 15 by 5-
2Ob B: I could divide maybe.
21 I: Well, give that a try.
22 B: 15 - divided by k (writes 15^ = ) _3
(Barry writes 3 for the answer, U | 1
5
then rewrites the problem this —> -12
way. ) 3
30 B: And that's the answer.*
31 I: Which is?
32 B: That (points to 3 underneath the 12).
33 I: Where?
3k B: Right here - (points again to the 3 underneath
the 12) the 3.
35 I: OK now, how do you know that's the answer?
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36 B: I always do that in math.
37 I: And what - do you think that
'
I mean, will that solve your
is their problem?
s a good answer?
problem? What
38 B: Get rid of one of their friends (laughs).
39 I: They have a problem - why do
rid of a friend?
they have to get
ho B: Or gain a friend.
Barry returns to his idea about changing the number of friends.
Why he refers to the 3 in the remainder's position as the answer is un-
clear. The interviewer tries to get him to balk about changing the
number of friends so that he can understand his idea, but is unsuc-
cessful. Then Barry says:
52 B: 15 take away 4 (writes) 15
15, lU, 13, 12, 11 (puts U fingers on ^
1. hand as he counts). (Writes 11 )* 11
79
80
81
B:
61
62
70
71
72 B:
B:
What happened?
I goofed - that was 11.*
Hmmm- (speaking to himself) what can I do now -
Well, why don't you read the problem again and
just make sure (3 inaudible words). So far
your answer is what?
Ah, 11. (Rereads the problem text out loud.)
(7s.) (clicks fingers) Got it. (Writes)
15
+Ji
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(corrects the answer to read 19-)*
19? Does that look right?
Uh uh (shakes head).
How come?
6l
82 B: 'Cause 19' s too high of a number.
83 It Well, this is a problem. We can multiply or
divide, or subtract, or add. Or maybe some-
thing else, I don't know. And how do you de-
cide which one to do?*
Qb B: I don't know.
Thus Barry makes a 'grand tour' through each of the four standard
arithmetic operations in the course of his solution attempt. Each time
he appears to be dissatisfied with the answer. When he uses the opera-
tion that would traditionally be used with this problem - division - he
goes through the algorithm accurately, but he seems unable to relate
the work he has done on paper to the problem situation. Instead, he
tries subtracting, and then adding the two numbers 15 and b. He also
makes a second reference to changing the number of people involved.
Thus we have the following additional phenomena:
Ob. 6 Barry attempts to use several different standard arith-
metic operations for the same problem , using written algo-
rithms with two of the numbers from the problem text.
Ob. T These attempts form the pattern of a repeated cycle in
which a method of solution is tried, and the suggested
answer is evaluated (and in this case always rejected).
Ob. 8 References to related problems - involving changing the num-
ber of people involved in the situation - occasionally in-
terrupt the above cycle.
Related arithmetic problems . To investigate the way Barry
reported
the remainder in the division problem as the answer,
the interviewer
In each case his be-
asked him to do three other division problems.
havior was similar. For example, consider the following transcript
Barry - "3 into 31"
1 I: Let's do a, this one - 3 into 31 - can you
do that?
2 B: Uh huh. Where's my pencil - there it is.
3 and 31?
3 I : Uh huh
.
k B: Divide - division?
5 I: Yup.
6 B: (Writes 3 [31
)
3 into 3 is 1. -— 10
3 times 1 - 3[3l\
minus — 3
-3 \
equals * \
minus 3 is zero \
bring down — /^l \
3 - divided by 1 -
doesn't work
3 times 0 - s' /
minus 0
one . ^
7 I: And what's - what's the answer?
8 B: One
9 I: One's the answer, OK.
Now what are these numbers here for (points to
the numbers under 31 ), and what's this number
(points to quotient)?
10 B: Oh, 3 doesn't go into 1 (points to 1 in "01"),
so put the zero there (points to 0 in quotient)
Then multiply uh - that. See, divide. OK?
Once, see, 3 goes into 3 once, right, then mul-
tiply - 3 times one is 3. I could do those all
day.
11 I: And what's the answer?
12 B : One
13 I: Do you get most of them right?
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Ik B: When I first went into 'em I didn't understand
' em.
15 I: How about now?
16 B: I understand 'em pretty well.
17 I: And the answer's one, and the, a - so you don't
have to give anybody this number (points to quo-
tient) or any of these (points to numbers below
31)?
18 B: I have to do it like that (sweeps pen over his
work from top to bottom).
19 I: Do you use those numbers? Which numbers to you
use at the end?
20 B: When I'm done with the problem?
21 I: Yeah.
22 B: That one (points to "1" at the bottom.
)
23 I: And what's — that's called the answer?
2h B: Uh huh.
25 I: OK.
26 B: I can do these all day.
27 I: Easy huh.
GOOJ B: Uh huh.
614
We summarize the phenomenon as follows:
Ob. 9 Barry executes a division algorithm proficiency but reports
the remainder as the answer.
Barry also did this in the same way on other written division problems.
Cognitive interpretations and comments on pedagogy
. At this time
Barry had worked through the greater part of a long chapter of division
problems in his Uth grade textbook in school, including extensive work
on division of this kind with a remainder. In Barry's class mathematics
was individualized so that students moved ahead through work pages in
their text only after completing previous pages 'successfully.' How
is it, then, that he was not aware of the meaning of the numbers in
the remainder and quotient positions of his division calculations? The
only apparent explanation is that Barry did not need to understand these
concepts in order to move through the curriculum. Apparently, Barry's
written work in division, which is quite accurate, constituted the main
2
index of Barry's progress for his teacher.
So we have a clear example here of the way in which knowledge of
an algorithm for manipulating symbols on paper does not necessarily
constitute a useful understanding of the basic mathematical concepts
involved. Barry's proficiency with the standard division algorithm is
impressive, but when it comes to applying this algorithm to a story
problem, a gap in his knowledge is exposed. The term appi ieation gap
will be used for the general phenomenon seen in subjects who display
proficiency in certain arithmetic skills but have difficulty applying
^For an extended discussion of the problem of inadequate in-class eval-
uation procedures, see Erlwanger (1973).
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them.
Each of the written arithmetic algorithms that Barry performs take
the form of an organized pattern of activity. One can begin to model
the cognitive activity responsible for this organized behavior by
saying that Barry possesses a specific cognitive structure for each of
the algorithms identified. In this case they will be called written
symbol algorithm structures. Each cognitive structure is thought of
as the repeatable pattern of mental activity which assimilates a cer-
tain kind of situation and which controls and coordinates an appropriate
motor response. This theoretical concept then allows one to maintain
a distinction between the external response and the internal cognitive
structure. One can use 'long division algorithm response (or pattern)'
to mean the observed pattern of behavior, and one can use 'long division
algorithm structure' to mean the internal cognitive structure in Barry
that organizes the response.
In Barry's case, when he uses the numbers 15 and I in a standard
arithmetic operation, he performs the operation smoothly and easily.
On the tape, it is obvious that he is confident and comfortable while
doing these calculations. One has the sense that these calculations are
separate, self-contained periods of activity - that once they are begun,
he will tend to carry them through without interruption, devoting his
entire attention to them. This may be related to the fact that Barry
displays no evidence of meaningful internal connection between the arith-
metic algorithm structures he uses and his perception of the practical
situation. The appearance of the algorithm responses as such separate
sections of activity on the tape is suggestive of the cognitive iso-
66
—
ation of the algorithm structures from practical concepts. He indi-
cates that he does not have a good sense of the domain of applicability
of each of the 3 inappropriate algorithm structures he uses, for if
that were the case they would have been rejected before he calculated
solutions with them.
This, then, is the sense in which one can begin to interpret the
application gap in Barry’s performance. He calculates, using a divi-
sion algorithm structure proficiently, and he gives some evidence of
a knowledge of the practical meaning of dividing the stones equally,
but somehow the connection between these two kinds of knowledge is
missing.
Summary . The following phenomena have been identified:
1. Ignoring extra information.
2. Spontaneous reference to a related problem.
3. Shifts between comments about related problems and reference
to written symbol algorithms.
U. Generation of solutions to arithmetic problems expressed in
standard written form and their solution via standard written-
symbol algorithms.
5. Evaluation and rejection of answers without giving evidence
of further arithmetic calculations.
6. Attempts to use several different standard algorithms for the
same problem.
7. These attempts, each followed by an evaluation, form the pat-
tern of a repeated cycle.
8. The references to related problems interrupt the cycle inter-
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mittently
.
9. Proficient execution of division algorithms followed by re-
porting the remainder as the answer.
Several of these phenomena suggest that one can describe Barry's
algorithmic structures as cognitively isolated. There is an apparent
lack of connection between a knowledge of the practical constraints
in the problem situation on the one hand and a proficient knowledge
of arithmetic algorithms on the other.
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(3) David - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
An Acted-Out Solution
In solving story problems, students do not always formulate an
arithmetic problem to be solved.
In this protocol one finds an example of a student acting-out as-
pects of the sharing problem situation explicitly in order to arrive at
the solution. David makes no mention of numerical arithmetic statements
in any standard form. With considerable confidence, David solves the
"Sharing 15 Stones" problem using a 'skeleton' drawing with only the
essential aspects of the situation included to represent the distribu-
tion of the group of stones to the children.
The protocol is interesting because it reveals actions that can be
performed at an intuitive level without references to standard arith-
metic calculations. David's solution is precocious in the sense that
he solves a story problem ordinarily thought of as a division problem
even though he has not had multiplication or division in school. If one
can describe the knowledge structures being tapped in protocols like
this one
,
one may be able to identify an intuitive foundation for multipli-
cation and division processes learned later in school.
David demonstrates a very limited but remarkably flexible know-
ledge of simple fractions in the context of dividing the remainder of
3 stones among U people. Although the use of fractions "lies
outside of
the main focus of this study, David's approach in sections B and C of
the protocol hints of an intriguing realm of children's ideas about
frac-
tions waiting to be studied via clinical interview techniques.
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Description of the Protocol
The complete protocol is given beginning on the following page.
In section A of the transcript David reads the problem and immediately
draws a group of 15 circles. We will refer to this group as the 'cen-
tral group." He proceeds to draw U squares which he calls 'sacks' or
cans' to transfer (by drawing) 12 of the circles to the squares from
the central group. He does this in lots of U circles, drawing one in
each square and then crossing off It circles in the central group be-
fore distributing the next U circles.
In section B David distributes the 3 circles that remain. He
proceeds to "cut" 2 of the circles "in half" and distributes a "half
stone" to each square. For the single remaining stone he says, "We'll
put little chunks of that one in each box."
In section C the interviewer probes for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the "little chunks" from the last stone. David is uncertain
about their size but says they could be called a "half of a half of a
half of a stone."
Observations . The following observations were made from the pro-
tocol :
Ob. 1 David acts out the problem situation relatively explicitly.
Had he made a more realistic drawing, or found some real
stones to use, we would say that he was even more explicit.
Conversely, if he had mentioned only numbers and number oper-
ations we would say that he was not explicitly acting out the
situation
.
David's profile :
Age: 8 years, 4 months
Grade
: 3
Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Classmates: Well above average
Position in Curriculum: No training in multiplication
or division
David - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol (11/26/73)
Section A
2
3
b
5
6
David: (Reads) "Jim and his
b friends found a green
paper bag about 2 feet
away from a rabbit hole.
Inside they found 15
green stones.—They want
to share them equally.
How many green stones
should each one get?"
Oh no-
Tough?
7 D: Uh huh.
8 I: How can we start on it?
9
10
11
12
13
lb
D
I:
D:
15 green stones- (draws
15 circles in rows of 3,
and a l6th, recounts them
and crosses out the l6th)
OK, now we wanna divide
it by 4.
What does that mean?
Here's one sack.. little
can (draws a square)
another, another,
another (draws 3 more
squares
)
OK, one for each- 1,2,3
b (draws small circle in
each square
)
OK, are gone (crosses
off U circles in center
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15 group) Now-we- divide U
more- 1, oops, 2, 3, U (draws
small circle in
16 each square )( crosses U
more off in center)
17 Now we divide this, by U
more (adds circle to
18 each square) Everybody's
19 got 3 (crosses off ^ in
center
)
Section B
20 D: And there's 3 more!
(concerned tone)
21 I: What's wrong?
22 D: Cut one in half, put it
in here and here
(draws a circle in two
of the 1+ squares)
23 I: And this is another
half?
2h D: Cut this in half, and,
here, and - here
(draws a circle in the
remaining two squares
)
25 I: Now, what are these you
just put here, are these
whole stones?
26 D: Half- half stones
27 I: Let's blacken those in
so we know they're
28 halves. Are there any
more?
29 D: (Blackens half circles
in the ^ squares;
30 draws vertical lines
through 2 of the 3
circles remaining un-
crossed in center)
31 There's just one more.
32 So we'll put little
chunks of that one in
each box. (Puts a dot
in each square)
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Section C
33 I:
3 1* D:
35 I:
36 D:
37 I:
38 D:
39 I:
1*0 D:
Ul I:
1*2 D:
1*3 I:
1*1* D:
1*5 I:
OK. How big are the
little chunks?
Little - like chunk,
chunk, chunk.
Could you draw that
last stone down at the
bottom- make a big-
great big thing for the
last stone- show me how
you-
1,- 2,3,- 1,2,3,- 1*
chunks— divided (draws
a large circle, divides
it into 1* parts with
vertical lines, puts a
dot in each part
)
What can we call those
chunks?
I don’t know.
A half of a stone?
Uh huh. — Half of
half of- half of a stone
A half of a half of a
stone? What does that
mean?
I don't know. Half of
a half of a half of a
stone
.
Half of a half of a
half of a stone- is that
what they get?
I don't know.
0 o
? •
—.
©0 0
3 o-o-
e
<
0
0 0
. •
-e -GrO-
(J> <b$-
-0-
r
—
o.
• 00
0 •
0
• 0
Is there any way to
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write what you did with
numbers?
46 D: I don't know.
47 I : That was a rough one
,
huh?
48 D: Yeah, I think I needed
bigger cans.
7't
Fig. 1 David's Drawing
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Ob. 2 David constructs a drawing as part of his approach. In this
case it is a ’skeleton’ drawing, with only selected aspects
of the story represented.
Ob. 3 David relates aspects of the story to different parts of his
drawing and to changes he makes in the drawing . He refers to
to the circles in the central group as stones (in line 9) and
to the 4 squares as "sacks" or "little" cans" (line 12). He
relates each sack to a person having some stones in line 18
when he says: "Everybody’s got 3." David refers orally to the
act of moving the stones as he crosses them out in the center
group and redraws the same number in the four squares (lines
22 and 24).
Cognitively we can interpret this behavior as indicating that David
associates manipulations of the drawing with actions relevant to the
story, such as giving a stone to one of the 4 friends. The way in
which the drawing symbolizes the story for David in this way will be
discussed further in a later section.
Ob. 4 In section A David draws a circle in each of the 4 boxes and
then crosses off 4 circles in the center group. This behavior
pattern is repeated 3 times.
Ob. 5 When 3 circles are left in the central group, David
refers to
cutting one in half , and puts a circle in two squares. This
pattern is repeated once more and after both actions crosses
off only 2 circles in the central group.
Ob. 6 With one circle remaining uncrossed, he puts a
dot m each
square, saying, "We’ll put little chunks of that
one in each
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box." Then he crosses off the last circle. David is uncer-
tain when asked the size of the chunks, but says they could be
called a "half of a half of a half of a stone."
Ob. 7 He does not refer to any arithmetic problem in standard oral
form. A possible exception appears in line 10 - "OK, now we
wanna divide it by !+." Arguments will be given later to the
effect that the antecedent of "it" is not a number and that
therefore this is not an expression of an arithmetic problem
in standard oral form.
Ob. 8 In several places David describes actions he is about to per-
form before he manipulates (makes a change in) the drawing .
These include, for example, line 13, "OK, one for each," (draws
small circle in each square), line 32, "So we'll put little
chunks of that one in each box." (puts a dot in each square),
as well as lines 10, 15, 17, 22 and 2U. Later we will inter-
pret this phenomenon as indicating the activity of cognitive
processes corresponding to internalized actions.
Ob. 9 We can characterize the protocol as a whole by saying that
David's approach to the problem has a piecewise adaptive char-
acter. The U squares are assigned one circle, then 2, then 3,
then 3 1/2 and finally 3 1/2 and a "little chunk." He sim-
plifies the problem by solving it in pieces. Each act up to
the last one leaves a new but smaller pile of stones to
be
divided. These actions form a pattern that is repeated 5
times - each time David draws an object in each of the h
squares and then crosses off circles in the central
group.
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Polya (19^8) recommends the heuristic of breaking a problem
up into simpler pieces. So one can say that David's spontan-
eous solution is compatible with this heuristic - his solution
is 'intuitively heuristic.' We can refer to a piecewise adapt-
ation cycle with the following form:
(a) New situation is viewed and a new 'helpful' (adaptive)
action emerges.
(b) The action is performed within the story situation con-
straints .
(c) Steps (a), (b) and (c) are repeated.
Of course, the actions appear to us to be helpful and to
be within the story problem constraints. It remains to be
shown that they have this status for David in terms of his own
cognitive processes.
Cognitive Interpretations :
Acting-out the problem situation with the drawing : During the
interview, David's attention is focused almost entirely on his drawing.
The drawing appears to help him in several ways.
a. It serves as a tallying device . This means that he doesn’t have
to keep track of the number left in the central group, and
after distributing the stones, if he needs to know how many
each received, he only needs to count the stones in a single
box to find the answer. In this way he doesn't need
to remem-
ber quantities 'in his head' during the distribution
sequence.
Thus the drawing can act as a physical, external
memory aid
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for quantities
.
b. The picture may help David to keep in mind aspects of the qual-
itative s ituat ion — in this case the story is concerned with
transferring objects from a source group to some people.
c. We can see how the potential of the picture to help a student
keep in mind aspects of the problem might contribute to the
conceptualization of a solution process if one takes the point
of view that the real problem in this case is not to find a
static answer in the form of a numeral but to find an appro-
priate sequence of effective actions . Presumably, the problem
solving process in this case would include trying out actions
and anticipating their effects. From a Piagetian viewpoint,
when the actions are performed on concrete objects, the prob-
lem solving process should be easier than when one uses com-
pletely internalized actions to find a solution. In the ab-
sence of real objects then, the drawing may provide a measure
of concreteness that is an aid to the conceptualization of
effective actions to solve the problem .
d. David’s drawing also shows one how he has isolated significant
aspects of the problem situation. The drawing does not in-
clude the 'rabbit hole.' The problem situation appears on
paper only as the transfer of circles from a large group to
k small boxes. Thus the drawing serves to make the situation
more concrete in a perceptual sense but also serves to make it
more abstract in the sense of being stripped of inessential
details
.
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e. It is an interesting question as to whether David thinks more
in terms of giving stones to people or in terras of sliding
circles into boxes as he works with the drawing. In other
words, once the drawing has been made, does David temporarily
forget about what it represents while he manipulates its ele-
ments, or does he always have in mind passing out stones to
four friends? This is a question of degree that can probably
not be answered with a strict yes or no. However, in the lat-
ter part of the protocol there are two indications that David
transfers at least some of his attention toward the literal
drawing and away from the original problem scene. One appears
in line where he refers to putting chunks in a 'box' rather
than a can or sack. The other appears when David refers to
'cutting one in half' - an operation which is easy to perform
with circles on paper, but difficult to perform with stones.
The above 5 characteristics are part of the sense in which the
drawing symbolizes the story situation for David. Of course, it is not
symbolic in the sense of being an arbitrarily chosen sign like
'$',
which has a socially agreed upon meaning. Rather, it is an invention
that is personal and also iconographic in that it bears a
perceptual re-
semblance to the symbolized situation. Somehow he trusts that
the answer
he obtains for the drawing would work for the 'real
thing. The inter
pretation given of the symbolic element here is that
David has some
familiar action-oriented structures for doing 'sharing'
and 'cutting
in half' in the real world, and that these
same structures can 'stretch'
to create and assimilate the parts of the
rough drawing just as they
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might assimilate real stones a.nd real friends.
Use of the word 'divide' . The phrase used by David in line 9,
"Now we wanna divide it by four" is interesting because it raises the
possibility that David may be aware of a standard arithmetical division
process that is relevant to the problem. The phrase fits one of the
standard oral forms (standard school-oriented grammatical formats) for
expressing division problems. But if he is aware of such a division
process it is clear that it is not the main one used in his solution,
since he proceeds to deal out "stones" in a very concrete manner without
reference to written arithmetic or oral counting procedures of any kind.
The word 'divide* is used twice again:
Line 13 - "Now we divide four more..."
Line lU - "Now, now we divide this by four more..."
Each time he is about to distribute h more "stones" to the four "people."
These sentences do not fit the standard oral form so well. Also, David
has not shown any knowledge of arithmetical division operations in other
problems where they could be used, and has had no training in multipli-
cation or division in school. One possible explanation for the appear-
ance of the first phrase in line 9 assumes that David has been exposed
to older persons using the verbal canonical form for expression
divi-
sion problems: "Divide a by b to get c," without being exposed
to ex-
planations of division procedures or how to use them. Since
the English
word 'divide' is not only used in an arithmetical context,
but also in
phrases like: "They will divide up the cake among h
people," one can
imagine David thinking about dividing up the stones
among U people and
trying to make it ’sound mathematical’ by approximating
canonical form.
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In making this interpretation, then, we infer that he does not go through
a mental process relating to dividing one number by another number.
Practical actions . If David does not use arithmetic ideas to
solve the problem, then how does he solve it? It seems plausible that
a mental conception of the practical action of sharing a group of ob-
jects is involved in David's mental activity. This would involve the
idea of passing out pieces to people from a central group and making
sure each person receives an equal amount. This cognitive structure
can be viewed as being the internal process responsible for controlling
the observed act of transferring one stone to each person from the cen-
tral group in the drawing. The internal process (and the external ac-
tion) are repeated 3 times in section A of the protocol. The importance
of the sub-idea that each person receives an equal amount is reflected
in David's comment in line 19, "Everybody's got 3." So from the way
that David acts-out the problem we hypothesize that a mental concep-
tion of a practical action is playing a primary role in the solution,
rather than an arithmetic process. This practical action structure
will be modelled in more detail in Chapter V.
Dividing the remainder . David seems very confident in his approach
until he expresses concern at the fact that only 3 stones are left
after having dealt out 12. But he proceeds to attempt to divide them
up as well. He continues in an "act out" mode, talking about cutting
one in half" and saying, "We'll put little chunks of that one in
each
box." Thus he reacts in a strikingly flexible manner when
the 'deal-
ing one to each' process becomes in applicable. How it
occurs to David
to begin cutting the stones is a major question that will be
discussed
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in Chapter 6,
Dividing the last stone seems to push David to the limit of his
understanding of how the repeated cutting of objects generates quan-
tities of "chunks. " He seems to think that the proper chunks to be
given to each person would result from repeatedly cutting the object
in half - but is unsure of how many times this would need to be done.
It should be emphasized that nowhere does David refer to a fraction
as part of a calculation in standard oral form. His use of the word
"half" appears to be closely tied to the action of "cutting in half."
Thus he appears to have a conception of "cutting in half" as a prac-
tical action, but there is no evidence that he conceives of 1/2 as a
number to be used in arithmetic calculations. This leads one to be-
lieve that the conception of "cutting something in half" is an intui-
tive one for David, and one that could serve as a strong starting
point for his work in fractions in school.
Subproblems . Recall that the repeated pattern in David's actions
of adding circles to each square, crossing off circles in the center,
and viewing the result was described as a piecewise adaptation cycle.
One cognitive interpretation of this characteristic is to say that
David appears to focus on a string of subproblems . Dividing h stones
among U people is his first subproblem (and his second, and his third).
Then he divides 2 more stones. His last subproblem is to divide the
one remaining stone among h people. Presumably, David finds it easier
to do this than to solve the original problem more directly.
It is
easy for us as adults to point to well-defined subproblems.
But it re-
mains to be seen in the diagrammed analysis in Chapter V
as to whether
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one can point to specific cognitive processes in David that can be
interpreted as defining subproblems for him.
Summary . David's solution to the "Sharing 15 Stones" problem con-
trasts markedly with Anna's and Barry's. Instead of using an arithmetic
algorithm he acts out the solution relatively explicitly by manipulating
the elements of a drawing. In acting out the solution he performs a
number of practical actions such as sharing and cutting in half. These
indicate that practical action structures are the main cognitive pro-
cesses behind his solution.
We have raised a host of interesting questions with regard to this
protocol. But in order to make further cognitive interpretations we
need better ways of representing cognitive structure interactions than
we have developed to this point. We will attempt to model these inter-
actions for this protocol in Chapter V.
(4) Joey - "8 Cake Packages" Protocol
A Counting-Based Solution
8li
In the protocol on the following page Joey successfully solves a
story problem by means of a counting-based calculation. This story
problem would ordinarily be solved by multiplication. Joey has com-
pleted the introductory chapter on multiplication in his 3rd grade
text. But, interestingly enough, he does not make a multiplication
calculation here. He uses a more intuitive counting-based method.
The interviewer tries to make it as easy as possible for Joey to un-
derstand the initial problem situation. He does this by introducing
the problem in a direct dialogue with the subject.
Observations : Lines 13 and lU indicate the form of Joey's suc-
cessful approach. He counts by 2's while putting up fingers, stop-
ping on 16 as he puts up the eighth finger. Apparently he intention-
ally stops counting by 2's when he has 8 fingers up.
The counting-based calculation Joey uses contrasts with a written
symbol calculation since no written numerals are used. It also con-
trasts with explicitly acted-out solutions since no drawings or mani-
pulatives are used to mimic practical action sequences that will solve
the problem directly. Thus we have:
Ob. 1 Joey performs a counting-based calculation to reach a solu-
tion.
A major feature of this counting-based calculation is the fact
that it actually consists of two coordinated counting sequences. Joey
counts by 2's up to l6, while at the same time counting out 8 fingers.
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Joey's profile :
Age: 9 years, 2 months
Grade
: 3
Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Classmates: Below average
Position in Curriculum: Completed one chapter on mul-
tiplication, working in first part of chapter on di-
vision in 3rd grade text
Joey - "8 Cake Packages" Protocol (5/ 2 /75
)
1 Interviewer: Got some cakes, OK? (Draws)
—
Hostess cakes. Come 2 in a package, right?
(Nods)
Gonna have a party, OK?
(Nods)
6
7
8
9
10
You're going to buy 8 of these packages (writes
numeral 8 on paper).
J: (Raises eyebrows, sits back in chair.)
I: How many cakes are your going to have alto-
gether when you get back?
J: You mean you're going to buy 8 of these?
(Points to drawing)
I: 8 packages.
J: OK, 2 h - (raises hands near chest) 2 (extends left
thumb)
11 I: Say it out loud.
12 J: 2,- (puts up 1 finger, then puts it down). 2,U,
(puts up 2 fingers, then puts them down).
13 2, U, 6, 8, 10 (puts up 5 fingers on l.hand, one
with each number spoken). (Puts l.hand on table)
12-
,
lU-, 16 (puts up 3 fingers on r. hand). (Looks
at each finger as he puts it up.
)
lii You're gonna, a, have l6 cakes altogether.
15 I: Have 16 altogether.
16 J: Uh huh.
IT I: Now how do you know l6, 'cause you go - how do you
get 16 - how do you -
18 J: Count by 2's.
19 I: Count by 2's. OK.
Thus he really performs 2 actions at the same time.
Ob. 2 Joey skips counts by 2 1 s orally to 16.
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Ob. 3 Joey counts out 8_ fingers silently.
Ob. b Joey coordinates these two counting sequences simultaneously
as he generates two parallel series.
Finally, Joey has some difficulty in 'starting up' this coordinated
sequence. He makes several false starts before a successful try at do-
ing the counting sequences together. Thus we have:
Ob. 5 Joey makes several false starts (saying only the first one
or two numbers before restarting) in coordinating the two
counting sequences.
Cognitive Interpretations
What kind of models of internal processes would be needed to ac-
count for this behavior? One can start by positing the existence of
two internal cognitive structures, each of which is responsible for
one of the observed counting sequences. In this case the two internal
counting structures controlling output act in parallel simultaneously
,
staying 'in time' with each other to produce the coordinated behavior.
The false starts indicate the difficulty for the novice in coordinat-
ing two separate counting sequences. They hint at the dynamic
(time-
varying) nature of the underlying cognitive structures responsible
for
these actions. And they indicate that the coordination
of the count-
ing sequences is a non-trivial achievement that needs
to be explained
by some cognitive mechanism. To fill this need it
seems necessary to
think of the two internal structures not as static
objects of knowledge
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but as processes which run through a pattern of activity over a period
of time . In this case the two structures run through their patterns
of activity in parallel, and this accounts for the fact that the ob-
served counting sequences appear together.
Two questions which we are not prepared to answer, but which at
least have been formulated, are the question of how the counting struc-
tures become involved in the first place, and the question of how to model
a detailed internal mechanism for the integration-in-time of two cogni-
tive structures.
We can sketch a model of cognitive processes to account for this
behavior as in Fig. 2, which shows the two cognitive structures, one
for which shows the two cognitive structures, one for each counting se-
quence, which must be synchronized in parallel.
One should not make the mistake of assuming that counting sequences
like these are necessarily associated with solving an arithmetic problem.
The fact that Joey does not refer to an arithmetic problem in standard
oral form opens up the possibility that the counting-based calculation
is not a method for solving a numerical arithmetic problem. The observed
behavior may be Joey’s more direct symbolization of how he might solve
the real problem in a grocery story - by counting out 8 packages of
cakes. In this interpretation, this counting-based-solut i on is seen to
lie midway between an acted-out solution and a solution involvi ng _a_
written symbol algorithm in terms of the explicitness with which the
situation is symbolized.
Collecting the 8 packages is symbolized by putting up 8 fingers.
Seeing and counting up the number of cakes is symbolized
by counting
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2's orally. The acts of verbal counting and raising fingers are much
less explicit as symbols of practical actions than a detailed drawing
in an acted—out solution. Yet they can still be directly associated
internally with the practical actions of taking packages off a shelf in
the store one at a time. Thus we can still perceive the possibility of
a one-to-one correspondence in time between actions of counting and
the vicarious practical actions of getting out the cake packages, where-
as this cannot be the case in the expression of, for example, a multi-
plication problem in standard oral form.
Summary . Joey solves a story problem using a counting-based
approach. This involves the simultaneous coordination of two cognitive
structures operating in time. The approach symbolizes the problem solu-
tion actions more explicitly than an arithmetic calculation expressed
in standard verbal form, but less explicitly than an acted-out solu-
tion.
(5) Hoy - "Sharing Six Candies" Protocol
The Assimilation Concept
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This protocol illustrates the way in which a child’s preconceived
ideas can influence his interpretation of a problem - to the point
where specific aspects of the problem are ignored or 'warped' to con-
form to his ideas.
The problem concerns a boy who is to share some candy with his
two sisters. It asks for an opinion on whether the boy shares them
fairly.
Roy's profile : (ll/21/TM
Age: 8 years, 2 months
Grade : 3
Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Classmates: Slightly below average
Position in Curriculum: No training in multiplication
or division.
1 R: (Reads aloud from card) "Jim got 6 candies from
his mother to - to share with his 2 sisters, Kim
and Marla. At - at school Marla already had some
candies and Kim was very hungry because she had
missed lunch. He gave 1 candy to Kim and 2 to
Marla. Do you think that was fair l
2 R: Yeah.
3 I: You do?
U R ; Uh huh - it was 6 and he gave 2 to Kim and 2 to
Marla and then - k take away 6 is 2 and they
each got 2.
Roy clearly reads from the problem out loud,
"... he gave one
candy to Kim...", only to turn around a few seconds
later and say.
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"...he gave 2 to Kim." Because we hear him read the problem out loud,
we cannot dismiss this contradiction as an accidental reading error.
For some reason he actually seems to have ignored or modified the mean-
ing of the phrase, "he gave 1 candy to Kim." Notice also that he ex-
presses a subtraction problem orally with the numbers appearing in a
non-standard order, "4 take away 6." The reason for this is unclear,
but we assume that his thinking here is closer to an idea we would ex-
press as "6 take away Ij."
The interviewer, surprised by Roy's behavior, probes for a re-
explanation:
5 I: OK - What happened? Jim had - tell me again why
you think it's fair - I didn't get all your reasons.
6 R: Like here's Kim and here is - how do you spell
Marla? (looks back at text for spelling) -
Marla, and here is Jim (writes the 3 names in
a row on paper), and urn -
T Jim had U (writes "U" under "Jim") and he gave
2 to Marla (writes "2" under "Marla") and 2 to
Kim (writes "2" under "Kim") and then U take
away - no - he had 6
8 and he gave 2 to Marla and he had U and he gave
2 to Kim and he'd have 2 back (writes "2" under
"Jim") and
9 then take away (crosses out
and then they each got 2.*
"1" under "Jim")
l6 I: And what makes it fair? Kim Marla J im
IT R: I just told you right here.
2 2
OJ
18 I: Because they each got 2.
19 R: Uh huh.
(A full transcript is given in Appendix II.) After
straightening
out some initial uncertainty about the number Jim
starts with, Roy gives
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us further evidence of the number of candies given to Kim. The inter-
viewer then asks Roy if he would like to check his answer.
20 I: Want to check it? Or are you sure?
21 R: I wanna check it.
22 (Reads problem again silently, then begins to
read aloud. ) "— 1 to Kim and 2 to Marla—"
No way ! (raises voice) He gave 1 to Kim and
2 to Marla.*
Roy is quite surprised by what he reads
,
and we suspect the reason
is that he expected the text to say that Kim had gotten 2. So we see
the interesting phenomenon of a reaction of surprise to a text he has
already read.
Roy now generates quantitative details for this new situation:
29 I: What ' d he do?
30 R: He gave 1_ to Kim and he gave two to Marla and
Marla got 2 more - than kirn, and, oh - how
much did Jim have left (moves lips, whispers
"take away" ) . He took away -
31 he took away 3 so he had 6. He had 3 left.
Marla had 2 and Kim had 1, and 3-3 plus 2
plus 1 is 6.*
Notice Roy’s spontaneous expression of the same situation in
terms of both subtraction and addition-type formats.
In sorting out these new relationships Roy seems to still be ig-
noring certain facts at hand — he dos not mention the fact that Kim
was hungry" and that "Marla already had some candy." It is as if his
overriding concern is to straighten out the discrepancy between his
first conception of the number of candies Jim gave out and what he
understands from the second reading of the problem.
9b
(This completes the protocol excerpts containing the phenomena to be
analyzed here. In the complete transcript included in appendix II Roy
reads the problem a third time and is surprised to discover that "Marla
already had. some candies." He eventually concludes that "you'd never
make it fair.")
Observations summary
. Several phenomena have been identified in
this protocol excerpt:
Ob. 1 The most striking phenomenon is the way in which the subject
apparently modifies or "warps" a feature of the problem and
ignores others.
Ob. 2 The subject shows a reaction of surprise when he rereads the
problem. (line 22)
Ob. 3 The subject spontaneously uses both a subtraction and an addi-
tion-type format to describe & single situation
.
(line 31)
Ob. U Other issues that will not be analyzed further here are:
a. reversals like "k take away 6";
b. the subject's temporary reference (line 7) to
Jim starting with U candies rather than 6 (which
he corrects )
.
Cognitive Interpretations
In this section we will suggest a theoretical explanation for the
'warping' phenomenon in this protocol. The 'warping' can be explained
using Piaget’s concept of assimilation (Piaget, 1952) and Witz & Easley's
concept of an active mental structure (Witz & Easley, to appear), and
in fact this protocol provides a classic example of one of the
more in
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teresting phenomena associated with effects of assimilation.
The major idea to be introduced here is that Roy is not just 're-
ceiving and storing information 1 as he reads the problem, but that he
is using mental structures of his own to interpret, organize, and
assign meaning to the sentences he is reading. This is the most general
meaning of the term assimilation - that aspects of the environment are
always actively interpreted in terms of one's previous knowledge - in
terms of the existing mental structures in the organism.
In this protocol it is apparent that Roy has some previous know-
ledge about what it means to share some objects. He also shows that
he comprehends the idea of separating 6 objects into 3 equal groups
with 2 objects in each group. It seems plausible that this knowledge
could have been involved in interpreting the first sentence of the prob-
lem — even before he read the remaining three sentences. In that case
he would have 'jumped to the conclusion' that each of the three per-
sons will get 2 candies before he finished reading the problem. If
this interpretation is correct, then the fact that he ignored the in-
formation in the rest of the problem text indicates the overriding
strength of his initial idea about what should happen when people are
sharing some objects. One then speaks of Roy's ideas (about sharing
and elementary arithmetic) assimilating the fact that there are 6 can-
dies and 3 people, and anticipating that each person will have two.
In this case these ideas do not assimilate the other facts given in
the problem - such as the fact that "he gave 1 candy to Kim" - even
though they are read out loud.
Thus, when certain mental structures or ideas become active we
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refer to the process by which they come to interpret or respond to
certain aspects of the environment as assimilation. The way in which
Roy ’jumps to a conclusion' here illustrates the active nature of the
assimilation process, as if the internal structures were actively seek-
ing or ’grabbing onto' certain expected features in the problem descrip-
tion just as much as aspects of the problem description are determining
which structures become active. There is also a generative aspect of
this process whereby details are 'filled in' to fit the context of the
active structures - thus the detail of the specific number of candies
each person receives is set at 2 in order to fit the 'sharing equally'
context. The way in which Roy ignores information in the problem il-
lustrates the selective nature of this process whereby the current ac-
tivity of certain ideas can cause a person to focus only on certain
limited aspects of a situation. This can lead to cases where one 'sees
what one expects to see' to a great extent. We therefore have a two-
way interaction between subject and environment - not only aspects in
the environment affecting the set of ideas that become active, but the
set of currently active ideas affecting the aspects which are focussed
on in the environment.
We can also use Piaget's concept of disequilibrium to model the
mental process behind the fact that Roy exhibits a surprised reaction
when he rereads the problem and says, "No wa^! (raises voice) He gave
1 to Kim and 2 to Marla." The reaction of surprise indicates that more
is going on internally than the simple inputting of new information.
We account for the reaction by the presence of a conflict or disequil-
ibrium condition between the ideas Roy has established about the piob-
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lem situation and the ideas he constructs while rereading the problem
carefully. The idea that Jim gave only 1 candy to Kim is incompatible
with his whole view of the situation - it is not just a detail to be
corrected. The reaction of surprise here is taken to be an indicator
of the disequilibrium condition thus set up. The condition is assumed
to set up tensions in Roy which encourage him to modify his ideas until
they are mutually compatible. And indeed, one immediately sees Roy
struggle spontaneously (lines 30 + 31 ) to reconstruct the situation.
In this view the answer to the question: "Why does Roy apparently
ignore the information in the last 3 sentences of the problem text?",
is answered in the following way — the information is ignored because
it doesn't fit with (is not assimilated by) the ideas that become ac-
tive in Roy to interpret the first sentence. The additional informa-
tion is incompatible with Roy's strong idea of equal shares and the way
in which 6 objects can be split evenly into 3 groups - it cannot be
interpreted in terms of these ideas and therefore it is not interpreted
at all - i.e.
,
the information is not assimilated by structures active
in Roy at the time he reads it.
Another concept that helps to account for Roy's behavior here is
the concept of a mental overload . This concept refers to the idea that
there is a limit to the rate at which certain cognitive processes can
proceed. In this case Roy's reading speed may exceed this rate and
therefore accentuate the difficulties Roy has in assimilating relation-
ships described in the problem text to appropriate mental structures.
Summary .
In conclusion, three new phenomena have been identified:
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1. Warping and ignoring of a situation aspect.
2. Reaction of surprise.
3. Use of contiguous subtraction and addition format.
In addition, we have introduced three theoretical concepts:
!• Assimilation— 5 aspects: interpretation, active seeking,
selective attention, generation of detail, and two-way inter-
action.
2* Disequilibrium - as conflict between cognitive structures.
3. Overload - beyond a maximum rate at which cognitive processes
can proceed.
(6) Roy - "Uo Tangerines" Protocol
Autonomy of Cognitive Structure Activity
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This protocol provides an example of a case where the subject
does not seem to apply a single method of solution directly to the prob-
lem. Instead, the problem text seems to set off several competing men-
tal processes within the subject. Some of these processes act in a
creative manner to generate related problems with different numbers.
Although he is able to solve these problems, he never does solve the
original problem. But the comments he generates in the course of his
attempts provide evidence for several significant kinds of cognitive
structure interactions.
Transcript and observations . In the protocol, Roy works on a
problem which includes several items of irrelevant information. Roy
readily ignores the extra information, and in fact, he anticipates the
question that is asked.
1 I: Let’s try this one.
2 R: (Reads) "A truck driver loads Uo tangerines in
5
boxes.
3 Each box holds an equal number of tangerines."
U Oh, I bet I know — (Says this softly to himself)
5 (Continues reading) "Each tangerine - "
6 I: What?
7 R: I bet I know what I’m gonna do, I'm gonna see
how - how much there is in each box.
8 I: Oh, OK.
9 R: (Reads) "Each box holds an equal number of tan-
gerines .
10 Each tangerine weighs - 3 ounces
11 and each box - box measures 6" x 5" by 8".
12 How many tangerines are in each box?"
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13 I knew.
Ik I: You did know, right.
15 R: Uh huh. So 5. boxes, ^0 tangerines - oh boy.
16 It couldn t be (shakes head) equal — pqnni l
numbers because - if it was
^ boxes it'd be 10
in each —
IT and 5 boxes it'd be —
18 it'd have to be, it'd have to be 50.
19 It couldn't — (interrupts)
20 I: There ' d have to be 50 tangerines?
21 R: It's thirty-fi
— (points to "Uo" on page)
thirty — no thirty —
22 wait (interrupts)— how many are in each box
continues to look at text).
23 I: What are you looking at now?
2b R: On this (points to first 2 sentences of written
problem)
25 Uo tangerines in 5 boxes (stretches).
26 ^0 - take away -
27 35 in each box
28 I: 35?
29 R: No (shakes head) it couldn't be 35-
30 I: Why couldn't it be?
31 R: (Asks) 15 in each box? (Looks at I .
)
32 I: How'd you get 15?
33 R: Because uh, I don't know.
3b I: It's OK to guess, I mean, this is a hard prob-
lem for 3rd grade. But I'd be interested in
how you guess.
35 R: I don't know, I just -
36 I: So 15 is a guess? Or do you have some way of
—
37 R: Uh huh.
15 is a guess.
This is the most difficult protocol presented so far to read and
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to analyze
- partly because Roy's comments apparently only hint at the
complex mental activities he is going through, and partly because Roy's
approach to the problem is not the straightforward, logical approach
one would look for from an adult. One needs to attempt to analyze pro-
tocols of this kind, however, if one is to take seriously the goal of
characterizing children '
s
ideas rather than measuring their conformity
to accepted adult ideas.
In lines 15 to 35 , instead of displaying a single direct approach,
Roy seems to shift between several different approaches to the problem.
In one approach he talks about how 40 and 50 Tangerines can be split
into 4 and 5 boxes, respectively. In another he appears to subtract 5
from hO to yield 35, but he retracts this figure as the answer. In a
third approach he arrives at 15 as the answer (how Vie does this is not
clear). He reports this answer to the interviewer as a question -
searching the interviewer's face for a reaction. (This is the only
instance in the protocol where Roy appears to be "fishing" for a reac-
tion from the interviewer. At other times he seems to work quite inde-
pendently and to be absorbed in the problem.) So one has:
Ob. 1 Roy shifts between several approaches in the course of his
solution attempt.
Ob. 2 Roy retracts a proposed solution, saying, "...it couldn't be
35.”
So far, Roy has not given a solution to the problem that he is
satisfied with but has succeeded in solving two related problems in-
volving 40 tangerines in 4 boxes and 50 in 5 boxes. This indicates that
in some sense he understands the basic problem situation and that
he has
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some kind of understanding of multiplicative relationships, at least
for certain sets of numbers. Instead of limiting himself to inferences
about the problem given, he actually generates new situations that he
seems to know more about. However, the transcript carries a sense of
this generation of related problems being more of a spontaneous reaction
reflecting ’what the problem makes him think of' rather than an inten-
tional strategy on his part. An important question for later reference
is: "Where do the related problems come from? What kind of internal
mental process is called into play in the context of solving a problem
which also leads to the generation of new cases?" Thus one has:
Ob. 3 Roy immediately generates two related problems .
Continuing:
38 I: Could you check it? See if it's right?
39 R:
40
OK. 40 tanger — (begins to draw)-
I'm gonna go - there's a - (whispers) box
(draws 5 large boxes).
hi (Drawing boxes ) One, two.
42 I: What's that?
b3 R
:
bb
45
b6
bj
48
49
Those are the boxes - three, four, five.
OK. - and there's 40 tangerines -
one, two (puts 2 dots next to first box) -
oh, wait - (interrupts)
Let's see, if there's -
(Points to each box as if counting)
(Points again to first box and I think I hear
him whisper "50"
. )
50 I: Fifty what?
51 R:
52
53
15 (points to first box) -
32 (points to second box) -
No, it's 30, 15 and 30 -
54 I: 15 and 15 are 30, yes.
55 R: And forty-five (separate words) - (points to
3rd box)
.
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56 Nope, it's too over.
Here Roy demonstrates his ability to check his proposed answer
against the constraints of the problem by using a drawing. This pro-
vides us with more evidence that he understands the constraints of the
problem. Thus he also retracts 15 as a solution. (Notice that he does
not act-out the situation in a completely verbatum manner with his draw-
ing. He doesn t start with 40 and put 15 of them at a time into boxes
[perhaps he begins to do this in lines Uh and ^ 5 ], He performs the re-
verse process as he indicates putting 15 at a time into each box and
counts the number he has used, until the total exceeds i+0. ]
The interviewer’s question about why 15 doesn't work leads to a
burst of activity.
57 I : What happened?
58 R: It's equals 35 plus 15 -
59 35 plus 5 is 40
60 and there 'd - there wouldn't be the equal amount -
61 there'd be like 1, 2, 3, H, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
(puts 10 dots in first box).
62 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (puts 10 dots in
second box )
.
63 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (10 in third box).
6 U Thirty (sweepts pen over 3 boxes).
65 1, 2, 3, k, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (10 dots in fourth
box)
.
66 And then that wouldn't be there, (crosses out row
of 10 dots in fourth box) -
67 there'd only be 1, 2, 3 , 5 , (puts 5 new dots
in fourth box)
68 and 5 tangerines, 1, 2, 3 , ^ , 5 (puts 5 dots in
fifth box) -
69 and 5 tangerines in that one -
70 that makes ^0 -
71 10, 20, 30, U0, 50 (points to each box).
72 I: OK - Fifty?
73 R: 10 , 20 , 30 - 35 , U 0 (points to each box).
10k
Fig. 3 Roy's Drawing #1
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74 It'd be five - if that'd be -
75 It'd be right if it was 4 boxes but - not five.
76 I: What would happen if there were 4?
77 R: Then - if we took away that one (crosses out
fourth box) -
78 10, 20, 20, k0_ (points to boxes 1, 2, 3, 5),
79 and we put 10 (puts 5 more dots in box 5, whis-
pering "1, 2, 3, 4, 5-") - and we put 10 in
that one (points fourth box),
80 and 10, 20, 30, 40_ (points boxes),
81 and 40 in there, that means 4_ boxes.
Why Roy says "35 plus 15" in line 58 instead of 30 plus 15 is not
clear. But he seems to have in mind adding groups of 15 together, one
for each box, and rejects 15 as the answer when the total goes over 40.
As opposed to his brief earlier comments in the protocol, Roy's
statements in lines 61-75 and 77-81 have more of the character of be-
ing full-fledged explanations of one of his conceptions. The state-
ments clearly relate back to his first approach involving 40 tanger-
ines in 4 boxes and 50 in 5 boxes. But here he goes further, showing
how the last group of 10 can be split into 2 groups of 5 to use up 5
boxes. Thus, he generates another pseudo-solution, one that fails to
meet the criterion of having an equal number in each box.
He seems to have some kind of lapse as he finishes this argument
in line 71 by saying, "10, 20, 30, 40, 50," as he points to each box.
After the interviewer's query he corrects this in line 73 to 10, 20,
30 - 35, 40." The pause in line 73 indicates the effort required
on
his part to break up the rhythmic act of counting by 10' s. This sug-
gests calling his error in line 71 a case of overshoot counting, where
a counting sequence is carried too far.
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Notice that his comments in line 6l-Tl are spontaneous and not
solicited by the interviewer. The fact that they are spontaneous is
important because this indicates that we are hearing a more direct ex-
pression of his understanding of the situation as opposed to an attempt
to respond to a question from the interviewer. These are extended
periods of expression - the longest in the interview. They present a
detailed picture of a rather complex idea. Their length parallels a
more intuitive observation from viewing the tape that Roy pours a pro-
portionately large amount of energy into them. There is also a co-
herence, speed, and confidence in his delivery in these sections that
give the explanation its 'drive' - that is, there is a feeling that Roy
is especially not prone to being interrupted here; there is something
he is going to say 'no matter what else happens.' So from these intui-
tive observations and from the detail, length, and complexity of the
passages, we have:
Ob. h Roy gives a spontaneous, 'driven'
,
extended explanation of
one of his approaches.
Next, the interviewer asks Roy about the extra information in the
problem text and then gives him a simplified version of the problem
with smaller numbers.
82 I: Does this help you down here? The other stuff?
(points to sentence in written problem: "Each
tangering weighs 3 ounces and each box measures
6" by 5" by 8".")
83 R: Uh uh. [No]
8U I: Think that's extra: or —
85 R: (inaudible)
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86 I: What if we had a - 15 tangerines instead of Uo?
87 R: - Uh - there 'd be 3 boxes and 5 in each.
88 I: Would that work?
89 R: Uh uh [no] - yeah [yes]
90 I: But what if we really had 15 tangerines and
we had 5 boxes?
91 R: Ya couldn't do that.
92 I: Couldn't split 'em up?
93 R: Ya couldn't split 'em up.
From this section one has:
Ob. 5 Roy states that 15 tangerines can be divided equally into 3
boxes (with 5 in each) but not into 5 boxes.
Thus Roy's statements here are incompatible with the commutative law of
multiplication. This is a rather striking phenomenon.
Roy's statement in line 87, "... there 'd be 3 boxes in 5 in each,"
is given immediately without any visible calculation in response to the
question, "What if we had... 15 tangerines instead of Uo?" This kind of
solution will be referred to as an immediate solution. This is reminis-
cent of Roy's first response of the interview where he gives an immed-
iate solution to a related problem rn line l6, "...if it was boxes
it'd be 10^ in each," (for U0 tangerines). Later, when Roy explains
this situation in lines 95 bo 8l, he draws U squares with 10 dots in
each and says, "...10, 20, 30, U0...". But this explains the quanti-
tative situation by starting from the answer and therefore does not
directly indicate a method he used to derive the answer. So there are
two instances of the following phenomenon:
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Ob. 6 Roy reaches an immediate solution to certain problems without
referring to any visible calculation method such as acting
out, counting, or written symbol manipulation.
Thus there is a fourth category to complete the list of basic
problem solving modes begun earlier. The list now looks like:
(1) Formulates and solves an arithmetic problem in standard oral
form or standard written form.
(2) Displays a counting-based approach.
(3) Displays an explicitly acted-out approach.
(b) Reaches an immediate solution without visible calculation.
Another pattern in the protocol is:
Ob. 7 All of Roy's trial solutions are multiples of 5 .
In connection with this pattern it is interesting to diverge momentarily
to make an informal cognitive interpretation. The immediate solutions
mentioned above occur in situations where Roy seems to think about
equal subsets containing 5 or 10 objects each. His drawing of U en-
closed groups of 10 dots in line 75 to 8l support this interpretation.
If this interpretation is also correct for the case of "3 boxes and 5
in each" then it provides a partial explanation for the apparent fact
that Roy has difficulty thinking about "5 boxes and 3 in each" in the
same way, since in that case, the equal subsets are not multiples of 5.
So it is possible that Roy is able to think in terms of groups of 5 or
10 more readily than with groups of other sizes.
Another phenomenon is the following:
Ob. 8 Roy interrupts himself in several places. Two of these cor-
respond with a shift in approach.
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Interruptions are observed when a) verbal or other activity stops sud-
denly without an ordinary completion, b) this may be accompanied by an
exclamation like "wait!" or "hold it!" or "no c) and it may be accom-
panied by frowning or a simultaneous body shift. Observed interruptions
are marked in lines 19, 22, and U6. The interruptions in lines 19 and
22 coincide with a shift in approach.
Shifts and re-emergence
. Recall that Roy seems to shift between
several approaches to the first problem. We can keep track of these in
the following chart
:
Approach Lines
A) 16-19) "If.
.
. U boxes it '
d
be 10 in each"
B) 21) "It's 35"
?) 22) ". . .wait"
B) 26-28) "I4 O take away - 35 in each"
1 29) "No it couldn't be 35"
c) 31-37) "15 in each box"
D) 38-60 ( Checks 15 at I . '
s
suggestion
.
)
A) 6l-8l) "10, 20, 30, U0"
This chart constitutes an informal classification of Roy's behavior.
It identifies sections (labeled with the same letter) that are appar-
ently similar with respect to the content of Roy's statements and draw-
ings. For example, sections in lines 16-19 and 6l-8l share the central
characteristic that Roy draws or speaks of boxes with 10 in each box,
in contrast to other sections. Question marks indicate sections where
there is an apparent shift in approach but too little data to allow
classification of the approach.
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In the absence of more detailed statements and actions on Roy's
part, this kind of classification is a speculative procedure. But it
is a procedure that gives one a behavior pattern to work from, and
there is always the possibility that one may be able to improve on the
analysis in view of subsequent data.
In conjunction with the phenomenon of shifts between approaches, one
can speak of the re-emergence of an approach when it reappears in the sub-
ject's behavior after being absent for awhile. The explanation in lines
6l to 8l is a particularly striking example of the re-emergence of an
approach because of the long intervening period between sections follow-
ing the "A" approach, and because of its spontaneous character. Notice
the length and complexity of the preceding section (lines 38-60 ) where
Roy is checking the answer via multiple addition. As he finishes explain-
ing why 15 won't work (lines 58- 60 ) he launches spontaneously into an
explanation where the earlier approach involving *40 tangerines in *4
boxes and 50 in 5 re-emerges and is extended. He does this on his own,
without a question from the interviewer about his earlier ideas. This
spontaneous explanation is rather long and complex, leading to the fol-
lowing phenomenon and the following question for future reference:
Ob. 9 There is a spontaneous re-emergence of an approach observed
at an earlier point in the protocol.
•^Alternatively, one might say that Roy's approach in lines 6l-8l should
be labeled (A+D) because it involves elements of his approach in (D) -
namely the imagined action of counting and placing equal groups in drawn
boxes in order to evaluate a tentative numerical answer. This observa-
tion would have the advantage of recognizing the way in which aspects
of behavior can overlap in various combinations. In that case one would
talk about "aspect A" re-emerging. The case of overshoot counting by
10' s in line 71 also supports the presence of aspect A.
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In the absence of a question from the interviewer, why does
this approach re-emerge?"
Cognitive Interpretations :
Successive Dominance and Competition
. The analysis will now move
from a consideration of patterns observed in the protocol data - the
phenomena - to a discussion of internal processes that can account for
these phenomena. One starts from the finding that Roy immediately dis-
plays several different approaches while working on the problem. This
suggests that there is a different thought process going on in Roy asso-
ciated with each approach. In addition, the fact that Roy shifts quickly
between these approaches, the presence of spontaneous interruptions at
some of the shift points, and the re-emergence of an approach suggests
that each of the thought processes behind the approaches 'decides on
its own' when to become involved in Roy's thinking. That is, one can
imagine each process as an entity with a certain degree of autonomy -
allowing it to compete with the other processes and even to interrupt
them.
To account for Roy's various approaches then, one posits the exis-
tence of several distinct, semi-autonomous, cognitive structures, each
of which 'take a turn' at dominating Roy's thinking. This accounts for
the presence of several approaches. This means that more than one cog-
nitive structure is capable of assimilating the same problem situation.
A structure need not be called into play explicitly by some other higher
level structure. It may 'respond on its own' to the current perceptual
situation and attempt to assimilate all aspects of the situation, there-
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by dominating the mainstream of cognitive activity for a time.
1
* This
opens up the possibility of producing sudden shifts and interruptions,
because one is without the strict control of a higher-order executive
structure to sequence the activity of various lower-order structures.
Thus a kind of competition for dominance (control) takes place between
structures, a new one 'taking over' when the currently dominant struc-
ture 'retreats' for some reason (such as a conflict with other con-
straints of the problem).
In other words, the observed periods of stable output within one
approach followed by a spontaneous shift to a new approach can be ex-
plained as the result of two opposing internal forces. First, the cur-
rently dominant structure tends to try to interpret the entire problem
situation from one point of view. Thus a structure can 'take over' for
awhile and support a period of stable behavior. But second, there is
a divergent spreading of structure activity. This can trigger the in-
volvement of new structures which may eventually 'take over' . So there
can be a stabilizing tendency and a divergent tendency in the cognitive
structure interactions going on at the same time.
Explaining the divergent generation of related cases . The theoret-
ical notion that cognitive structures act with a certain degree of
^In the absence of sufficient data to analyze each approach in detail
we cannot specify whether the cognitive process associated with each
of Roy's approaches should be thought of as a single structure or as
several cooperating structures. Here we simply use the word 'struc-
ture" in the singular for convenience. In the case where one models
the cognitive process behind an approach as consisting of several coop-
erating structures, one accounts for observed shifts by changes in the
profile of currently active structures, leaving open the possibility
of observed approaches that share some characteristics but not others.
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autonomy can also play an important role in explaining the phenomenon
of the divergent generation of related cases. Recall that Roy gener-
ates related cases in referring to the following sets of quantities:
a) 1+0 tangerines + 1+ boxes, 10 in each
b) 5 boxes, 10 in each -» 50 tangerines
c) 1+0 tangerines, 5 boxes -+ 3 boxes, with 10 in each, and 2 boxes,
with 5 in each
d) 15 tangerines -* 3 boxes, 5 in each
In each of these cases, Roy generates a new configuration of boxes
of tangerines. In a) and d) he begins from a single quantity - the
total number of tangerines. Thus in these 2 cases Roy does not appear
to converge on a determined answer in the way one does in carrying out
a standard arithmetic algorithm. In that case, one starts with two num-
bers and determines a third, so one can make several points:
0b. 10 In cases a) and d) above Roy begins with a single number in
the context of a story and generates other quantities that
will fit some of the aspects of the situation;
Ob. 11 In none of these cases does Roy refer to an arithmetic oper-
ation in standard oral form.
Ob. 12 Furthermore, certain appropriate combinations are not gener-
ated, such as: e) 1+0 tangerines, 5 boxes 4 8 in each box -
or f) 15 tangerines -* 5 boxes, 3 in each box.
Any cognitive mechanisms one proposes to account for Roy's be-
havior should account for the above characteristics.
The generative aspect of Piaget's motion of assimilation is rele-
vant here. Consider another generative phenomenon - that of symbolic
llU
£la£- A 3 year-old playing with blocks may 'exercise' a cognitive
structure concerned with the idea of 'giving gifts' for example, by
assimilating arbitrary objects to the structure. Thus two large toy
blocks may serve to represent a brother and sister and a small block
may represent the gift given to the brother by the sister. In this
case the child generates for himself the imaginary details of the gift-
giving situation such as the decoration of the gift and the comments
made by the imaginary brother and sister. The details are generated
as the structure concerning gift-giving becomes active and assimilates
the bare blocks. This structure will presumably involve substructures
that deal with the giver, the gift, the person given to, and perhaps
associated auxilliary behaviors (like saying "thank you"). Thus part
of the assimilation process in the case of symbolic play is the imag-
inary generation of appropriate context details via substructure ac-
tivity.
A key feature of Piaget's concepts of assimilation and structure
is that they are used to explain both recognition performance behavior
and generative behavior. Thus the same cognitive structure and the same
basic assimilation process could account for the subject's behavior in
recognizing a gift-giving situation, for participating in one, and gen-
erating an imaginary one. In each case an act of assimilation is in-
volved on the part of the structure. Even in recognition and perfor-
mance, a creative, generative, mental act is involved. This point of
view might be summarized in general by the statement: One understands
(recognizes, performs in, imagines) a given situation via structures
which generate actions (including perceptual orientations) appropriate
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to it. This statement suggests that we take generation as a central
property of cognitive structures, not as a separate process.
In situations where Roy generates a related case like:
UO tangerines -* h boxes, 10 in each
we can say that the number Uo is assimilated to a structure that inter-
prets 1*0 tangerines as U groups of 10, thereby generating additional
detail and injecting it into the conceptualized situation. Piaget's
fundamental concepts of assimilation and structure, then, provide us
with the possibility of accounting for generative phenomena such as
the generation of related cases.
Using the assimilation and structure concepts to explain the gen-
eration of related cases is reminiscent of the explanation of the 'warp-
ing' phenomenon given in the previous protocol (Roy - "Sharing 6 Candies").
There we assumed that some structure was taking an active role in assert-
ing an equal distribution of candy even though the problem text stated
otherwise. In the present protocol we assume that a structure takes an
active role in generating the related case - ^0 tangerines -* h boxes,
10 in each. This case is generated even though it does not fit all of
the constraints of the problem as stated in the problem text. In both
cases the most outstanding feature is the fact that the problem text is
interpreted in an unorthodox manner to fit a stable cognitive process
already existing in the subject.
Accounting for Roy's extended explanation . The extended explana-
tion in lines 6l-8l brings up the difficult, deeper issue of the nature
of mathematical understanding because it suggests that the facile way
in which Roy can think about groups of 10 goes beyond a rote
procedure
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for solving problems of a certain type. Without being so bold as to
attempt to define 'mathematical understanding', one can make several
suggestive points.
One can summarize Roy's statements and actions in the explanation
as follows
:
UO tangerines •* k boxes, 10 in each
U0 tangerines -* 3 boxes, with 10 in each and 2 boxes, with 5
in each
Now these relationsips are generated
,
not drawn from the problem text.
Thus one cannot think of the cognitive process behind Roy's explana-
tion as merely an algorithm for solving a specified kind of problem.
Furthermore, the explanation is distinguished by its spontaniety,
length, coherence, 'drive', and complexity. These qualities suggest
that Roy is expressing something he 'understands' as he gives the ex-
planation. They suggest an internal awareness of a system of relation-
ships relevant to certain ways of joining and separating the various
groups of objects. The phrase, 'awareness of a system of relationships,'
describes a vague theoretical idea, but it is an idea that contrasts
sharply with the theoretical idea of an algorithm or sequence of men-
tal steps which merely performs (solves a given problem) but cannot
support an explanation or generate novel behavior . A theory for an
internal mechanism which fits the phenomena better is the activity of
a cognitive structure, or group of structures, extended continuously
over the period of time during which the explanation is given.
A cognitive interpretation of the re-emergence phenomenon . In this
protocol the re-emergence of approach "A" (involving references to 40
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as U groups of 10 ) was observed after a considerable period of inter-
vening activity. This was all the more surprising since the approach
had not led to a satisfactory solution for Roy during its first appear-
ance. Roy says (line 16), "... if it was U boxes it’d be 10 in each
and 5 boxes it’d... have to be 50." This is followed by a shift to ap-
proach B, presumably because Roy cannot reconcile ideas behind approach
A with the constraints imposed by the problem text (1*0 tangerines di-
vided equally into 5 boxes). How then does the approach re—emerge?
To account for this we think of a cognitive structure, S^, which
is the internal organization whose functioning produces the approach A
that we observe. The structure is thought of as a dynamic internal
process which becomes active and continues for a period of time, provid-
ing a temporary orientation with which to interpret the problem situa-
tion. The most distinctive behavior pattern produced by this structure
is the pattern of referring to units of groups of 10 objects. We model
the re-emergence of the approach then by assuming that the structure
regains dominance as it reassimilates the problem situation.
The notion of a process for understanding the problem situation
in a certain way also ties in with the notion of aggressive assimilation
introduced in the previous protocol analysis. It is difficult to ac-
count for the present dialog by modelling Roy's thinking as the delib-
erate selection of various methods based on the analysis of certain
features in the problem. Because of the spontaneous way in which
approach "A" enters in lines 1(5 and 6l_, it seems more valid to model
Roy's thinking as a process which "grabs onto" the problem situation.
Thus at the beginning of the protocol we think of a structure hecom-
'Vu*.
VV
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ing involved which involves working with objects in groups of 10, and
we think of this structure as proceeding autonomously to interpret the
problem ’on its own terms.' This is the sense in which we think of a
cognitive structure assimilating the problem situation aggressively,
the fact that Roy does not seem to be fully in control of
the emergence of approaches that he displays.
Then we can interpret the re-emergence of approach "A" in line 6l
in terms of structure actively reassimilat ing the problem situation.
This can account for the spontaneous way in which Roy "slides into"
the beginning of the explanation in line 6l that constitutes the re-
emergence of approach "A". A model of Roy’s thinking which postulated
a higher level decision making process that analyzed features of the
situation and made the decision to shift to another approach would
have a hard time accounting for the way in which the shift occurs.
Similarly, in a model in which methods of solution are chosen and tried
out one at a time, previously unsuccessful approaches like this one
would be marked as inapplicable and therefore not be retried. On
the other hand by modelling cognitive processes as autonomous cogni-
tive structures which can aggressively assimilate a situation, we open
up the possibility of a ’strong’ structure reassimilating the situa-
tion, leading to an observed re-emergence of an approach. Roy’s ex-
tended explanation provides evidence that this process is less of a
solution method than it is a means of understanding the situation. It
represents a ’compelling point of view’ to Roy, and as such it is not
so easy for him to simply mark it as inapplicable. So one sees
Thus by modelling cognitive processes withapproach "A" re-emerging.
119
autonomous properties like the ability to assimilate aggressively,
one can explain observed phenomena like the spontaneous re-emergence
of an approach.
Summary
. In the analysis of this protocol several behavioral
phenomena have been identified which are shown in the following dia-
gram below the horizontal line. We have also proposed several kinds of
cognitive processes to account for these phenomena, shown above the
horizontal line. The downward pointing arrows indicate the processes
that help to explain such phenomena in Fig. U
.
Cognitive
Proces
Phenomena
Characteristics
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Structure
Autonomy-
Extended Re-emergence
Explanation of an Approach
Fig. U Relations between Cognitive Processes Characteristics
and Observed Phenomena
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Chapter Summary
A wide variety of phenomena observed in the protocols examined in
this chapter can now be listed along with protocol numbers:
1* Expression of an arithmetic problem in standard written
form or standard oral form; (l), (2), (6)
2. Non-standard word order for division problem; (l)
3. Makes a standard written-symbol algorithm calculation; (l), (2)
U. Tries alternative algorithms for a single problem; (2)
5. Answer is evaluated and rejected; (2), (6)
6. Generates related cases; (2), (6)
7. Use of drawings; (3), (5), (6)
8. Describes actions before drawing them; (3)
9- Piecewise adaptation cycle (solving a problem in pieces)
- an intuitive heuristic; (3)
10. Two parallel series generated by counting; (M
11. False starts in counting; (4)
12. Warping aspects of problem; (5)
13. Ignoring aspects of problem; (5)
lU. Reactions of surprise; (5)
15- Expression of same situation in both addition and
subtraction formats; (5)
16. Re-emergence of an approach; (6)
17. Interruptions; (6)
18. Extended explanation; (6)
19. Favors multiples of 5 and 10 ; (6)
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20. Disparity in solutions to two problems related
by commutativity; (6)
21. Overshoot counting; (6)
In addition, four basic modes of solution behavior were identified:
1. Formulation of an arithmetic problem in standard oral
form or standard written form; (l), (2), (6)
2. An Acted-out solution; (3)
3. A Counting-based solution; (U)
U. An immediate solution; ( 1+
)
And three broader phenomena were identified:
1. Misapplication of written arithmetic algorithms; (2)
2. Problem is 'misread' to fit the subject's ideas; (5)
3. Successive shifts of approach; (2), (6)
The theoretical concepts assembled in order to begin explaining
these phenomena have included the concepts of: autonomous cognitive
structures remaining active in time, assimilation and disequilibrium,
written arithmetic algorithm structures, counting structures, practi-
cal action structures, isolation of algorithmic structures, parallel
structure activity, overload, and successive dominance.
In Chapter V the David-"Sharing 15 Stones" protocol will be anal-
yzed further and two new protocols will be analyzed in a more detailed
manner. There diagrams will be used to develop models of cognitive struc-
ture interactions as they occur in time and to explicitly tie aspects
of the models to protocol observations. Methodology for these more
detailed analyses will be developed in the next chapter
.
123
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY II
Maps of Cognitive Structure Activity
In order to analyze protocols at a deeper and more detailed level,
a diagramming technique will now be developed which displays the rela-
tionships between the observed behavior of a student and a model of his
or her cognitive processes. This is an extension of a diagramming tech-
nique called the "wavy line diagram" proposed by Witz (1973) and de-
scribed by Easley (197^)- It is also related to methods of diagramming
used by Driver (1973), Tripplet (1973), and Knifong (1971 ).
Example of a diagrammed protocol . The purpose of these diagram-
ming techniques is to aid in the construction of explanations of a sub-
ject’s behavior in terms of the activity of various cognitive structures.
In order to introduce these techniques in the context of a simple example,
the protocol of a younger child working on a simple arithmetic problem
will be used. Consider the following transcript of an interview with
Kim (grade l.U), in which she demonstrates her ability to do a simple
subtraction problem on her fingers. Kim demonstrates this ability
on several different occasions. In this instance, the diagram portrays
the very simple theory that Kim has an established mental process that
governs this behavior—and that as a first approximation it can be
modeled as a single unit of mental organization—a single cognitive
structure. Line 1 and lines U through 6 from the transcript on the
following page are diagrammed in Fig. 5*
1214
Kim ~ Subtraction Problem
1 I: Try ... 8 take away 7.
2 K: 8 and then take away 7-
(This problem is addressed to Kim and another girl,
Jill, working at the same table. Kim makes some
motions with her fingers, says that she got 2 for
the answer, but seems uncertain. I ask here to
try again to make sure, and she begins by saying
"8" as she holds up 7 fingers. I point this out,
and she puts an eighth finger up.
)
h K: (Has 8 fingers up)
5 (Puts down 7 fingers, one at a time)
remains up)
(One finger
6 I think it's one.
7 I: OK, so you put 8 fingers up, then you
down, one at a time, huh?
put them
8 K: Yeah
.
9 I: Can you count out—can you count for
do .
.
put them down? You have 8?
me when you
10 K: (Puts up 8 fingers)
11 OK— 8 and then take away 7-
12 (Puts down 7 fingers in succession, begins counting
aloud with the 3rd finger down)
13 3, 1,5, 6,
7
lh I: And what happens?
15 K: I have 1 left.
In the diagram in Fig. 5 time runs from left to right. Below
wavy line one finds the investigator's observations of events during the
interview, as refined in several playbacks of the tape. These include
statements of the interviewer and of the subject, actions performed
by the subject (written in parentheses), and current aspects of the
Model
of
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Kim: (Puts
up 8
fingers
)
K: (Puts
down 7
fingers
,
one at
a time)
s one.
8 fingers 1 finger
up up
Fig. 5 Initial Wavy Line Diagram for Kim
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environment (shown enclosed in boxes). Above the wavy line we find
the investigator's model of the subject's mental activity. The model
is trivial in this case so far, showing only the activity of a single
structure. The investigator draws the region labeled "Take-Away Using
Fingers to indicate that a cognitive structure (a stable unit of men-
tal functioning) is active in Kim during this time. This unit actively
coordinates her perceptions and actions while she is solving the prob-
lem. The horizontal line extending to the right of the structure in-
dicates the length of time through which the structure stays active.
In this case the line indicates that the internal "Take-away using
fingers" structure 'stays on' for the entire protocol.
The left-most vertical arrow pointing upward shows that the struc-
ture assimilates the interviewer's question, "Try 8 take away 7". In
this case the structure's activity is initiated as this assimilation
occurs. The structure provides an interpretation of and a response to
the question. The right-most upward-pointing arrow runs from a box
below the wavy line indicating that Kim is holding her hands in a
position with one finger raised, to the horizontal line indicating
that the "Take-away using fingers" structure is still in an active
state. The position of Kim's fingers is here taken to be an aspect
of the world to which she is attending. The upward pointing arrow in-
dicates that this aspect is assimilated by the structure. Arrows point-
ing downward indicate those places where Kim's observable actions are
thought of as being initiated and controlled by the Take-away using
fingers" structure.
Thus as statements and actions occur in time in the observable
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world (below the wave line), one thinks of an organized, unobservable
mental process going on in time inside the individual. In this first
first example the model of this process takes the simplest possible
form- that of a single structure which is active for a period of approx-
imately 30 seconds.
Lower level perceptual and motor output structures are assumed to
be operating as well but are not shown explicitly in the diagram. Only
the higher level 'mediating process' is represented. Kim's perception
of the phrase, "Let's try 8 take away 7", for example, certainly in-
volves the activity of aural and language comprehension structures. In
the diagrams in this study the operation of these structures will not
be shown explicitly but will simply be assumed. (See Fig. 6.)
Cognitive structure activity can be modeled at different levels
of detail, depending on the interests of the investigator and on the
level of detail in the data. The previous transcript can be diagrammed
as in Fig. 7 , with an exploded view of the "Take-away using fingers"
structure to provide a more detailed model of its internal form.
In this diagram Kim's three sequential actions are each associated
with the activity of particular substructures: "Put up fingers," "Put
down fingers," and "Counts remaining fingers." The substructures
labeled "1st Number m" and "2nd Number n" indicate that the "Take-away
using fingers" structure assimilates two numbers. They are labeled
with letters for the convenience of the analyst (the letters do not
carry the connotation of being variable concepts in the full mathematical
sense in the mind of the subject.) Using this model, one would expect
Kim to be surprised and puzzled if she were asked a question like.
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Fig. 6 Lower Level Structures
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Fig. 7 'Exploded View' of "Take Away Using
Fingers" Structure
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How much is 8 take away?" because the question would probably activate
the "Take-away using fingers" structure in Kim, but would not satisfy
the expectation of the structure to assimilate two numbers. In other
words the question would create a disequilibrium situation, because it
would activate this unit of functioning, but the unit would not be able
to embrace, or orient to, the question in a meaningful way. Thus cer-
tain expectations are built right into the "Take-away using fingers"
structure.
The arrows labeled "followed by" indicate that these substruc-
tures are organized within the overall structure to follow each other
in their operation. The structures "8" and "7" represent number structures
activated by the interviewer’s question. There are many possible ideas
that could be activated in Kim by mentioning the word 'eight'. These
would include structures for saying the word "eight," seeing or writing
the numeral, perceiving aspects of a collection of 8 objects, counting
to 8, etc. Since we do not have enough data in this protocol to infer
the distribution of activation among these ideas in this case, we simply
label the structure "8" and think of it as the cluster of ideas acti-
vated by the word "eight" in this particular situation. Note that this
labeled structure does not represent a static 'internal symbol' that is
'stored' or 'transferred.' It represents an active perceptual or motor
process that is active in Kim here for a while.
Observation and theory . It can be seen that this type of diagram-
ming makes explicit the separation between observed phenomena and cogni-
tive processes ahered to less formally in the previous chapter by repre-
senting phenomena (in this case the raw transcript) appearing below the
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wavy lines and models of cognitive processes appearing above it. In
addition it shows the connections between theory (above) and observa-
tions (below) in the form of the vertical arrows crossing the wavy line,
pointing upward from aspects of the environment assimilated to struc-
tures and downward from structures to the observed behavior they pro-
duce. The diagramming also permits one to make more detailed models
of cognitive processes to keep track of complex relations between cog-
nitive structures above the wavy line.
The wavy line diagram can also help to clarify other methodological
issues concerning the analysis of cognitive structures. Recall the
attempt in Chapter III to keep observations and theoretical interpre-
tations separate in the analysis. In particular any statements that
would suggest that one could observe cognitive processes directly were
avoided. What the subjects said and did was not viewed as equivalent
to what they thought— it was necessary to construct a theory of the
subject’s thought processes from his statements and actions. Thus the
statements about cognitive processes in a subject did not follow logic-
ally from his behavior. The fact that Roy assimilated what he read in
the "Sharing Six Candies" problem to an active structure concerned with
sharing equally did not follow logically from the data in the protocol.
The assimilation concept is an invention originating with Piaget. In
this case it was used to account for Roy’s behavior on the tape. What
the analyst does is to utilize and invent theoretical constructs that
give one explanatory power when facing the data on the tapes. One is
not "proving" the existence of assimilation or other cognitive mechanisms
but one is saying that the child's behavior makes more sense to us when
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one thinks in terms of the child possessing certain kinds of cognitive
structures that assimilate certain aspects of the situation. According
to some contemporary accounts of the nature of science, such as Kuhn
(1962) and Bohm ( 1969 ) , this is the case with all structural concepts
in science. Fundamental concepts like the atom, the photon, and the cur-
vature of space around a star do not "follow" automatically from phys-
ical observations. They are structural concepts that have been created
by scientists to help explain diverse phenomena. They are creations of
the human mind that 'fit 1 a body of observations.
If the models of cognitive processes do not follow logically from
observations, then what is their relationship to observation? We need
to specify some other kind of relationship between observations and
theory. These are the R1 and R2 relations specified by Witz (1973)
and represented by the arrows which cross the wavy line. These serve
the purpose of tying theoretical models to observations, and show ex-
plicitly which aspects of the model account for which aspects of ob-
served behavior. This~m^thodology allows the investigator to approach
the analysis of interviews as a creative endeavor. Models above the
wavy line are in a real sense invented by the investigator. It is only
in this way that new insights can be gained and it is only in this way
that novel approaches used by children that surprise us can be explained.
But they are created as the investigator is immersed in his observations
of the tape. A strong constraint is kept on the creative process of
theory building by maintaining rigorous ties to data. In this way one
avoids having one's theory 'take off on its own' and become too far
removed from the reality of the real behavior of children. The con-
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straints on theory in this case are rooted in the practice of starting
from the tape and from a detailed protocol and from including the proto-
col in the report. The R1 and R2 relations then tie the constructed
theory to the data and serve the purpose of forcing the analyst to
keep revising his models of cognitive processes until they can account
for as many detailed observations as possible. In summary, the method-
ology employed involves creative theory construction constrained rigor-
ously by the requirement to peg theoretical models to the data explicitly. 1
Progressive refinement . One particularly important feature of
this type of analysis that is difficult to reflect in a final report
is the fact that the analysis process is one of progressive refinement.
The processes of telescoping or presenting an exploded view of a cogni-
tive structure (used in the second diagram of Kim's interview) is one
example of progressive refinement. In that case we started with a very
simple model to account for the observed data and proceeded to expand
the detail of the modelT^by breaking down a cognitive structure into its
component parts. But models above the wavy line also suffer drastic
revisions—not just expansions—during the analysis of each interview.
This process of proposing a certain configuration of cognitive struc-
tures to account for an interview passage, rereading the protocol to
determine whether the configuration is compatible with other passages
in the interview, then returning above the wavy line to modify the con-
figuration is repeated many times.
This process, in which large numbers of preliminary hypotheses are
1
See the notes at the end of appendix 1 for a related discussion of
methodology in the analysis of solutions to simple arithmetic problems.
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rejected in the early versions of the models, is not reflected in the
diagrams printed in the final analysis. But in reality the analysis
process is a bootstrap procedure of just this kind. Phenomena observed
in the protocol lead to new insights for a cognitive explanation, for a
model of cognitive activity. These models in turn aid him to see
similar phenomena elsewhere in the protocol - ones he did not see at
first glance. Thus the attention of the analyst oscillates back and
forth across the wavy line as he works. The process is one of analysis
by synthesis, because the analyst must synthesize a model of cognitive
activity above the wavy line. But the model is constantly being checked
for correspondence with the data, and this involves many revisions
in the model and scores of replays of sections of the tape. An example
of this revision process will be given in the Joey - "Sharing Fifteen
Stones protocol in Chapter V . In that analysis an initial diagram
and a revised diagram will be presented as an illustration of the pro-
cess of progressive refinement.
The Dynamic Cognitive Structures Model:
Concepts and Diagram Notation
This section defines basic concepts of a model of cognition based
on cognitive structure activity, and develops a notation for diagram-
2
ming cognitive structure interactions. These concepts will be util-
ized in the analyses in Chapter V. The reader may prefer to begin
^See Chapter I, pages 22 to 32, for references to studies by Witz, Easley
and others where the concepts of cognitive structure, substructure, se-
quential and parallel integration, activity elements (related to expec-
tation), activation, the R1 relation (external assimilation), and R2
relation are introduced and discussed.
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reading Chapter V and refer back to concept definitions and notation
given here as needed.
!• Stable Dynamic Relations Between Structures
These relations describe the way structures are organ-
ized to become active in groups. They are stable over per-
iods of weeks to years.
A. Cognitive Structures (Fig. 8a)
Cognitive structures are the basic units
of mental functioning in the model. They are
stable processes which, when activated, assim-
ilate aspects of the environment and provide
an interpretation for or response to them.
B. Substructures (Fig. 8b)
Structures S^ and S^ are shown as sub-
structures of structure S^. This means that
S^ and S^ will ordinarily be active whenever
S^ is active. As S^ and S^ function, S^ can
integrate the functioning of S^ and S^, i.e.
S^ is a higher-order unit of functioning.
C. Sequential and Parallel Integration (Fig. 8c)
The output of substructures may be se-
quenced in time, for example, to control the
habitual performance of two actions in a speci-
fied order (Case l). They may also be inte-
grated in parallel, as when two actions are
performed in a simultaneous or overlapping
a. Cognitive structures
c.(l) Sequential
integration
of substructures
b. Substructures
c. (2) Parallel
integration
of substructures
d. Expectation-
intention
Fig. 8 Stable Dynamic Relations Between Structures
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a. Structure activity
c. Internal assimilation
Source
gone
Some
candies
V^left
d. Disequilibrium
e. Assimilation gap
Fig. 9 Transitory Structure Dynamics
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manner (Case 2).
D. Expectat ion- Intent ion (Fig. 8d)
This relation is used to model structure
activity where the subject is about to perform
an action and indicates that he or she expects
a certain effect to occur as a result. When the
action-oriented structure A is active, a tension
condition is set up in the perceptually-oriented
structure P, which continues until the expected
effect is perceived and assimilated to P.
II . Transistory Structure Dynamics
These properties and relations determine how structures
can excite, conflict with, and cooperate with each other.
They are stable over shorter periods of seconds to hours.
A. Activity (Fig. 9a )
Structure A becomes fully active at time t^,
remains active until t^, where its activity de-
clines to a peripheral level, and 'shuts off' —
becomes inactive — at t^. The horizontal line
is called the structure's activity trace . In-
tuitively, when one says that someone is cur-
rently aware of an object or event one implies
that some internal structure associated with
that object or event is currently fully ac-
tive. Similarly if one says that someone is
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in a state of readiness to perform some action
one implies that some internal structure assoc-
iated with that action is currently fully ac-
tive.
Example: David - "Sharing 15 Stones" Pro-
tocol (Lines 22-44). David has distributed
3 stones each to 4 people and when 3 stones
are left over he proceeds to cut two of them
in half. This is accounted for in the dia-
gram by a structure labeled "Cutting in half"
which is active through line 30 before drop-
ping to a peripheral level of activity. The
structure becomes fully active again over
line 39 where David has cut the last stone
into 4 "chunks" and the interviewer asks him
whether a chunk can be called a half of a
stone. (See diagram on p.156)
B. Activation (Fig. 9b)
A is already in an active state. A's
activity excites B (through some path of
coupling) sufficiently so that B 'turns on'
and changes to an active state . B may ac-
tually receive excitation from several
sources (A^ A
2 ,
A^ ) which cause B to be-
3The examples in this section refer to the three diagramed analyses
in Chapter V.
come active. In this case we say that A con-
tributes to the activation of B.
Example: (Fig. 9b) Joey - "Sharing 15
Stones Protocol (Line 8). Joey immediately
says, "Fifteen take away This is ac-
acounted for by a structure labeled "Take away."
The model shows the school ideology structure,
"Use an arithmetic problem in standard verbal
form," contributing to the activation of the
"Take away" structure.
Internal Assimilation (Fig. 9o
)
When structure S^ assimilates structure
the activity of structure S^ becomes inte-
grated temporarily over a period of time with
the activity of structure S^. Intuitively one
thinks of embodying an idea that provides
an interpretation or meaningful context for S 0 .
It can also be the case that the activity
of or is initiated by the assimilation.
In that case the appearance of the assimilation
relation in the diagram will correspond with
the beginning of that structure's activity
trace
.
Example: David - "Sharing 15 Stones"
Protocol. David has drawn 3 small circles
representing stones to be shared among it people
and begins to "cut one in half" (Line 22). In
this case an action structure assimilates a per-
ceptual structure as the object of the action.
D. Disequilibrium (Fig. 9d)
This condition arises when a structure
attempts to assimilate a structure and fails.
The condition is assumed to create tensions in
the system which encourage the processes of
activation, reassirailation
,
and suppression
until the disequilibrium condition is ended.
Example: Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies"
Protocol (Line 11 ). Kathy tries to divide
15 candies among 3 people by giving 3 to
each but discovers that some candies will
still be left. This knowledge conflicts with
the expectation that the candy source should
be used up.
E. Assimilation Gaps (Fig. 9e)
This is a condition which sets up ten-
sions similar to those caused by a disequil-
ibrium condition— further cognitive activity
is encouraged until the condition ends. This
condition occurs when a structure attempts
to assimilate another structure in order to
operate, but no appropriate structure S 2
is
Ih2
currently active. It is diagrammed as an oscil-
Example: Joey - "Sharing 15 Stones" Pro-
tocol (Line 65 ). After an unsuccessful arith-
metical approach, Joey shifts over to dealing
out blocks into 4 groups to solve the problem.
Just before he begins dealing, Joey checks
the problem text to establish the number of
recipients. To account for this the diagram
shows the occurrence of an assimilation gap
in the activity of a substructure of the
"Sharing" structure. The condition is assumed
to activate other structures which lead Joey
to refer to the text. This leads to the
assimilation of the needed structure relat-
ing to the number of people, "4 friends",
ending the assimilation gap condition.
III. Relations Between Cognitive Structures and Observations
of Behavior :
A. Relation (Fig. 10a)
The R^ relation between a structure S and
a set of aspects A , A? , ,
in the environment
indicates that S provides an interpretation of
or response to the aspects. S is said to assim-
ilate the aspects A
][
and A
?
attended to in the
Fig. 10 Relations Between Cognitive Structures
and Observations of Behavior
U4
environment. If the structure S becomes active
as this happens (Case l), one says that S be-
comes active as it assimilates and A,,. If
S is alreaay active (Case 2) one simply says
that S assimilates A^ and A^.
One refers to these cases as external
assimilation vhen one wants to distinguish
them from an internal assimilation relation
between two structures.
Often, one thinks of an aspect A^ being
assimilated to a low-level perceptual struc-
ture P which is in turn assimilated intern-
ally to a higher-order structure S (Case 3).
However, explicit reference to lower order
structures will often be omitted in which
case the notation in 1 will be used instead
of that in 3.
It should be emphasized that structures
can assimilate several aspects of the environ-
ment at once (Case l). Also, a single aspect
can be assimilated by more than one structure
(Case 4 ).
B. Relation (Fig. 10b)
One's most direct sources of evidence for
the presence of an active structure in the
subject are observed patterns in the subject's
behavior. Thus, one thinks of a structure
manifesting itself by controlling or influenc-
ing specific actions (including statements)
of the subject. One can indicate the relation-
ship between the structure and the observed be-
haviors it accounts for by means of an R
p
rela-
tion between a structure appearing above the
wavy line and molar aspects of observed be-
havior (B^, B^, ) below the wavy line
(Case l). In some cases different structures
can be involved in the same molar aspect of
behavior (Case 2).
3Easley and Witz (1975) define the R2 relation as the entire set of
connections between observed aspects of the subject's responses and
the cognitive structures attributed to him for a protocol. R]. is de-
fined as the set of connections between observed aspects of the environ-
ment and the cognitive structures that assimilate them. The R]_ and R2
relations are both characterized then as many-many relations in the
mathematical sense.
CHAPTER V
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DETAILED ANALYSES
Some techniques for constructing more detailed models of cogni-
tive processes were discussed in Chapter IV, and three detailed anal-
yses will now be presented. These analyses will draw together many
of the individual theoretical concepts developed in Chapter III, where
a survey was made of a wide range of story problem solutions.
Two challenging goals of this chapter are the following: The dia-
grammed models given will attempt to describe interactions between cog-
nitive structures in real time
. Furthermore, ties between the models
and protocol observations will be exhibited explicitly .
The solutions chosen for detailed analysis here are of a parti-
cular kind. They are all solutions where the student explicitly acts
out the actions involved in the story of the problem by using drawings,
hand motions, or manipulative materials. This means that the protocols
are particularly rich in observable behaviors and makes them good can-
didates for detailed modelling of the cognitive processes occurring.
They also offer a look at solutions that do not depend on written sym-
bol algorithms, and therefore may lead to insights about more funda-
mental problem solving behaviors that are less formal than written
arithmetic
.
The first analysis in this chapter extends the discussion given in
chapter III of the David - "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol. Two new pro-
tocols are then discussed in the second and third analyses.
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David - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
Detailed Analysis 1
In this section the David - "Sharing 15 Stones
sented in chapter 3 will be analyzed more formally,
ing the reader may wish to review the phenomena and
pretations discussed there for the protocol, and to
protocol pre-
Before proceed-
cognitive inter-
reread the tran-
script on p. JO.
In this section a more detailed set of observations will first
be made from the transcript, followed by the construction of a cog-
nitive model using the diagramming techniques developed in the previous
chapter.
Additional observations. In Chapter 3 it was stated that David's
actions form a piecewise adaptation cycle in which he repeatedly draws
an object in each of the U squares and then crosses off circles in the
central group. This cycle can be shown more explicitly in the follow-
ing chart.
Code Letter for
Type of Behavior Line
A 9 Draws 15 stones in center
B 10 "Wanna divide it by 4."
C 12 Draws sacks
.
X D 13 Draws a circle in each square.
Y E 1
—
1
Crosses off h circles in center
B 15 "Now we divide b more."
X D 1
6
Draws circle in each square.
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Crosses off U circles in center.
"Now we divide this by k more."
Draws circle in each square.
"Everybody’s got 3 ."
Crosses off U circles in center.
"Cut one in half."
Draws circle in 2 of the squares.
"Cut this in half."
Draws circle in two remaining squares.
Draws vertical lines through 2 cir-
cles in center.
"We'll put little chunks of that one
in each box."
Puts a dot in each square.
Crosses off last circle in center.
Sections are labeled with the same letter where they are observed
to be the same type of behavior. Behavior patterns are identified here
at two levels. Letters in the left column denote more general behavior
categories than letters on the right. Letters used to classify more
than one episode of behavior carry the following interpretations:
B - Refers to dividing U
D - Draws a circle in each square
E - Crosses off four circles in center
G - Refers to cutting in half
H - Draws circle in 2 squares
Code Letter for
Type of Behavior Line
Y E 16
B IT
X D IT
F IT
Y E 19
G 22
H 22
X G 2h
H 2k
Y I 30
J 32
X K 32
Y L 32
11*9
General categories are:
Y — Puts an identical object in each square
Y - Crosses off objects in center group
It should be noted that these behavior categories are not defined
before the interview. They are formulated from the child's behavior
by the analyst as he views the tape. The analyst is constantly on the
look-out for new behavior patterns that he has not seen before. It is
only in this way that he can be sensitive to the child's organization
of his behavior, including novel and creative behavior.
The chart shows the behavior pattern X-Y repeated 5 times in the
left-hand column, where X stands for putting an identical object in
each square and Y stands for crossing off some objects in the center
group. Thus we have a repeated pattern of behavior on David's part.
At the same time, there are variations in his behavior in the X and Y
passages. For example, in line lU David crosses off U circles in the
center group, and in line 30 he crosses off 2 circles. Later these
variations will be interpreted as David's adaptations to the new situa-
tions that develop as he solves the problem in a piecewise manner.
Several sections of transcript can be identified which show that
David orients himself perceptually to several distinct groups of ob-
jects in his drawing. David repeatedly refers to or acts separately on
several distinct groups of objects . These include at least groups 1
,
2 t 3 , 4, 5 and 6 shown in Fig. 11* Several kinds of observations
are rele-
vant here. Groups 1, 2, 3, b, and 5 are drawn with their members spat-
ially contiguous. Group l's members are drawn sequentially and so are
Group 6’s (the people's "cans"). Groups 2, 3, b, and 5 are referred
•o
o
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Fig. 11 Groups David Refers To
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to when David says, "Everybody’s got 3." 1 and 6 are also referred
to verbally. David refers to the squares differently at different
times during the interview, calling them sacks, cans, boxes, and
apparently associating them with people in the statement, "Everybody's
got 3. This indicates that the abstract figures in his drawing are
flexible to a certain extent as symbols for various aspects of the
story.
The transcript itself, the phenomena from chapter III
,
the draw-
ings of distinct groups, and the behavior pattern chart constitute the
observations made from the protocol.
Cognitive processes model
. One can attempt to connect these ob-
servations explicitly along with those in chapter III, to a model of
David's cognitive processes during the interview. The analysis of
this protocol will center on the diagram in Fig. 13 . A simplified ver-
sion of this diagram appears in Fig. 12.
In chapter III it was proposed that a major element of David's men-
tal activity is based on a practical action idea of sharing. Starting
from the major X-Y behavior pattern just identified in the protocol, a
practical action structure appears in the diagrammed model in Fig. 12
to account for David's repeated actions of putting an object in each
of the four squares. This cognitive structure is labeled "Sharing"
in the diagrams. The horizontal trace line extending to the right
from this structure indicates its extended, continuous activity, stretch
ing almost to the end of the protocol. Vertical lines connect the struc
ture to each observed behavior that it accounts for below the wavy line.
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Fig. 12a Initial Diagram - David's Solution Process
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Fig. 12 b
(Sharing)
( Draws ( Draws
circle circle
in 2 in 2
squares) remaining
squares
)
3 circles 1 circle
left in left in
central central
group group
David's notion of sharing relates to several groups - a group of
people, a source group or source quantity of material to be shared,
and the groups of material that each person receives. These are the
groups represented in David's drawing. The basic action represented
in the drawing is that of transferring stones from the central group
to the people. The unit of mental functioning controlling this action,
labeled "Give n shares to n people," constitutes the main substructure
of the "Sharing" structure and all of the other elements in the struc-
ture are organized around it. Thus the structure is an action-oriented
structure. As a unit of knowledge, one thinks of the sharing structure
as a stable, internal process that can become activated in David to
control, comprehend, or imagine an external act of sharing. This in-
ternal process must integrate and make sense of several aspects of
the situation. More specifically, there must be a perceptual orienta-
tion to an initial situation with a quantity of material to be shared
and a group of people, ordinarily with the overtone that the people de-
sire the material. There is a kinesthetic sense of the motion of
transferring pieces of material to each member, and there is the no-
tion, dependent on the concept of 1-1 correspondence, that every person
must get a share. There are also perceptual expectations about what
should happen as the result of the sharing act - that each person will
have an equal amount and that the source material will be gone (or al-
most gone).
The structure is modeled in the diagram in Fig. 12 as having 2
major substructures. The substructure controlling the perceptual-motor
act of giving n shares to n people is accompanied by two perceptual
Sharing
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Fig. 13a Detailed Diagram: David’s Solution Process
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Fig. 13 b
people
)
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substructures which create the expectation of two results: that each
person will have an equal amount, and that the source group will be
used up. That these results are expected by David after a successful
act of distribution is indicated in the diagram by the notation a
—
Ql
read "Do or have a, then expect situation B").
Here by expectations one means that certain perceptual substruc-
tures are activated ('warmed up')—ready to assimilate an external
event. Thus there is a kind of tension condition set up within the
child when he or she is ready to act, and the tension condition is re-
laxed when the expected event is assimilated to the waiting perceptual
substructures. One makes a special effort to avoid thinking of the
sharing structure or any other structure as a piece of static informa-
tion or as some kind of verbal statement. Instead one thinks of it
as a stable, action-oriented unit of functioning in David. As a unit
of knowledge, it is closer to what one would call "knowing a skill" or
"knowing how to share" than to "knowing some information" or "knowing
some facts about sharing."
Diagrammed analysis overview . The model above the wavy line in
Fig. 12 will now be presented in an overview fashion first and then ex-
amined in detail in terms of Fig. 13. One can account for the repeated
actions of 'passing out’ stones with the activity of the "Sharing"
structure. This structure accounts for David's behavior in section
A where he passes out 3 circles to each box on paper, one circle at
a time. The structure operates 3 times, distributing U circle-stones
each time. It has an action-oriented substructure that assimilates
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a source that can be divided into n equal shares and distributes them
to n people. This leads to two expectations: that each person will
have an equal share, and the source will be used up.
When this structure cannot assimilate the 3 stones remaining in
the same manner, the structure labeled "Cutting in half" becomes ac-
tive in parallel with the "Sharing" structure as two of the circles
are cut in half and U half circles are passed out (section B). How
the "Cutting in half" structure is activated will be the focus of a
later discussion. Another structure labeled "Dividing by cutting"
accounts for the way David handles the last remaining stone as he says,
"So we'll put little chunks of that one in each box." This is a re-
lated but more general and less differentiated structure than the
Cutting in half" structure, and the size of each of the resulting
chunks is anticipated with less precision. When the experimenter
asks about the size of the "chunks" (section C) David's "Cutting in
half" structure is presumed to operate recursively as he describes
the chunks as a "half of a half of a half of a stone." The detailed
diagram in Fig. 13 first shows the "15 stones" structure being assimi-
lated to the "Divide source into equal pieces" substructure. But
there is no evidence of any action being taken on this group as a
whole. Instead, the diagram shows the "Give n shares to n people"
substructure activating and assimilating the stones structure "in
place of" the 15 stones, signifying that David stops attending to the
15 stones and focuses on only the first U stones as a source group of
a size he feels comfortable with. This is shown as a termination of
the horizontal line for the activity of the '15 stones structure
l6o
and the activation of the "k stones" structure. The structure then
repeatedly assimilates new groups of U stones as the source, never
assimilating 8 or 12 stones to give 2 or 3 to each person.
"Cutting in half". The "Give n shares..." substructure reassim-
ilates new groups of ^4 stones and distributes them until only 3 are
left. The perception of these 3 stones is not directly assimilatable
along with the "U friends" structure to the "Give n shares to n people"
substructure. This is presumed to create a kind of ’free for all’ sit-
uation where other ( subliminally active) structures are able to com-
pete for control of David's thinking, and a structure labeled "Cutting
in half" emerges. This structure is shown assimilating perceptions of
individual 'stones’ (circles) and going through the internalized action
of cutting them in half, leading to the expected result of having 2
smaller, equal pieces.
Internalized action . Going through the internalized action of
"cutting in half," is only the way we explain the fact that David
can actually represent in the drawing what happens when an object is
cut in half. He does this without actually cutting a real object in
half, so we model his cognitive process as an internalized action.
The diagramming technique developed so far is powerful enough to show
some aspects of this internalized action in detail. In dealing with
small numbers of objects (l to U) we assume that the subject is cap-
able of holding active a separate perceptual structure for each ob-
ject or group of objects that he works with. The structures drawn
are responsible for perceptual expectations of having twoas o
o
smaller pieces as a result of cutting one circle or stone in half.
l6l
We can think of a perceptual structure say, for perceiving a small
stone, that would be active if David were actually seeing a small
stone. We assume that the same structure has become active here, even
though there are no real stones present. In this case we can speak in-
formally of David imagining the presence of a stone. Similarly, he
imagines cutting the stone in half, when the "Cutting in half" struc-
ture is active without actually cutting anything in output mode.
The internalized action process is presumed to involve the activa-
tion of perceptual and motor structures at some intermediate level be-
tween the lowest structures of sensation and action and the higher con-
ceptual expectations for cutting an object in half can be active inter-
nally in the absence of real external objects and cutting movements.
Can David imagine manipulating quantities of objects? His activity
here is certainly consistent with the idea that he can imagine mani-
pulating at least 2 objects. He says (line 22), "Cut one in half, put
it in here and here," and draws a circle of 2 of the 1+ squares. He
knows that "cutting in half" is going to produce 2 objects, and this
knowledge is integrated smoothly into the context of sharing. The
interpretation represented in the diagram is that this knowledge is
basically a perceptual-motor anticipation. He knows how to cut some-
thing in half, and when he gets ready to cut something in half, his
perceptual structures are ’fired up’ to assimilate 2 new objects of
equal size. This view contrasts with the idea that David is using a
'memorized fact’ in a verbal form where he knows that '1 divided by 1/2
is 2." We are assuming that David's mental activity in this case
is
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very similar to what it would be were he actually sharing and cutting
real objects.
Subproblems and re-assimilation
. Recall the earlier observation
that the way in which the action of sharing is repeated with adaptive
variations suggests a "piecewise adaptation cycle" of the following
form:
(1) Perform helpful action within situation constraints.
( 2 ) New situation is viewed and new "helpful" act emerges.
(3) Steps (l), (2), and ( 3 ) are repeated.
An equivalent way to describe the form of David's solution behavior
is to say that he solves the problem in pieces in a step by step manner.
Furthermore, each new step takes the results of the previous step as
its point of departure, and this allows David to adapt to results in
the partial solutions as he goes along.
What kind of internal process can account for such a cycle? One
way to think about the model here is to say that David keeps solving sub-
problems that get him a little closer to a final solution. The "Sharing"
structure is shown assimilating situations as small as sharing 1 stone
between 2 people. In the diagram this means that the structure reassim-
ilates (re-focusses on) "2 friends" instead of friends" and 2 half-
stones instead of ">4 stones" in a flexible manner. For the observer
each subproblem can be identified by: (l) Bursts of organized activity
which indicate that a particular set of structures is operating; (2)
The fact that these bursts of activity related to a limited subset of
the objects represented.
Does this behavior imply the activity of a separate 'executive
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structure in David which analyzes and breaks down the problem so that
useful subproblems can be defined for solution? The diagram shows that
we can model his cognitive processes in this case without such an exe-
cutive structure. The diagram does not show subproblems being defined
and then solved, it shows subproblems emerging as_ they are solved. In
other words, an action structure like "Cut in half" is not 'called
up' by another structure in order to complete a certain task with spec-
ified features. Rather, it assimilates a piece of the situation on its
own that it can do something with (in this case 1 stone). If it is
anticipated that the action of the structure will contribute to the
overall solution, it goes ahead and outputs behavior. But the subset
of objects in the problem situation that are focussed on in this be-
havior have already been determined by the subsolution - by what the
structure could do something with. This determines the shape and size
of the observed subproblem.
Thus the cognitive model used to explain the presence of the piece-
wise adaptation cycles does not include a higher-level 'executive'
structure determining the form of the cycle. Rather, semi-autonomous
structures become active as they assimilate a piece of the problem
situation. This process will be called ' piecewise-adaptive assimila-
tion.' The observed cycle is then seen to be a global effect produced
by localized structure activities and interactions.
The next sections describe further details in the analysis of this
protocol. However, the reader interested in seeing more protocols can
skip at this point to the summary given for this protocol on p. 170.
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Chaining
. The diagram in Fig. 13 shows the integrated activity of
perceptual-motor knowledge structures. The expected result of cutting
one stone in half (two equal pieces) is assimilated by the "Sharing"
structure which can 'imagine' distributing the pieces fairly to 2 people.
Thus two structures are temporarily chained together with the expected
perceptual result of the operation of one structure becoming the per-
ceptual situation assimilated by the next.
Recursion . As described earlier, the last single "stone" remain-
ing is assumed to be initially assimilated by a general "Cutting in
chunks" structure to yield the "little chunks" output in line 32. The
phrase "half of a half of a half of a stone," used by David in response
to a question about the size of the chunks, has several possible inter-
pretations. It appears that David is applying the "Cutting in half"
structure recursively. Roughly, this means that the structure is
applied to its own output. More precisely, 'applies recursively' re-
fers here to an activity-oriented structure S which assimilates a
perceptual situation and includes the expectation of another per-
ceptual situation (see Fig. 1^). When this structure is reapplied
by assimilating the new perceptual situation (P 0 ) to its action com-
ponent (a) we say that the structure is applied recursively. Here the
first expected effect from cutting in half the single "stone is to
have two equal smaller pieces. Each of these could then be assimilated
by the same "cut in half" structure to yield 1* equal pieces of an even
smaller size. However, it is not clear that David is able to imagine
doing this here with precision. He indicates his uncertainty in line
h2 by saying, "I don't know," before saying "half of a half of a half
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Fig. lU Recursion
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of a half of a stone." On the other hand, there is a certain definite-
ness to this remark, since it counters the interviewer's probe (line 1*0),
a half of a half of a stone? What does that mean?" which indicates
only two halvings." Two possible interpretations are advanced for
David ' s statement
:
(1) He has an appreciation for the possibility of generating
U equal pieces from one stone via the "Cutting in half"
structure. But the exact sequence and number of halvings
required is unclear to him.
(2) He comprehends the sequence of actions required, but de-
scribes them linguistically in a non-standard format.
There are 3 acts of halving required to generate the k pieces -
possibly this is reflected in the way he says "half of" three
times (one to represent each act of cutting). This is the
interpretation represented in the diagram. It is consis-
tent with a tendency to focus on the act of cutting a
piece in half as opposed to focussing on the resulting
half-pieces
.
Initial activation of structures . There is a remaining question
of how the "Cutting in half" and "Cutting in chunks" structures are
activated. Many children (such as Joey, whose solution to the same
problem is analyzed at the end of this chapter) would be content to
leave 3 objects as an unused portion or let one person go short by
one. Not so with David. He seeks a more nearly perfect solution.
An event related to this question emerges in a later portion of
the interview not shown in the transcript. David mentions that he re-
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cently worked on the problem of dividing a popsicle stick into two
equal pieces. The stick was ^ 1/2" long and David had determined that
each half would be 2 1/U" long. Thus he had had a recent experience
with cutting something in half, in fact, with cutting a half in half,
and this may have contributed to the ease with which the structures
were activated in the present case.
But this does not really answer the question fully, and one wishes
that one could point to specific characteristics of the situation which
triggered the activity of these structures. As it stands, the model
cannot fully account for this aspect of the protocol.
One modelling possibility would be to include the idea that the
"Sharing," "Cutting in half" and "Cutting in chunks" structures are
connected to each other conceptually. Possibly, an idea of dividing
in the sense of splitting is active in all three cases. This then could
be a link that contributes to activating both the "Cutting in half"
and "Cutting in chunks" structures. Witz (1973) and Tripplet (1973)
have discussed structures called frameworks which consist of such
collections of schemes that become active together. Their work may
provide an important clue to a fruitful direction for future model-
ling in cases like the present one.
It can be assumed that all that is actually required is that some
minimal level of activation be provided, for example, to the "Cut in
half" structure. It can be assumed that its activity will be self-
multiplying once this structure is active at a low level and begins to
assimilate aspects of the situation. Once the structure assimilates
a single stone to the idea of cutting and begins to anticipate the
re-
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suit of 2 equal pieces, then the "Sharing" structure can reinforce the
activity of Cutting in half" by assimilating its anticipated effect.
So what one has here is a kind of ecological situation where a small
initial 'nudge' activating "Cutting in half" can in this favorable con-
text trigger ensuing interactions which eventually bring the structure
up to a high activity level.
Look-ahead
. One needs to qualify the statement that David is
thinking via internalized actions here, because his drawing acts as a
semi-concrete aid through which some of his ideas can be symbolized ex-
ternally and acted-out. The drawing both provides a way to keep track
of the results of previous actions and provides a medium in which struc-
tures can act concretely (can operate in output mode).
But to the extent David 'thinks through' what he's going to do be-
fore he draws it, one can infer that he is engaging in internalized ac-
tions. An intriguing question to ask for each point of the protocol is:
"How much does he think through ahead of time - how far can he 'look
ahead' at each point?" At one extreme it is clear that David doesn't
anticipate the final result of the chain of all his actions right at
the beginning of the interview. At the other extreme, one is confident
that short actions like "Cut one in half, put it here and here,"
(draws circles in 2 of the U squares) are thought through ahead of time,
because this is what enables him to add to the drawing in a piece by
piece fashion. Between these extremes, how much does David 'look ahead'?
It is not possible to say much about this question in the absence
of announced predictions or plans on the part of the subject. The an-
swer represented in the diagram for this protocol is, "most results
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of action chains are not anticipated ahead of time beyond the current
drawing cycle." By ’drawing cycle* here we refer to the relatively well-
defined bursts of drawing activity in the protocol, separated by pauses
and spontaneous verbalization on the part of the subject.
One possible exception to this limitation is the sequence where
David cuts 2 circles in half to distribute them to k people. We have
already inferred that he anticipates that cutting one in half will pro-
vide equal pieces for 2 people. How much more does he anticipate here?
That cutting 2 in half will give just enough for the 1+ poeple? The
diagram does not reflect this anticipation. But it could be changed
easily if evidence were found for the anticipation. This would involve
compressing and shifting the cognitive activity above lines 22 and 2b
to the left - effectively showing more internalized action taking place
before David does any drawing. Such a situation is shown above the
wavy line over protocol line 39 before David makes his comment about
"Half of a half of a half of a stone." In that case his statement pro-
vides some evidence for a look-ahead chain of several internalized ac-
tions. One can call the act of modifying the diagram so that cognitive
activity is shifted to the left 'red-shifting' This informal metaphor
recalls the way the spectral patterns from stars that are moving away
from the earth are shifted as a whole toward the red end of the spec-
trum while the form of the pattern remains unchanged. There is a na-
tural tendency (at least in this analyst) in doing structural analysis
of this kind to show cognitive structure activity going on in time sim-
ultaneously with (directly) above) or just prior to the observed actions
of the subject that reflect it. One can then redshift sections above
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the wavy line (move them to the left) where the subject shows evidence
of look-ahead via internalized actions.
Summary
. David's use of a drawing in this interview provides one
with an unusually good basis from which to conceptualize the play-out
of internalized actions going on in David. On the one hand, doing the
drawing makes David's actions more explicit and less internalized than
they might be if he had no drawing materials or manipulative materials.
But in that case, then we would lose the large contribution that the
drawing (and David's comments about it) make to our attempts to fol-
low David's cognitive processes. And clearly the way that David uses
the drawing does not indicate that his thinking is limited to the points
where we see explicitly symbolized actions being put down in the draw-
ing. On the contrary, the drawing serves mostly to record the results
of mental actions, not the acts themselves, and his comments preceding
the acts of drawing indicate the extent to which he can think about
and anticipate actions and their effects internally. Thus interviews
that encourage drawing behavior appear to be a promising technique for
future work on reasoning processes.
Behavior was accounted for via three practical action structures
:
"Sharing,” "Cutting by dividing," and "Cutting in chunks." Each of
these have basically the same form, consisting of an action substruc-
ture connected dynamically to a perceptual structure comprising an
expected effect. Internalized actions were conceptualized as involving
the activity of these structures in the absence of external output.
Several other new concepts have been introduced to give one in-
creased explanatory power in the area of problem solving. David s
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solution was seen to be built-up in a piecewise manner in contrast to
Kathy's select-and-evaluate cycle approach in the next section. David
appears to solve a string of subproblems but these evolve only as David
becomes aware of subsolutions. The subproblems appear to form from the
actions that solve them, not from some higher order definition process.
David's overall approach can be described in terms of a piecewise adapta-
—
^
-
on cycle that emerges as a global effect of local structure activities.
Internalized actions can be chained
,
to provide longer range an-
ticipations, and the amount of look-ahead refers to the extent to which
this occurs. Structures can function recursively by forming a real or
internalized action chain where a single structure reassimilates its
own anticipated effects.
Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies" Protocol
Detailed Analysis 2
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Another example of an acted-out solution is the following session
with Kathy, a third grader. Kathy has not been introduced to multipli-
cation or division in school, and yet she succeeds in solving a problem
that would ordinarily be solved by division. Using what could be
termed an intelligent trial and error approach, she seems to estimate
and check possible solutions to the problem repeatedly until arriving
at the solution. A shortened version of the protocol is given below.
(An asterisk indicates where a transcript section has been deleted.)
A complete transcript is given in appendix II.
Kathy's profile :
Age: 8 years, months
Grade : 3
Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Classmates: Well above average
Position in Curriculum: No training in multiplication
Transcript :
Section A
(Kathy and the interviewer discuss
a situation where 3 girls want to share
some candy. Each girl is 8 years old
and weighs 55 lbs., they decide. Three
circles are drawn on paper by the inter-
viewer to represent the girls.) Kathy
then asks
:
How many pieces of candy are there?
There' re 15
.
22 K:
23 I:
Section B
K: Mmmm, this is gonna be hard. (Draws 15 ver-
tical lines on paper) 1 ,2 , 3 ,*+ ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,10
,
11, 12, 13, lU, 15— and you put 3, no that wouldn't
work, (taps finger quickly in air over "A" 3
times and pauses; repeats over "B" and "C",
counting aloud as she reaches group "C") 1,2,3
—
That wouldn't work.*
29 I: How do you know?
30 K: ' Cause I tried it.
31 I: Oh, you marked off
32 K: (Puts 3 check marks over first
3 lines and over 2 more groups of
3 lines) 1,2,3; 1,2,3; 1,2,3.
II
33 I: What were those little things on top?
3*4 K: Candies*
Section C
Uo (Draws a new row of 15 lines) So, 1,2,3,*+, 5,
6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,1*4,15 (I. counts them as
well) An now we'll try 5, we're gonna skip *4
hi I: What makes you think 5
?
h2 K: Nothing-
b3 I: Well why skip *4, boy, you sure are mean to *4.
hh K: Because— well maybe— I don't know.
*
Section E
52 Well, I'll try *4 since you convinced me.
(Draws a new group of 15 lines)
(Puts 3 groups of *4 checks over new line of 15-
)
(Moving lips)
Fig. 15 Kathy's Drawing
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53 I: Say it out loud.
5U K: — 3,U ; 1 , 2 , 3 , 14 .
see, I should have skipped and made 5
Section F
I:55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
K:
I:
K
I
K
I
K
J j J 1 J y j / / J W
Section G
63
How many are - why 5?
Maybe it would have been fi- four and a half.
(Laughs
)
Can you tell ahead of time whether 5 will work?
Yes- no it won't
—
yes it will - 'cause there's
3 more candies, so it will work.
Left over at the end?
Yeah
Why should 5 work just because of that?
'Cause there's 3 people and 3 more candies,
and so that if you did 5 there 'd be 1 more
candy for each person and 5 would work.
So, (counts to 15 while drawing new set of 15
marks) (Writes 3 groups of 5 check marks
over the 15 lines) 1,2,3, ^,5; 1,2,3,14,5;
1
,
2
,
3
,
14
, 5 , it worked! u J J J J J JU JJ Jj
6U I : Far out .
*
Protocol summary . The protocol will be referred to by sections,
indicated by letters in the margins. In section A the problem is in-
troduced via informal discussion (as opposed to being read from a pre-
pared card). Some irrelevant information is included, which Kathy ig-
nores. The interviewer delays imparting the information about how
many pieces of candy there are to be shared. The fact that Kathy asks
for this information is an example of a subject spontaneously seeking
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necessary information to solve a problem.
In section B Kathy draws a series of lines on paper to represent
the candies to be shared. Apparently she taps her finger over these
lines to indicate passing out groups of candies to each of the three
girls. Apparently she guesses that each girl should get 3 candies and
rejects this figure when she sees that there will be some left undis-
tributed. When asked about how she knows it won't work, she says,
"I tried it," and draws check marks over 3 groups of lines, leaving 6
lines unchecked.
In section C Kathy estimates that the answer might be 5 but seems
to indicate that it could be 4 as well, when asked about that possibil-
ity.
In section E, Kathy evaluates 4 as a solution and rejects it. She
returns to 5 (her original 2nd estimate) but comments that it might be
4 1 / 2 .
In F she is asked to predict whether 5 will work (without using
marks on paper to try it out). She says it will, "because there's 3
people and 3 more candies and so that if you did 5 there 'd be one more
candy for each person [left over from giving 4 to each]." Kathy's
statements here are compatible with the distributive law. (Compare
her statement in the situation above to [4x3] + [1x3] = 5x3).
In G Kathy evaluates 5 as the solution by again acting out the
distribution into 3 groups.
Characteristics of Kathy's approach . It is instructive to con-
trast Kathy's approach with a more traditional approach to the problem
involving the idea of dividing 3 into 15 to get 5 candies for each
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happening here. First, although Kathy's first estimate (3 candies to
each girl) may be a guess, it is a reasonable guess. Some mental pro-
cess has guided the selection of this initial number to lie within cer-
tain bounds-to be 'in the ball park.' Second, Kathy's choice of sub-
sequent guesses is intelligent as well- they 'move in the right direc-
tion' based on her experience in evaluating the previous guess. Thus
when giving three candies to each girl results in some being left over,
something in Kathy's conception of the problem tells her to pick a
higher, not a lower number for her next guess. Perhaps 'select and
evaluate cycle' is a better name for her behavior here than 'trial
and error.
'
In summary, several distinctive aspects of Kelly's approach to
this problem are:
Ob. 1 She does not refer to a multiplication or division problem
in the standard verbal form) yet she solves the problem.
Ob. 2 She repeatedly cycles through a pattern of proposing possible
solutions and evaluating them.
Ob. 3 Her proposed solutions are a tentative, not a determined re-
sult (with the exception of the provoked prediction that 5
will work at the end of the protocol).
Ob. H Her initial solution is 'in the ball park'.
Ob. 5 After she states that a solution won't work, her next proposed
solution is modified in the right direction.
Ob. 6 She 'acts out' the story of the problem using a drawing in
evaluating her tentative solutions.
We are then left with the following problems:
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(Pi) Can we actually model the mental process behind the select and
evaluate pattern? - can we provide an explanation for the cycles?
(P2) Can we say something about how she is able to solve the problem
without using standard arithmetic operations?
(P3) What mental process can account for the reasonable initial
guess?
(PU) What mental process can account for reasonable second guesses
based on experience with earlier guesses?
Cognitive interpretations
. These questions will be addressed by
using a model of interactions between cognitive structures shown in
the diagram below. As a beginning, only parts A ,B
,
and C of the tran-
script will be analyzed. Parts E and F will be analyzed at the end of
this section.
One can account for Kathy's behavior by positing the existence of
several cognitive structures, shown in Fig. l6
,
that become active in
Kathy in this protocol segment. One assumes that the initial discus-
sion of the problem activates a structure in Kathy embodying the idea
of 'sharing some things'. When this structure is active, Kathy is able
to think about, and imagine kinesthetically or visually, basic aspects
of the act of sharing a group of objects. Once the sharing structure
is active, it will be described as being "in output mode" when it ac-
tually controls motor output in an act of sharing. At other times it
may still be active when it is not controlling an actual movement. It
is not assumed that any kind of external or internal verbal activity
is necessary on Kathy's part in order for the structure to be active or
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in order for Kathy to share objects or think about sharing them.
One can now give a brief description of the diagrammed model to
account for the first select-and-evaluate cycle in the protocol. The
"Sharing a discrete quantity” structure coordinates with another struc-
ture dealing with relative sizes of numbers to produce the inital re-
sponse of proposing a solution of 3 candies for each girl. The sharing
structure then operates in output mode on the 15 marks Kathy has drawn
on the paper, treating them as if they were candies, and 3 marks are
assigned to each of the 3 girls by putting checks over them.
The point of view taken here is that one actually sees the real-
time operation in output mode of the "Give n to each from s" substruc-
ture when Kathy looks at the row of 15 marks and taps off groups of 3
for each girl. She sees that some marks will be unassigned and left
over. Kathy’s perception of this result conflicts with an expectation
built into the sharing structure that all the candies will be distributed
and sets up a state of disequilibrium. This disequilibrium (as shown
as a Jagged line in the diagram) between two structures leads to
a rejection of 3 candies as the tentative solution and to the initia-
tion of a new select/evaluate cycle.
Thus the diagrammed model tends to rest a large amount of respon-
sibility for Kathy's actions with the concrete, situation-specific,
"Sharing" structure rather than with some structure for a more ab-
stract number operation. The internal makeup of the sharing
structure
is modeled as involving several substructures. An act of
distribution
whereby several persons are each given n objects from a source is fol-
lowed by the expectation of two results- that each
person will have
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n objects and that the source will be used up. That these results are
expected by Kathy after a successful act of
distribution is indicated in the diagram by
a £ Bthe notation at the right: (read "Do a;
then expect situation B.")
The complexity and sophistication of Kathy's "Sharing a discrete
quantity" structure is an important factor that determines the level of
detail and precision with which she can think about the problem. For
example, the structure might assimilate the number of objects to be
shared (the number of objects in the source group) as an important as-
pect of the situation. Or it might exist as a less differentiated idea
which deals with collections of objects in the same way as continuous
quantities (like a pitcher of juice or a single candy bar). One would
expect the former type of structure to coordinate more easily with
arithmetic structures.
From the data in this protocol one has difficulty saying much
about the question of how Kathy forms her initial proposed solution.
For the first proposal to be 'in the ball park' one feels that some
sense of relative number sizes must be coordinated with the sharing
structure, but here the analysis is unable to say anything in detail
about what might comprise a "Sense of relative number sizes" for Kathy.
It is also possible that 3 may only be her first verbalized solution
proposal and that other selection/evaluation cycles rejecting other
solutions have taken place in the seconds preceding this proposal.
One can never hope to identify all of a subject's thought processes;
however, it often happens that data from a later protocol will shed
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light on an issue in the present one. Thus one can aim for the progres -
s ivs refinement of our models as a long-range goal.
Accounting for the select evaluate cycle
. An explanation of the
select /evaluate cycling takes the following form: the sharing struc-
ture, once it has become engaged in the situation, "wants" to succeed
in terms of fulfilling its own expectations. It "keeps trying," in this
case by actively reassimilating different values for the number of can-
dies to give to each girl. Thus one assigns a kind of mastery motive
to each structure, consonant with Piaget's notion of active assimila-
tion by a scheme in order to achieve equilibrium. The sharing struc-
ture acts out its role using the initial guess of 3 candies, control-
ling hand motions over the 15 marks on paper to symbolize handing out
the candies. This leads to a perceptual situation which does not satis-
fy the expectation of candies being "used up". The resulting disequil-
ibrium situation inhibits the activity of the proposed solution struc-
ture ("3 to each"), and the sharing structure is then free to try to
assimilate a new structure for the quantity of candies to be given each
girl. Thus we posit no 'executive procedure' for controlling the cycles
they are a global effect of local structure interactions.
This completes the primary analysis of this protocol. More tech-
nical points of analysis are given below. (The reader interested in
progressing to the next protocol can skip to the section summary.)
Technical analysis: improving the estimate . At this point prob-
lem PU is still unsolved—how does Kathy know that she should increase
rather than decrease the number of her estimate? In Kathy's case
the
point of view taken here is that the mental structuring leading to
this
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effect lies primarily within the "Sharing a discrete quantity" struc-
ture itself, not in some more general rule-type structure. Something
like the kind of knowledge in question would be reflected verbally in
the statement, SI: "The more each person is given, the fewer the num-
ber of objects left in the source pile afterwards." Following Driver
(1973), one can call this a semi-quantitative expectation, since it
deals with associating a change in one quantity with a change in ano-
ther, and yet is not a numerical relationship.
The model takes the point of view that some form of this expecta-
tion is built into the simple sharing structure. The fact that Kathy
knows which way to change her estimate is an effect that derives from
this expectation and from the anticipatory and repetitive character
of the sharing structure. Giving objects to a group member is an
act that is repeated during sharing until each member has been dealt to.
One assumes that Kathy is able to think of the act of giving one member
of the group an increased amount of candy as an act which simultaneously
reduces the quantity left afterwards in the source group. This is a
simpler semquantitat ive expectation than that reflected in Sl_ above.
Can she then see that modifying several of these single acts in succes-
sion must also reduce the final quantity of the source group? The fact
that she can reflects an extremely basic and important characteristic
of this kind of iterative knowledge structure—the characteristic that
effects expected from (associated with) modifying a single action are
also expected from modifying the repeated action. This provides an
explanation for how Kathy is able to modify her proposed answers in
the right direction.
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Kathy's "distributive" explanation
. Kathy seems to have a new
insight at the end of the protocol. When she finds that giving h to
each person will not work she says:
5^ K: See, I should have skipped and made 5
55 I: How many are—why 5?
56 K: Maybe it would have been fi- four and a half. (laughs)
57 I: Can you tell ahead of time whether 5 will work?
COir\ Yes- no it won't
—
yes it will— 'cause
there's 3 more candies, so it will work.
59 I: Left over at the end?
60 K: Yeah
.
6l I: Why should 5 work just because of that?
62 K: Because there's 3 people and 3 more candies, and
so if you did 5 there 'd be 1 more candy for
each person and 5 would work. So, (counts to 15
while drawing new set of 15 marks) (Writes 3
groups of 5 check marks over the 15 lines) 1,2,3
i+,5; 1,2, 3, U,5; 1,2, 3, ^,5; it worked!
6U I: Far out
.
Kathy '
s
statements are compatible with an adult interpretation of
this situation using the distributive law (compare her statements to
the equation 3x(U)+3x(l)=3x(5)) Is Kathy then using the dis-
tributive law to help her solve the problem? How can one characterize
the thought processes behind her statements?
Of course Kathy's 3rd grade class has not studied the distributive
law in the algebraic form (c xa) + (c xb) =c x (a+b) and it is
certainly unlikely at her age she is thinking about an algebraic ex-
pression here. Perhaps she is thinking about the written numerical
equation 3 x ( h ) + 3 x ( 1 ) = 3 x (5) but this is also unlikely since she
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has never studied multiplication.
Figure b shows an alternative model of Kathy’s thought processes
in this segment that involves her practical action structure of sharing
and an elementary arithmetic structure for enumerating combined groups
of objects via 'counting on'. This model fits what Kathy says and does
and yet does not involve sophisticated rules concerning numbers and
the order in which they can be added or multiplied. Instead it is
much more directly concerned with the poeple and objects in the situa-
tion and the various concrete acts of redistribution that can occur.
An informal description of this model of Kathy's thinking runs
as follows: it is assumed that Kathy begins in line 35 with the pre-
vious results in mind of having 3 candies left over from giving f4 to
each. She notices that there are 3 more candies and 3 people and
imagines distributing one more candy to each person as an act that
will be fair and that will use up the source of candy. Then she must
also realize that distributing one more to each person when each al-
ready has b is equivalent to having distributed 5 to each initially.
These events are reflected in the various assimilatory events shown
in the diagram in Fig. IT-
Essentially, the diagram shows the same basic "Sharing" structure
shifting from the problem of sharing 15 stones to apply itself to the
problem of sharing 3 stones. A new structure, "Combine by counting on",
becomes active in order to anticipate the result of giving h to a per-
son and then giving 1 to the person. It is assumed that Kathy real-
izes that the person will have 5 because she can count on 1 more be-
yond U. (Perhaps she anticipates this in a somewhat different way.
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Fig. 17 Process for Kathy's 'Distributive' Explanation
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there is not really enough data in the transcript to model the details
of this addition mechanism.)
Thus to model Kathy's insight whereby she suddenly sees that she
can distribute the remaining 3 candies to solve the problem, we show a
reassimilation on the part of the "Sharing" structure. This mental act
is associated with a shift away from the select and evaluate pattern
into an approach whereby she solves the problem in 2 steps in a piece-
wise manner. She realizes that instead of trying to "hit the money"
with single guesses for the exact number to be given to each, that
after she distributes a certain number to each she can work to distri-
bute the remainder left over. This is the same piecewise adaptive
approach David used in the "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol.
A second component of her insight here is her comprehension of
the fact that distributing 4 to each followed by 1 to each is equiv-
alent to distributing 5 to each. This is a good example of the role
of equivalent action sequences in mathematical thought. Notice that
we do not represent Kathy's comprehension of this equivalence by some
kind of internal symbolic equation—rather the interpretation given is
in terms of the assimilation relationships that are present between
action-oriented structures at the moment of insight.
In Fig. IT the comprehension of equivalence corresponds on the
one hand to the parallel maintenance of activity in: (l) structures
that cooperate in 2 steps to anticipate that each person will have
5 candies after receiving h and then 1 (from points (A) to
(C) in the
diagram); and (2) a structure which can distribute 5 candies to each
person directly from (B) to (C) in the diagram. Both complexes
of
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structure activity are connected to the structure "Each has 5."
Thus Kathy's thought process here is characterized not as 'an
application of the distributive law' but as a spontaneous reasoning
process. It is in fact unlikely that she could make the same explana-
tion for a similar situation with larger numbers— it seems probable
that her approach here depends on being able to see that the 3 extra
candies will distribute evenly to 3 people and she might not be cap-
able of doing it with a larger number left over. So it seems wrong-
headed to say that she is using a general principle. And yet her
reasoning at this very simple and concrete level seems like the ideal
kind of starting point for building a more general structure. Her
reasoning here appears intuitively well-grounded, sure, and stable.
The sense in which her approach can be described as intuitive will
be discussed further in Chapter VI.
Summary . To explain Kathy's capability of adjusting her proposed
solution, one can refer to the iterative and anticipatory nature of an
action-oriented "Sharing" structure in Kathy, and to the semi-quantita-
tive expectation (built into this structure) that taking a greater quan-
tity from the source pile produces a greater reduction in the source
pile.
The select/evaluate cycles observed in Kathy's solution are ex-
plained in the model by showing the "Sharing structure repeatedly
assimilating values for the number of candies given to each, as it
attempts to avoid a disequilibrium condition. Kathy's "distributive
insight is modelled as a reassimilation of objects in the drawing to a
practical action structure.
Joey - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
Detailed Analysis 3
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The following protocol is particularly interesting because half
way through it the subject shifts his approach rather radically. It
provides an example of a student using his own capacity for self-
correction and being able to 'make a comeback' after starting on a prob-
lem in a wrong direction. Here one has an example of a second type
of self-corrective behavior that contrasts with the select and eval-
uate cycle seen in the Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies" protocol. In that
protocol, Kathy proposed a numerical answer, and when it didn't work,
she was able to modify the answer successfully to reach a successful
solution. In this protocol, on the other hand, Joey formulates a
subtraction problem which he hopes will generate the solution. When
the solution conflicts with his perception of the constraints of the
problem, he shifts to an entirely different solution-generating pro-
cess. The major theoretical challenge of the analysis then, is to
account for this shift in approach.
Protocol summary . The complete transcript of the protocol begins
on the following page. It illustrates a format for transcribing at a
finer level of detail. Time runs vertically down the page with state-
ments and action that occur simultaneously appearing on the same line.
In section A Joey reads the problem from a prepared card. His
initial comments can be summarized in three phrases:
"15 - ... (pause
)
Urn - 15 take away (pause)
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15 take away 6.
Here he very quickly refers to a subtraction problem in standard
oral form and then seems to be concerned with determining an appropriate
subtrahend. He formulates the arithmetic problem, "15 take away 6,"
saying that the 6 came from adding the numbers U and 2 in the text.
Thus in his solution he uses what was intended to be irrelevant infor-
mation.
In section B after a long pause the interviewer suspects that
Joey is having trouble with the arithmetic problem 15 take away 6 and
suggests that he might use paper or blocks as an aid. In lines 19— U
h
Joey counts out 15 blocks from a box and the interviewer questions him
about his counting method. Joey then repeats the phrase "15 take away
6" and moves 6 blocks away from the central group of 15- He says, "They
both should get - they each should get" and begins to count the remain-
ing blocks in the central group. Then he frowns and when asked what will
happen says, "One's gonna get more," in a concerned tone, while
looking at the two groups of blocks. He then says, "How many?" and
reads the words "U friends" from the text. The interviewer asks, "How
can you tell one's gonna get more?" In section C, line 60, Joey answers,
"Because if I splew -. They each - one gets two, one - the other gets
2..." and simultaneously begins to remove k groups of 2 blocks from
the central group and place them nearby. He proceeds to deal out all
the remaining blocks to the 4 groups, one at a time. He looks at the
4 new groups and says, "It's not enough for all of 'em... and identi-
fies the short-changed group. When asked in line 6^ whether that group
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might be "Jim," Joey appears to be embarrassed and asks whether one has
to be for Jim. The interviewer says no, and Joey then identifies the
h Sr°UPS °f bl°CkS “ beins Jim ' s 11 fiends. When asked about how many
more stones they would have to find, Joey says, "One."
Initial questions raised by the protocol
.
(1) As with the other 3rd and Itth grade students who did this prob-
lem, Joey thinks of the problem as involving 1+ people rather
than 5. We can proceed directly to analyze the protocol in terms
of the problem Joey concerns himself with - involving k people.
The reason why he uses k instead of 5 is not clear.
(2) Why does Joey initially formulate the subproblem "15 take away 6"?
One is tempted to dismiss this behavior by saying, "He's guess-
i- ng by randomly plugging numbers into an arithmetic operation,"
or. He s juggling the numbers just to use all of them and arrive
at an answer." Is there any less capricious, plausible explana-
tion for his behavior?
(3) Joey makes a rather valiant comeback after having started off in
a wrong direction. What chain of mental events causes Joey to
change his approach near line 65 ?
(4) Given the fact that Joey knows how to solve the (U person) prob-
lem by "dealing out" blocks, why is it that he didn't use this
method initially?
Characteristics of Joey's approach .
Ob. 1 The statement in line 11, "15 take away 6 ," followed in line
l 6 by the word "equals -" is an example of expressing an arith-
metic problem in standard oral form.
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Ob. 2 On the other hand, part C of the protocol (beginning with
line t8) contains no statements in canonical form. Joey
—
ts~°ut the Problem explicitly using different areas of
the table to represent the source pile of stones and the
four sharers
.
Ob. 3 So there is a shift from using the blocks to work a numer-
ical problem expressed in standard oral form towards refer-
ring to the blocks as things to be shared and referring to
groups of blocks on the table as "persons." Actually, the
first indication that the blocks are taking on any signifi-
cance other than being objects to count with occurs in line
62 where Joey says, "One's gonna get more," in a concerned
tone. This indicates that the two unequal groups of blocks
may represent the groups of objects that two sharers would
get. And by line 79 Joey is referring explicitly to groups,
"...for one person, the other person, the next person and
then so on."
Initial analysis . The initial diagram in Fig.l8 shows basic as-
pects of Joey's thought processes modelled directly from the protocol.
A structure labeled "Take away" is assumed to be responsible for the
statement in canonical form, "15 take away 6 -," in line 11. Why Joey
chooses to subtract, and why he adds the h and the 2 to obtain 6 as
the subtrahend is not clear. The uncertainty about the source of ac-
tivation of the "Take away" and "Add" structures is indicated with
question marks in the diagram.
Fig. 18a Initial Diagram: Joey’s Solution Process
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)
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The "Take away" structure assimilates two number structures, a large
number and a smaller number. The readiness of the structure to operate
with these number ideas is shown by two substructures labeled "l" and
"s". A third substructure labeled "a" anticipates the activation of
another number structure smaller than the larger number which will be
treated as a result. Different children will use different structures
in different circumstances to produce a solution to this subtraction
problem in standard verbal form. But there is no way to infer more de-
tails of the structure Joey uses from the data in this case, so it is
labeled "Take away." The same approach is used for "Add" structure.
The oscillating activity trace line for "s" indicates its "need"
or propensity to assimilate a second number for the subtraction process
to proceed. In this case Joey seems committed to the "Take away" struc-
ture’s operation, but this is delayed until an assimilation of the most
appropriate number to ’take away' has occurred. Here, the active as-
pect of the assimilation process is particularly clear: the substruc-
ture initiates a kind of internal and external search for another appro-
priate structure to assimilate. Thus, the oscillating line represents
a kind of disequilibrium state within the structure. In this case the
structure lacks an appropriate context for its operation - the recogni-
tion of an appropriate number structure for assimilation by "s".
When Joey has difficulty doing this calculation in his head, the
interviewer suggests using paper or blocks, and it is inferred that a
related but different "Take away objects" structure is activated and
assimilates the blocks. As he proceeds to subtract 6 from 15 using
the blocks, the crucial point in the protocol where Joey frowns, says,
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"One's gonna get more," and then changes his approach to the problem,
provides a real modelling challenge. Joey is clearly perturbed when
he makes the comment, "One's gonna get more (concerned tone)," in
line 62. This indicates that he sees that the two groups labeled A
and B in the drawing do not have the same number of blocks. That this
perception is the immediate source of disequilibrium is supported by
his earlier statement in line 5^, "They both should get, they each
should get
,
(after which Joey begins counting blocks in group R).
They both should get," indicates an expectation on Joey's part that
he should end up with a situation where 2 people have equal quantities.
When this does not happen, we see him frown and hear him speak with a
concerned tone in his voice, and we model this by showing a disequili-
brium relationship between the perception and expectation structures.
But the question remains as to the source of the expectation, shown as
a question mark in the diagram. This question will be addressed in
the revised analysis to be presented later.
Joey then asks the question, "How many?" as he looks at the prob-
lem text and reads, "1 friends." Apparently, he deliberately seeks more
information here from the text. It is not clear why this happens at
this point.
In line 68, Joey either ignores or does not understand the intent
of the interviewer's question, "How can you tell one's gonna get more?"
and says, "Because if I splew - they each - one gets 2 -" and begins to
deal out the 15 blocks into h groups. The cognitive process here is
represented by treating the dealing behavior as stemming from the ac-
tivity of a "Sharing" structure in output mode. It seems likely that
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Joey uses "splev" as the past tense of "split" In this
model of the "Sharing" structure involves substructures
context. The
for splitting
up the group of objects by distrubing one or two objects at a time
to each person and for the exDectatirm +>,0+ « up on that each one should end up
with the same number.
A reasonable way to proceed here would be to show the "Sharing"
structure s activity initiating as the dealing begins, but in Fig. 18
the structure is actually shown becoming active at an earlier point
m the protocol. By shifting activation to an earlier point, sliding
the structure to the left on the diagram, one can account for Joey's
previous act of seeking information on the number of "friends" from
the problem text. This assumes that he did not assimilate the idea
of U friends to a structure for sharing during his first reading of the
problem text. As with the "Take away" structure earlier, one thinks of
the Sharing structure as now being in a position to act, but needing
to assimilate more detail in the environment before it can act. One
thinks of the structure embodying the knowledge that some objects are
going to be given to a group of people, but in attempting to function
the structure finds that it cannot act without attending to a partic-
ular characteristic of the group of people - its number. This type
of situation will be called an assimilation gap . This is much the same
as the situation where one sees a person walking toward him and suspects
that it might be one of several friends, and so tries to squint and
shade his eyes to get a more detailed look at the person's fact to de-
termine which friend it might be, in order to behave in an appropriate
manner. Thus, one thinks about Joey's information-seeking behavior here
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not as a search for an "item to be inputed" but as the perceptual act
of focusing on a new aspect of the situation. The fact that he learns
how many friends there are from the printed text via lower level read-
ing skill structures is incidental here. One could use the same assim-
ilation model if Joey were, for example, doing something with a real
group of children, suddenly needed to know the number of children in
order to get enough supplies of some kind for them, and proceeded to
count the number of children.
The "Each have the same amount" structure active in line 5U is
identical to the expected-effect substructure of the "Sharing" struc-
ture, so one treats these as identical in the diagram. One can then
say that the "Sharing" structure is activated by a spread of activity
from one of its active parts. Activity spreads from one structure to
the other because there is a permanent dynamical connection between
these structures in Joey. When one shows a structure consisting of
several substructures, one is in effect saying that there are permanent
dynamical connections between the substructures and that all of them are
connected via the structure as a whole. While substructures may act
in a particular sequence in output mode, one assumes that pre-output
activation can spread in any direction along connections between the
substructures. Thus, in this case a structure concerned with an effect
activates a structure concerned with the cause of the effect.
After the blocks are dealt out, Joey recognizes that one person
will be short-changed, but doesn't show concern at this in contrast to
the way that he did earlier in line kk. Instead he merely indicates
that "there's not enough for all of them," and when asked, "How many
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more would they have to find?”, he says, "one.” This behavior is
modelled by the interactions shown between the "people have same amount"
expectation in the "Sharing" structure, the perceptual structure for
the 1* groups, and a "Small quantity manipulation" structure which assim-
ilates the groups of h and 3 blocks, and anticipates the effect of add-
ing a block to the group of 3. In this last calculation it is assumed
that with numbers of this size there is no need for Joey to do any stan-
dard arithmetic - he simply uses "low level" perceptual-motor structures
to identify the action needed to make the perceived situation of 3 blocks
into one of 1+ blocks."^
Revised Analysis
. The preliminary analysis leaves us with some
unresolved difficulties in the form of 3 structures whose initial ac-
tivation is unexplained. Two of these difficulties can be removed by
inferring that the "Sharing" structure becomes active even earlier-on
in the protocol (as shown in Fig. 19) than is represented in the diagram
in Fig. l8 . First, the "Sharing" structure can function as the missing
source of activation for the "Take away" structure. We think infor-
mally of Joey sensing an analogy between this arithmetic process
and the act of taking the stones away from a central group to give
to the friends. Formally, we show the "Sharing" structure contributing
to the initial activation of the "Take away" structure. Second, the
early activity of the "Sharing" structure provides a source of activa-
tion for the "Each have the same amount" structure participating in lines
5 I4 and 55, since this is in fact a substructure of the "Sharing" struc-
^Piaget's statement about "intuitive numbers" quoted on p. 6 is relevant
here.
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ture.
School ideology structures
. So in Fig. 19 it is inferred that the
"Sharing” structure is activated at the very beginning of the protocol
when Joey reads the problem text about sharing the stones equally. But
then one must face a new question: if the "Sharing” structure is active
from the beginning of the protocol, then why doesn't this structure
operate to solve the problem immediately - why does this only happen
later on beginning in line 70? This question and other aspects of
the first part of the protocol are explained when we also infer the ac-
tivity of s chool ideology structures in Joey. The factor assumed to
influence Joey here is the following habit : when confronted with a
story problem, one strives to construct a standard arithmetic problem
in standard verbal form that relates to the story problem and 'yields'
the answer. Because Joey is influenced by this habit, his attention is
quickly dominated by the task of constructing and solving a standard
arithmetic problem. If we assume that he expects to construct a prob-
lem in standard verbal form even before he reads the text, then the
"Sharing” structure initially serves only to tip the balance of activa-
tion in favor of one of the standard forms. Joey's comprehension of
the problem situation from reading the text may be too weak initially
to enable the "Sharing" structure to dominate these standard arithmetic
structures. Only later, after Joey begins using blocks, does the
"Sharing" structure dominate and enable Joey to solve the problem in
an "act-out" mode. Thus, the diagram also shows a structure, "Solving
story problems," that is a general school ideology framework for
approaching story problems - causing Joey to be in a certain mental set
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or frame of mind when he is about to do a story problem. This frame
of mind is assumed to include the expectation that the proper way to
do the story problem is to produce an addition or subtraction calcula-
tion in standard form.
Joey's school ideology structures may also influence his behavior
in adding U and 2 to provide 6 as the subtrahend for the problem "15
take away ". The habit of 'using all of the numbers' in a story
problem to calculate the answer may play a part in this behavior. This
kind of orientation toward 'using the numbers' also helps to explain
the fact that Joey later solves the problem of sharing among U people
instead of 5*
The activity of the "Sharing," "Friends," and "Stones" structures
are shown as receding immediately to a low level as soon as the "Take
away" structure becomes dominant. This aspect of the model is supported
by the fact that during the time that Joey is attempting to calculate
the answer to "15 take away 6" he refers to numbers alone without any
reference whatsoever to the enumerated objects (stones, people, etc.)
One can propose a possible explanation for this observation if one
assumes a limited capacity for structure activity at any given moment,
consistent with general empirical findings in short-term-memory research.
Since "15 take away 6" is a difficult problem for Joey, and presumably
involves him in a large amount of cognitive structure activity, there
may be 'no room left' for him to hold in mind or sustain the activity
of these qualitative aspects.
It is interesting to note the way in which his use of blocks as
an aid to calculation leads him to reintroduce these qualitative ideas
2ll
in a sharing context. As Joey separates 6 blocks from a group of 15 in
line 52, he seems to expect the two resulting groups to have equal num-
bers of blocks with each group belonging to one person. Qualitative
language begins to re-enter Joey's statements here: "They both should
get - they each should get -." This situation is modeled by showing
the two groups of blocks on the table activating a structure for "2
friends" and eventually reactivating the "Sharing" structure. Thus, one
can make the interpretation that Joey begins to attach symbolic meaning
to the blocks — he begins to assimilate them to ideas about objects to
be shared by people - and as he does so he begins to be aware of the
discrepancy between what his constructed arithmetic calculation 'tells
him to do' with the blocks and what the story 'tells him to do' with
the blocks. At this point the story ideas win out, the "Sharing" struc-
ture becomes dominant, the "Take away" structure is suppressed, and
Joey begins to act-out the problem explicitly by dealing out blocks
into groups.
The question of whether the interviewer plays a role in triggering
Joey's shift in approach should also be considered. It is conceivable
that the interviewer's question in line 58: "They're going to share
them?" is a major factor contributing to Joey's shift from a numerical
to an acted-out approach. This is not the interpretation given in the
diagram, however, because Joey's prior statement in line 5^ > They both
should get—they each should get— ," indicates that the practical
"Sharing" structure has already been reactivated before line 58.
Progressive refinement . Constructing the second diagram in otder
to solve problems recognized in the first diagram is an example of the
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progressive refinement of a cognitive model. Actually, the author went
through many cycles of refinement, modifying diagrams and comparing them
with the tape, just to arrive at the initial diagram shown in Fig. 18 .
Only the last cycle from Fig. 18 to Fig. 19 is shown here.
Disequilibrium cycles and successive dominance
. The model of
Joey's cognitive structure interactions gives a fairly specific answer
to the question of how Joey 'makes a comeback' and changes his approach
in the middle of the interview. The most important factor appears to
be the development of a conflict or disequilibrium situation which allows
a new mental structure to 'take over' by line 69. The whole process
can be called a disequilibration cycle with the following form:
1 . A solution process is attempted while other structures re-
main active simultaneously,
2. followed by a disequilibrium situation where two active struc-
tures conflict,
3 . followed by competition between alternative ideas for domin-
ance, with one eventually taking over.
1. etc.
(Joey only makes one pass through such a cycle, but it is easy to imag-
ine the possibility of several passes occurring in other situations.)
Recall that in the Kathy - "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol, Kathy also ex-
hibited behavior indicating an internal disequilibration cycle. How-
ever, the current protocol indicates a somewhat different process than
Kathy's select-and-evaluate cycles. Joey does not repeatedly select and
evaluate answers here; rather, he appears to try to determine a single
answer via a process. And when his first process runs into trouble another
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one takes its place. In Joey's case we see a complete shift in approach
in the middle of the protocol. This was accounted for by the successive
dominance of two cognitive structures, one following the other.
Sgpntaniety and the spread of activity
. Is Joey's behavior spon-
taneous or carefully planned? Can one say anything about spontaneity
using the model of cognitive structure activity? One point where his
behavior is clearly spontaneous is in lines 57 and 62 where Joey is
taken aback with the fact that removing six blocks from 15 does not
leave equal groups - that "one's gonna get more." Spontaneous events
like this one are particularly interesting to the analyst because they
are clear indicators of a 'new development' in the mental activity of
the subject. (For the moment we use the term 'spontaneous' to describe
both relatively unanticipated mental events and the resulting behavior.)
The model of cognitive structure activity shown in Fig. 19 provides a
first-order interpretation of the origins of Joey's spontaneous behav-
ior. One way in which it does this is by explicitly showing how devel-
opments in the environment can trigger new mental activity in the sub-
ject. The spontaneous event just discussed is one example of this. The
diagram in this case shows a configuration of blocks which triggers a
perception of more blocks in group "A" than group "B", which in turn
triggers a disequilibrium relationship with another structure. Thus,
an outside event causes unexpected mental events to unfold spontaneously.
But this is not the only spontaneous interaction. In the analysis
activation of structures takes place internally as well as externally.
The model portrays several of these mental events as spontaneous also.
One place where this kind of interaction is inferred is over line 8
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where the activity in the "Distribute to people from source" structure
spreads to the Take away" structure.
Another internal activation is modelled over line 51* where the ac-
tivity of the "Each have same amount" substructure spreads to the en-
tire Sharing" structure of which it is a part. Now in both of these
cases the model is that of a spread of activity from one structure to
another, and this spread is not under the control of some higher order
"executive" structure in the subject. Thus, the model is not consistent
with the idea that Joey makes a decision to activate these structures
at these points in the interview - if by a decision we mean a premedi-
tated choice of action based on some rational analysis of factors in
the situation. Rather, the activity of the structures represent ideas
that occur to him in a spontaneous way, because they become activated
through connections with other currently active structures.
Summary . Several new theoretical concepts have been introduced in
this analysis: School ideology structures were assumed to influence
Joey to orient to produce an arithmetic problem in standard oral form.
With Joey in this frame of mind it was assumed that the idea of removing
objects from a group to be distributed contributed to the activation of
a "Take away" arithmetic process. This process then began to dominate
his thinking, suppressing ideas about qualitative aspects of the prob-
lem. The suppression is partly the result of a limited capacity for
activity in the mind. When he used blocks as a minipulative aid he be-
gan to assimilate them to the idea of sharing objects. This lead even-
tually to a disequilibrium situation where the block configuration pro-
duced by the take away process could not be assimilated to the idea of
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people having equal shares. In this situation the "Sharing" structure
became dominant, completing one pass on Joey's part through a disequili-
brium circle. With the sharing structure becoming reactivated, an assim-
ilation ga|> occurred and Joey deliberately sought clarification (on
the number of people) from the text. This cleared the way for the
Sharing 1 structure to operate, and Joey reached a meaningful conclusion
by dealing out the blocks concretely.
Several key events in Joey's solution were accounted for by a
spontaneous spreading of activity between structures as opposed to ra-
tional, premeditated decisions.
219
Intuitive Processes
What does it mean when someone says, "I can see that it's true in-
tuitively," in a mathematical context? In this section the question
of whether the protocols that have been presented can be used to il-
luminate the issue of what one means by intuitive mathematical proc-
cesses will be discussed. As was mentioned in Chapter I, Erlwanger
(197*0 was able to show that many of the grade school students he
studied were dependent on a system of rules for producing answers to
written arithmetic problems—and that these rules had very little to
do with the students' intuitive mathematical ideas. Erlwanger was
thus able to point to behaviors which he felt did not indicate the
presence of intuitive mathematical ideas, but the issue of what does
constitute an intuitive mathematical idea has remained in doubt. Cer-
tainly in reading the three transcripts taken up in the detailed anal-
yses of Chapter V one gets a very different overall impression than
one does watching students execute standard algorithms for solving
written arithmetic problems. The task of this section will be to try
to characterize specific ways in which these three protocols can be
said to exhibit intuitive mathematical behaviors.
Recall Kathy's explanation in the "Sharing 15 Candies" problem:
I: Why should 5 work just because of that?
K: "Cause there's 3 people and 3 more candies [leftover from
giving U to each from a pile of 15 ] and so that if you did
5 there 'd be 1 more candy for each person and 5 would work."
Can one tell in general whether a student is giving an intuitive ex-
planation that is understood in a 'solid' way rather than a superfi-
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cial explanation based on a memorized rule or rote method? Certainly
Kathy conveys the impression that her thinking here is based on an in-
tuitive understanding rather than a rote method. What can one point
to in the transcript to support this impression?
Two different ways in which the protocol analyses in question
can be said to indicate the presence of intuitive processes (shown in
Fig. 20 ) are first, the way in which thinking on the part of the stu-
dents is grounded in actions, conceptions of actions on concrete ob-
jects, and second, the way in which autonomous structures come into
Play spontaneously rather than being "called up" in a set order accord-
ing to a fixed method.
Action-grounded knowledge
. The first of these will be called
action-grounded knowledge, a type of intuitive knowledge, and the se-
cond will be called spontaneous reasoning, a type of intuitive reason-
ing. The diagram in Fig. 20 shows these two types of intuitive internal
processes above the horizontal line and shows some types of behavioral
indicators associated with them below the line. One can say that the
thinking behind Kathy's 'distributive' explanation above is action-
grounded here in the sense that it is concerned with actions on concrete
objects
.
By saying that a student's thinking is grounded in action, it is
meant that the student uses thought structures which involve the real
or imagined movement of concrete objects, such as the simple act of
transferring a piece of food from one person to another. The story
problems given here certainly involve simple movements of this kind.
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Fig. 20 Intuitive Processes
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and the models of students' thought processes developed reflect the
way in which the students refer repeatedly to concrete actions during
their solution attempts. The thought processes shown were predominantly
not abstract arithmetic operations on symbols, but were practical action
structures assimilating real or imagined concrete objects. For example,
in referring to sharing some objects, David says, "Cut one in half,
put it in here and here' (referring to an area in a drawing representing
a stone and two sharers). He refers directly to actions on concrete
objects
.
There appear to be two main behavioral indicators that one can use
to tell when this type of thought is occurring—first
,
the presence of
verbal references to concrete actions or drawings of such actions or
the presence of such actions made externally; and second, the type of
language the student uses to describe why he is sure about his explana-
tion.
References to actions on concrete objects (or the symbolization of
such actions using manipulative materials or drawings) were particularly
easy to identify in the acted-out solutions analyzed in this study, as
is shown by the examples just given with Kathy and David.
An interesting conjecture about the effects of action-grounded
knowledge is the following. One can often detect a student's expres-
sion of necessity in a mathematical explanation in the form of state-
ments that say "it has to work that way" as opposed to "you have to do it
that way to get it right." The second format is often observed in the
case of children explaining standard arithmetic algorithms. They say,
"You have to carry this one," or, in dividing 72 and 3^9, "You've got
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to have the smaller number outside (the division bracket) or you won't
get it right." These statements refer to conventions that students
adhere to in order to execute arithmetic algorithms in a proper manner.
On the other hand, statements like Kathy's: "...if you did (give) 5
(candies to each person) there 'd be 1 more candy for each person and
5 would work." refer to something that "has to" be true in the context
of the qualitative situation, not just in the context of the "way it's
supposed to be done." It is possible that action-grounded knowledge is
responsible for these kinds of conviction. It is possible that whenever
one probes a situation where a student in effect says: "It has to work
that way," that one will find an action-grounded knowledge structure
at work. This hypothesis is supported by the protocols analyzed in
the present study and should be studied further.
Spontaneous reasoning . In addition to action-grounded knowledge,
spontaneous reasoning refers to another type of thought process that
can be called intuitive. The contrast to be emphasized here is one be-
tween solutions involving an established method familiar to the subject
vs. action sequences that are constructed more or less 'on the spot' in
a flexible manner. Again Kathy's 'distributive' explanation appears
to be a spontaneous construction, and not the application of a familiar
method, as does David's piecewise adaptive approach to the sharing 15
Stones problem.
Two indicators that a spontaneous process is taking place are:
1. reference to a novel, non-standard solution approach, and 2. spon-
taneous interruptions, 'ahas', or reactions of surprise during the solu-
tion attempt. When a subject uses a novel approach it lends credence
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to the idea that the subject is constructing it ’on the spot,’ but
of course this is not a conclusive indicator. (Spontaneous behavior
may at times mimic a standard method, and a standard method that is
learned or applied erroneously may produce novel behavior.)
But in many cases it is obvious that a subject is grappling in a
spontaneous manner with a problem rather than using an established me-
thod of solution. Indicators of this kind are seen in the Joey "Shar-
ing 15 Stones protocol where Joey shifts his approach from solving a
subtraction problem in standard oral form to acting out the situation
using counting blocks. There is a spontaneous interruption when Joey
suddenly stops counting a group of blocks he is using to help with his
subtraction calculation. His concerned tone of voice indicates the
surprise of a disequilibrium condition, and there is a shift to an
acted-out approach. The process behind these events was not modelled
as a rational 'executive' procedure choosing a new approach. The shift
was accounted for by the disequilibration and subsequent drop in ac-
tivity of a previously dominant structure, followed by a spontaneous
assimilation of the situation by an action-oriented "Sharing" struc-
ture which became dominant.
Spontaneous processes vs. procedures . In diagramming cognitive
processes should there be a visible difference in the diagrams for a
spontaneous vs. an established solution process? One way in which such
a difference could be reflected can be illustrated by considering a
hypothetical alternative version for a portion of the diagram for
the David "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol. The upper diagram in Fig. 21
shows the original spontaneous model for this section while the lower
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a. Spontaneous Solution Process
b. Established Solution Process
Fig. 21 Spontaneous vs. Established Solution Processes
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diagram shows an alternative model portraying a solution via a standard
method known previously to the subject. In the first diagram, the struc-
ture "Cutting in chunks" becomes active spontaneously as it assimilates
the situation in which it can be helpful by creating a new situation
where sharing can occur. Below, the same "Cutting in chunks" structure
is part of a larger structure in the form of an established procedure
which activates the two actions in sequence in a fixed way. The spon-
taneous form of the process in the upper diagram characterizes most of
the models used to account for the observed behaviors in this study.
Do cycles in behavior imply cognitive processes in the form of
procedures ? In the three detailed analyses of Chapter V several types
of behavior cycles were identified—David’s piecewise adaptive cycle
and Kathy's select and evaluate cycle are two of these. Also, Joey's
shift in approach in response to a dilemma indicated the possibility
of approach disequilibrium cycles that could also apply to other pro-
tocols where more shifts in approach are observed like the Roy "Uo Tan-
gerines" protocol. Now in order to explain the presence of these re-
peated cycles in behavior it is tempting to postulate the presence of
an internal cognitive process in the form of a fixed procedure that pro-
duces the behavior, since procedural terminology includes various means
for iteration, ("Do-loops ," GOTO statements, etc.) For example, Fig. 22
shows a very simple procedural model of the internal process behind
Kathy's select and evaluate approach. This model was rejected in favor
of a less structured, less methodical process.
The word 'procedure' is used here to indicate a certain type of
cognitive structure with the following characteristics: 1. the struc-
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ture controls separate actions (via substructures) to be performed in
a well-defined sequence; 2. the collection of substructures is activated
as an established unit—once activated it runs its course in a predeter-
mined manner unless there is some drastic interruption. As used here,
the concept is not equivalent to that used in computer science— in the
cognitive structures model used in this study there is no such thing
as internal static strings of symbols serving in the role of inputs
and outputs for a procedure. There are only other active structures
which can activate or be assimilated by the procedure. But the concept
as used here does share the basic idea of an established method consist-
ing of a sequence of steps. One might want to use this concept as a
model to explain a child's methodical pattern of behavior in doing long
division problems, for example.
But in the case of the three cycles identified above, the analyses
have demonstrated that in each case cognitive processes can account
for the cycling that are not procedures. Just as the autonomous be-
haviors of predator and prey can lead to cyclical population levels,
the autonomous activity of cognitive structures can lead to cyclical
behavior patterns.
How, in general, can one decide on the basis of a tape whether to
model a cognitive process as an established sequence of steps—as a
procedure? The diagram in Fig. 23 shows some of the possible links be-
tween observable behaviors (below the horizontal line) and established
procedures on the one hand vs. spontaneous processes on the other
(above the horizontal line). The point just made above is the fact
that, contrary to what one might think, repeated behavior patterns
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(cycles) are not necessarily indicative of procedural processes but
can be accounted for by spontaneous processes. Thus cycles are shown
as potentially explainable by either type of process. Similarly, either
type of process can account for behavior where the subject describes
part of his solution activity before he performs it-in the spontaneous
case internalized action can take place and anticipations can be ver-
balized.
However, inflexibility in the order of steps taken under varying
conditions would indicate the presence of an established internal pro-
cedure. Whereas interruptions and surprise responses of the 'aha*
variety are spontaneous events that indicate spontaneous processes.
This last indicator—
—spontaneous events—has been the primary one used
for Justifying the choice of spontaneous processes used in the cogni-
tive models in this chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary of Findings and Concepts Developed
In this study exploratory clinical interviews were conducted with
third and fourth grade students as they attempted to solve simple quan-
titative story problems. A wide variety of phenomena were observed
in the students' solution attempts. Although some of the students’
approaches seemed related to standard methods taught in school, others
did not.
Models of the students' cognitive processes were developed that
help account for the phenomena identified in the protocols. Piagetian
(and neo-Piaget ian) concepts such as assimilation, disequilibrium, cog-
nitive structure, and structure activity were utilized in these models
and were related to specific instances of observed behavior. Although
the study draws on these theoretical concepts, it also has a strong em-
pirical emphasis. Rather than starting from an established body of formal
mathematics and attempting to show what the children know in those terms,
the study started from the children's mathematical behavior and from a
general theory of cognitive functioning, and attempted to construct a
detailed model of the children's thought processes in specific protocols.
Findings from the analyses were given at several different levels:
(1) Complete and unedited protocols were included so that the
reader could make his own analyses.
(2) Observations of events and behavior patterns in the interview
were made from the tapes and identified in the analyses. These
231
led to the formation of certain observational concepts, such
as. generates a related problem, expresses an arithmetic prob-
lem in standard oral form, exhibits false starts in counting,
etc
.
(3) Specific explanations of certain phenomena in the protocols
were given in terms of descriptions of cognitive processes
that account for them.
(M Specific explanations of extended sections of protocol were
given in the form of diagrammed sequences of cognitive struc-
ture interactions.
(5) These specific explanations of phenomena in the protocols
utilize general theoretical concepts that may apply to other
students
.
An attempt was made in Chapter III to introduce the wide range of
solution behavior observed. Cognitive concepts were also developed
there which can begin to explain these observations. After developing
analysis methodology and diagramming techniques further in Chapter IV,
detailed analyses of three protocols were given in Chapter V where stu-
dents acted out solutions explicitly using drawings or concrete aids.
These last analyses shed light on children’s mathematical processes
that are not dependent on rules for manipulating written symbols.
Observations . The analyses include the following observations:
(1) Different students can attempt to solve the same story
problem in widely different ways.
(2) Several kinds of successful solutions to story problems
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ordinarily solved via division and multiplication are re-
ported from students who have not yet studied these opera-
tions in school.
(3) Four basic modes of solution behavior were observed:
a) Expression and solution of an arithmetic problem in stan-
dard oral form or standard written form
b) Acted-out solution
c) Counting-based solution
d) Immediate solution
(U) Four spontaneous behavior patterns (often referred to as heur-
istics) were identified:
a) Select and evaluate pattern (convergent trial and error)
b) Successive shifts in approach (using more than one approach
to attack a problem)
c) Piecewise adaptation pattern (solving a problem in pieces)
d) Generating and solving related problems
(5) Other phenomena observed include: inappropriate use of al-
gorithms; use of drawings; spontaneous actions relating to
inverse, commutative, and distributive principles; and a
subject 'misreading* a problem to fit his own ideas.
Cognitive models . Some general features of the model of cognitive
processes proposed to account for these phenomena can be summarized as
follows. A method of diagramming was used which allows one to repre-
sent cognitive structure interactions in a student as they occur in time.
This technique also allows one to explicitly tie aspects of the cogni-
tive model to detailed protocol observations. Several types of cogni-
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tive structures were discussed, including written-symbol algorithms,
counting-based structures, and practical action structures. Cognitive
structures were described as semi-autonomous, activatable processes which
assimilate and respond to aspects of the environment. Other theoretical
concepts utilized include: structure activity levels, parallel struc-
ture activity, competition for dominance, external and internal assimila-
tion, disequilibrium, internalized actions, chaining, and recursion.
The theoretical concepts used in this study can be organized in the
following way.
I - Major Theoretical Concepts Used in the Cognitive Structure Model
A. Forms of Structure Organization
Cognitive structures
Substructures
Sequential and parallel integration
of substructures
Expectation structures
B. Structure Interactions
Structure activity levels
Parallel activity
External assimilation
Internal assimilation
Disequilibrium
Assimilation gaps
11
‘ e^Clflc Theoretical Concepts Used In E»p1n natlons of t.h„ p„„ t
A
- of Structure Organon™
Practical action structures
Counting structures
Written symbol algorithm structures
Semi-quantitative expectations
School ideology structures
Structure isolation
B ‘ Structure Properties and Interactions
Competition for dominance
Piecewise-adaptive assimilation
Select and evaluate process
Limited capacity for parallel activity
Aggressive assimilation
Generative assimilation
Overload
Internalized action
Iteration
Chaining
Recursion
The analyses suggest that the children have knowledge structures
which are active and semi-a.utonomous in the sense that their structures
aggressively assimilate problem situations, generate related cases,
dominate other structures, drive explanations, and influence perceptions.
Many of the reasoning processes modelled took the form of structure in-
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teractions that are spontaneous rather than being governed by established,
hierarchical procedures. Structures were shovn-conflicting with each
other; cooperating with each other; and interacting with the environ-
ment-in a manner similar to the way different species interact in an
ecosystem.
Discussion of Cognitive Interpretations
The three detailed analyses in Chapter V claim to give a descrip-
tion of mental events that account for problem solving behavior in ex-
tended sections of protocol. One is able to claim some degree of rigor
because the correspondences between detailed protocol data and cognitive
processes were exhibited explicitly in the diagram.
One can divide the theoretical interpretations into two groups —
(1) the forms of knowledge structures, and (2) the forms of reasoning
processes (structure interactions)
— that have been used to account
for observations of behavior.
Knowledge structures - practical action structures
. The most im-
portant knowledge structures in the last three analyses were practical
action structures
. The students were given story problems that would
ordinarily be classified as division problems, and they produced suc-
cessful solutions—but no standard division algorithm behavior patterns
were observed. How then were these problems solved? They were solved
as the students acted out the problem situations using drawings or man-
ipulative materials. The students’ concept of 'sharing' was modelled
as a process organizing an activity, not as a collection of static re-
lationships or of facts about sharing. The emphasis on action-oriented
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structures was particularly natural i„ this case since the
solutions were acted out fairly explicitly by the students
. The
center of the solution process was the act of sharing itself. And
this is an informal, practical action; practical in the sense that it
action the child can use to solve a real problem (not just a story
problem) and informal in the sense that it is probably learned by the
child in social contexts rather than in the formal school setting. Also,
although these actions may involve counting single sets of real or drawn
objects, they do not depend on a knowledge of standard arithmetic al-
gorithms like column addition or long division. Thus we have seen
several cases where students use a practical action structure to act
out the solution to a story problem without using a standard
algorithm structure
.
Another question concerns the extent to which these three solu-
tions are ’special cases.' Several protocols were chosen for analysis
because they contained more 'visible,' (i.e., acted out) solutions.
Perhaps this is the only kind of solution where action-oriented struc-
tures are involved. Is there then any indication that one can use ac-
tion-oriented structures to model knowledge underlying other kinds of
solutions where counting procedures or written algorithms are used?
There is such an indication in the way that drawings are used in
conjunction with internalized actions in the acted-out. solutions. Re-
call that these solutions are not acted out totally explicitly. Blocks
or drawings are used to symbolize the results of imagined actions on
real objects. Thus the activities are carried out on concrete objects
but are less explicit or 'true to life' than acting out a sharing situa-
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tion with real people. And especially in the cane of David and Kathy,
internalized actions sometin.es took the place of overt actions. The
concept of internalized actions was introduced to account for sections
where students described actions before they were represented in the
drawing (sometimes they were not represented at all). Internalized ac-
tions then provide the possibility of a link whereby practical action
structures can be involved 'behind the scenes') in solutions where more
formal arithmetic appears. In that case it would be possible to think
of most solutions, even those like Anna's where the only behavior one
observes externally is a written calculation, as involving a vicarious,
internal acting out of the problem at some level via a practical action
structure. Thus, internalized actions, via the activity of practical
action structures, constitute a primitive process for solving problems
that may be shown in further studies to underlie solutions involving
arithmetic calculations.
Reasoning via structure interactions
. The explanations of solution
behavior given for the eight protocols have included competitive and
cooperative interactions between structures as well as interactions be-
tween internal structures and the external environment. The power of
these non-logical but non-trivial interactions is impressive.
One can use the general term ’reasoning’ to describe these inter-
actions; but reasoning here refers to processes of cooperation and con-
flict between action-oriented structures, not to the logical manipula-
tion of static statements. Fig. 2h shows a diagram of these two con-
trasting meanings. In an action-oriented, cognitive structures model
reasoning is a spontaneous interaction between a collection of active.
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autonomous knowledge structures whereas in a verbally-oriented, logic-
based model, reasoning is a planned, well-defined process which trans-
forms true statements—segments of static knovledge-into other true
statements
.
Cooperation, external interactions and conflict will now be dis-
cussed in turn.
Cooperation between structures
. Three forms of cooperation have
been discussed— internal assimilation, parallel operation and chaining.
As discussed m David's "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol, internal assimila-
t_ion provides a mechanism by which reasoning can take place in the ab-
sence of external objects. One structure can then provide an inter-
pretation and an appropriate context for the functioning of another
structure internally and this can be considered a form of cooperation.
The concept of chaining was introduced in the David— "Sharing 15 Stones"
analysis
. The Cut in half" structure is seen as operating so as to pro-
vide a better situation for the original "Sharing" structure to operate
in. Thus two structures cooperate so as to provide a path to an improved
solution. Parallel operation was discussed in the Joey "8 Cake Packages"
protocol, where two counting-based structures cooperated by operating
in a synchronous fashion to produce a solution.
Interactions between structures and the environment . Other types
of interactive cognitive processes that have been introduced are the
feedback interactions between structures and the environment. The
general form of these interactions is shown in Fig. 25-
A select-and-evaluate pattern was identified in the Kathy "Sharing
15 Candies" protocol where Kathy estimated a solution, tested it using a
2h0
Cognitive Cognitive
reaction reaction
Fig. 25 Feedback Interaction
drawing and adjusted the solution. This was modelled as a self sustain-
ing Interaction between a practical action-oriented
"Sharing" structure
and the marks on paper that Kathy used to symbolize the distribution
of groups of candies.
A giecewise adaptation circle was used to describe behavior in the
David "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol where David 'built up' a solution
piece by piece, eventually distributing the entire group of circles
he had drawn representing the stones. This was modelled as an interac-
tion between a practical "Sharing" structure and externally drawn marks,
where the "Sharing" structure reassimilated successively smaller sub-
groups left to be distributed.
A marked shift in approach was identified in the Joey "Sharing 15
Stones" protocol. Joey shifted from using counting blocks as an aid
in doing a subtraction calculation to using the blocks to represent
stones to be dealt out into k groups. It was proposed that this shift
was triggered by a conflict between an internal structure (expecting
each person to receive the same amount) and the perception of an exter-
nal configuration of the blocks (showing unequal groups). It was also
proposed that the presence of a 'concrete effect' was playing a role in
this shift in approach, where the presence of the concrete materials
encouraged a 'takeover' by the practical "Sharing" structure. This re-
presents another type of interaction between external events (in this
case the presence of the blocks) and the balance of activity in internal
cognitive structures.
Conflict between structures . Two of these examples of external
interactions are also examples of conflict between structures. Kathy's
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select/evaluate approach is an example where different numbers are
tested by the student—and these number ideas are rejected whenever the
perceptual results of passing out candies and the expectation that none
will be left conflict. Thus the number ideas compete with each other
for consideration, and the perception-expectation conflicts are what
keep the cycle going as the "Sharing" structure attempts to reach an
equilibrium.
The concept of successive dominance (or 'takeover') of one struc-
ture after another structure's activity is suppressed is an example of
competition that was used to interpret the Joey-"Sharing 15 Candies,"
Barry- Sharing 15 Stones" and Roy-"40 Tangerines" protocols. In each
of these protocols the subject was observed to take several different
approaches to the same problem, and the successive approaches were
accounted for by the presence of different structures competing to
assimilate the situation.
Therefore there are two senses in which structures can come into
conflict — (l) in disequilibrium situations where one structure tries
and fails to assimilate another structure, and (2) in situations where
two or more structures compete for dominance.
The interactive character of the solutions . For the protocols
analyzed in Chapter V the student's possession of a practical knowledge
structure was not sufficient by itself to explain the student's be-
havior. The protocols show fairly complex interchanges going on between
the subject and the environment. The models of cognitive activity pro-
posed did not show any process as simple as that of a single knowledge
structure responding to a problem and outputting a solution. (Nor do
they show a simple linear sequence of mental actions outputting a solu-
tion. ) They show a complex series of interactions between internal struc-
tures and external events, and between the internal structures themselves
during the course of a solution. They show structures reassimilatine
new situation aspects in the course of a solution attempt, structures
competing for dominance, and structures cooperating to complete a solu-
tion. Ordinarily one uses the words "reasoning" in the context of
problem solving to refer to cognitive activity where a familiar series
of actions is not immediately available to the subject as a solution.
It is the adaptive, competitive and cooperative activity of structures
that has been used here to explain just these cases where processes
go beyond a simple habitual response. Thus, several cases were anal-
yzed where a familiar series of actions was not available to the student
to provide a solution, and a new combination of several actions was re-
quired. So a description of a subject's mental structures is not enough
to account for problem solving behavior—one must also describe the in-
teractions between structures and between structures and outside events
that lead to appropriate action sequences.
An ecological metaphor
. But on the other hand the point of view
presented here does not treat reasoning processes as controlling the
structures in a rigid way. Rather, reasoning processes are viewed as
spontaneous interactions between structures—and the structures them-
selves retain a large degree of autonomy and retain the ability to act
alone in certain situations. Autonomous properties have been ascribed
to structures in the context of structures competing for dominance,
generating related cases, and aggressively assimilating situation as-
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pects to account for phenomena like counting overshoots, interruptions,
Shifts in approach, and the re-emergence of an approach. So reasoning
is not viewed as a set of rational well-ordered processes which inte-
grate various passive knowledge structures to engage a problem. Rather,
knowledge structures actively engage (assimilate aspects of) a problem
situation themselves and in doing so they interact with each other in
certain ways by competing and cooperating as they interact with the en-
vironment. The play-out of these interactions may be termed 'reasoning.'
A metaphor apropos to this view would be an island ecology involving
many resident species that have established niches and form a stable eco-
system. The adaptive species reactions that would be observed if one
were to introduce a new food source on the island—by stocking a lake
for example might also trigger a play-out of complex interactions like
competition, cooperation (symbiosis) and assimilation (of new food
sources or territory). As in the proposed cognitive model, the island's
ecology is made up of semi-autonomous units (organisms) which act inde-
pendently but which also enter into several kinds of interactions with
each other.
Suggestions for Further Research
Arithmetic structures . Beyond the area of elementary reasoning
processes, the present study has only scratched the surface of the prob-
lem of identifying children's arithmetic structures. Several directions
for studies are suggested:
1. Appendix I contains a study of Joey's comments on simple
arithmetic problems that he solves "in his head. More
the way arithmetic
studies of this kind would illuminate
structures work outside of a practical context.
2. Practical problem solving interviews with 1st grade child-
ren may show how practical action structures operate when
conservation of number is still not firmly established.
They should also indicate the form of arithmetic structures
in their early stages of development.
3. Practical problem solving interviews with older students
may indicate the nature of recurrent difficulties with
concepts of fractions and proportions.
Drawings
. Solutions centering on drawings appear to offer a unique
opportunity for studying internalized actions.
• Quantitative and non-quantitative problems where it
is necessary to use a sequence of several different kinds of actions
may be useful in determining the extent of the overlap between the pre-
sent Piaget ian—based model and the search model in information process-
ing theories. A central question to be dealt with here is the problem
of how the activity of an appropriate action structure is triggered in-
ternally. How do relevant actions come to mind?
Structural learning . When there is a sufficient understanding of
typical arithmetic structures occurring in children, one should be
able to study structural changes over longer time periods by mapping a
particular set of cognitive structures in a child on two occasions.
Varying number ranges . The fact that Roy is knowledgeable about
the results of dividing i*0 objects into ^ boxes and 15 objects into 3
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boxes but not with to Into 5 boxes or 15 Into 5 boxes suggests that
Roy’s knowledge or arithmetic is not evenly distributed over the num-
ber range 0 to 50. A conjecture is made here that this unevenness is
not just a reflection of which arithmetic facts Roy has tried to memor-
ise but that it signals the presence of certain general cognitive struc-
tures through which the child organizes the way quantities combine.
Further research is needed to identify these structures. One interest-
ing research format involves using a story problem more than once with
a student but with the numbers changed.
Dynamic properties
. Examples of observed dynamics (interruptions,
overshoot counting, false starts in counting, word emphasis patterns
in certain transcripts, rhythmic actions or speech, reactions of sur-
prise, etc.) are used to a limited extent in this study. Further studies
of these phenomena, seen as the effects of structures operating in real
time, should add support to the notion of internal structures as dynamic
processes as opposed to static representations.
Studies of single students . An attempt has been made in this
study to uncover a wide range of phenomena and to develop cognitive
mechanisms which begin to explain them. In depth case studies of single
students working on many problems would serve to refine these cognitive
models and to make stronger claims for their validity. An appreciation
of the usefulness of both general concepts and particular protocol
models will grow as they are refined enough to be able to account for
a whole series of protocols with an individual student in a consistent
manner
,
Internalized actions . Studies are needed to investigate the fol-
lowing hypothesis raised by the studv- qn i* St,Ucty
- solutions to quantitative story
problems are organized on the basis of internalized actions on objects
even in cases where one observes immediate solutions, counting-based
solutions, or the formulation of arithmetic problems in standard form.
Educational Implication's
It is unfortunate that the intuitive knowledge and reasoning pro-
cesses discussed in this study seem to be utilized to such a limited
extent in school.
Despite repeated urges to "start from what the student knows,"
it is still true that many educational activities are designed around
a blank slate model of the learning process. "Starting from what the
student knows" is too often translated to mean: "Determine which of
the standard objectives in the curriculum has been mastered by the
student." Too little advantage is taken of knowledge and reasoning pro
cesses that originate with the student.
It is suggested here that reasoning processes and practical know-
ledge structures like those identified in this study can serve as
starting points for building mathematical ideas. Certainly this study
gives only a partial list of such starting points, but the list should
become larger and clearer as more clinical research is carried out.
Problems in applying arithmetic . Barry's attempt to solve the
"Sharing 15 Candies" problem was interesting because he made a 'grand
tour' through four written arithmetic algorithms involving multiplica-
tion, division, subtraction, and addition. Furthermore he was observed
to report numbers in the place of the remainder as the answer in written
division problem. These observations are related to Engager's (19TM
clinical study of 5th and 6th grade children. He found the absence
of a relationship between school mathematics and intuitive ideas about
quantities (in the students) and showed how the students in his
study had instead constructed a large number of rules centering on the
manipulation of number symbols on the printed page. Now one could
probably very easily teach Barry to report the number on top of the
division bracket as the answer rather than the number at the bottom
of the calculation. But the heart of the matter does not of course lie
there. Barry's division algorithm structure appears to be an isolated
structure that has difficulty in connecting its activity to practical
action structures that interpret practical problems.
In order to examine the problem of isolated structures, the role
of story problems in the typical grade school class will first be
discussed. The standard approach to teaching arithmetic is to teach
written computation skills and then to give students story problems
which provide practice in applying those skills. One first teaches a
section on a particular operation, say addition of 2 digit numbers with
regrouping, moving quickly from a conceptual introduction using concrete
objects (or, more frequently, illustrations) to ’serious business' -
practice with written arithmetic problems. Only after practice with the
written arithmetic are story problems introduced. Thus schools typically
make a separation between a context of computation—of do i ng aritlimetic—
and a context of applying arithmetic. It is possible that this separa-
tion is a major factor leading to the cognitive isolation of algorithmic
structures in children.
above sequence need not al-
The present study indicates that the
ways be followed. In the protocols of David and Kathy in Chapter V
one sees them solve the "Sharing 15 Stones" problem ordinarily solved
via division by using different acted out approaches. Neither David nor
Kathy have studied division in school. And although Joey had already
had an introduction to division problems in school, he too acted out
the solution to this problem. Joey also used a counting-based approach
to the "8 Cake Packages" problem. These protocols show that it was pos-
sible to engage these children in interesting forms of problem solving
using problems that would ordinarily be reserved for older children.
When they could not or did not use a written arithmetic algorithm, they
used an act-out or counting-based approach. They assimilated the prob-
lem to the structures they had—to what they knew how to do . One of
the interesting features of mathematics is that there are usually many
ways to get to the same place. Too often schools seem to champion only
one way to getting to a particular place, such as using written-symbol
algorithms to calculate the answer to a story problem.
Starting from practical contexts . Can one use story problems to
introduce children to new arithmetic ideas? Although the interviews
in this study were not designed to be instructional experiences, one
does see in the protocols interesting situations where learning may
occur. Since David and Kathy are just about to reach their first chap-
ter on multiplication and division it would be interesting to try in-
troducing them to these topics by starting from practical contexts por-
trayed in story problems. One could try to tap into the practical ac-
tion structures of the children as the intuitive foundation on which
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new counting-based structures and algorithmic structures can be built.
In that case, instead of learning to do arithmetic so that they can
later it, students would be learning to do arithmetic in the con-
text of applying it. For example, the time to introduce Joey to the
notation for multiplication, such as 8x 2=16
,
might be directly after
he solves a problem like the "8 Cake Packages" problem where he uses
a counting-based approach. If Joey can connect this notation to
several different practical problems before he is required to memorize
all of the multiplication facts, then he may be on the way to estab-
lishing a link for himself between the world of symbols on paper and
the world of practical actions.
Progressive levels of symbolization
. The study proposed that in
several of the protocols the children solved story problems via intern-
alized actions without the use of formal arithmetic ideas. This led to
the hypothesis that solutions to story problems are often organized men-
tally on the basis of internalized actions on objects even in cases
where one observes immediate solutions, counting-based solutions, or the
formulation of an arithmetic problem in standard form. (See p. 237.)
This suggests that educators should pay increased attention to the devel-
opment of children’s ability to reason via internalized actions. One
way to do this may be to encourage students to symbolize practical prob-
lem solutions at increasingly abstract levels— in acted out, drawn out,
counted out, and finally, written arithmetic formats. It appears to
be crucial that students not view these formats as completely separate
spheres of activity. They should be able to translate between them
and view them as different ways of representing the same problem.
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Tapping intuitive knowledge and reasoning processes. Story prob-
lems may not be the best medium for these approaches—other mediums
may work better, like problems growing out of small-group projects
(see Lomon [1971] for a description of a project approach) or the use
of mathematics to describe systems in the study of science. But in
any case there appears to be an opportunity and a need for a creative
effort to develop instructional settings that meet two general criteria.
First, algorithmic procedures and notation need to be connected to
quantitative situations that are already intuitively meaningful to the
student in some way. This may help to prevent the cognitive isolation
of algorithmic structures. If a student can solve certain problem sit-
uations successfully through practical actions and counting, then these
may be good starting points. Algorithmic methods, rather than be studied
as ends in themselves, should be learned as useful shortcuts to practical
approaches, like counting or acting out, that are more intuitive but that
are too time consuming.
Second, the protocols analyzed here were explained via the presence
of active knowledge structures which entered into spontaneous reasoning
interactions such as generative assimilation (leading to the generation
of related cases), chaining, recursion, the select and evaluate process
(leading to solving a problem via convergent trial and error) and piece-
wise assimilation (leading to solving a problem in pieces). Settings
need to be found where creative reasoning interactions like these can
most easily come into play. In this way perhaps students can develop
an appreciation for the fact that there are many ways to reach places.
and a sense of confidence in their ability to find them.
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appendix I
PATTERNS IN JOEY'S COMMENTS ON ARITHMETIC PROBLEMS
The exploratory clinical interview approach used in the main body
of the present study for the analysis of story problem solutions can
also he applied to the analysis of solutions to simple arithmetic prob-
lems. This appendix illustrates this application by interpreting pat-
terns in Joey's comments on arithmetic problems, showing how many separ-
ate instances of behavior can be attributed to a few types of thought
.
processes. Notes included in this appendix analyze the same data more
rigorously, illustrating a second level of analysis that is somewhat
more formal.
Introduction. Elementary teachers today feel a good deal of pres-
sure to maintain a high rate of mathematics achievement in their class-
rooms, both in terms of standardized test scores and in terms of the
amount of curriculum material covered successfully. This pressure often
tends to focus one on monitoring correct answer percentages so that suc-
cessful students can be reinforced and moved ahead if possible, while
students having trouble can be identified for more practice or for re-
views of lesson material. However, authors such as Davis (1972), Gins-
burg (1972), Erlwanger (1973), Lankford (197*0, Easley (1975), and
Easley and Zwoyer (1975), have indicated an alternative to an exclusive
focus on performance scores in the classroom. They suggest paying atten-
tion not just to whether a student's answer to a problem is correct,
but also to the particular process the student goes through to obtain
the answer. This approach can uncover some fascinating patterns in
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student's behaviors, and holds promise for providing a basis for more
effective instruction. This appendix describes some patterns in a
third grader's explanations of how he solves certain addition and sub-
traction problems. Analysis of these patterns suggests that at least
two of them are manifestations of ideas he has constructed largely on
his own, independently of his training in school. In addition, the
flexible nature of these ideas contrasts with a simplistic view of arith-
metic knowledge—the view that a knowledge of arithmetic consists of a
collection of facts and symbol manipulation algorithms.
A simplistic view o f arithmetic knowledge as facts and algorithms
.
According to this view one first learns to say and write the names of
the natural numbers in order. Then one memorizes the simple addition
facts up to 9+9=18. The same is done for subtraction facts. Armed
with these facts one can learn various algorithms for solving more dif-
ficult problems with paper and pencil. The addition 13 for example,
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is performed using the facts 3+5=8 and 1+2=3 with the appropriate habits
for arranging the numerals on the page so that the two individual re-
sults, 3 and 8, can be read as a single 2 digit answer. Carrying, col-
umn subtraction, and borrowing algorithms complete the picture, allow-
ing one to add or subtract any two natural numbers. Multiplication and
division facts are learned in a similar way, as well as the accompanying
algorithms which extend the domain of application of these two operations
to any pair of natural numbers.
In this view then, the facts learned initially, like 2+3=5, are
seen purely as a set of separately learned associations. Given a pair
of numbers and an operation, the student must associate to this combina-
tion a third number designated as the answer. The algorithms which
use and extend these facts are methods involving one or more simple steps
to be performed or repeated in a specified order. Here we have in mind
the standard arithmetic algorithms which are used in conjunction with
visual symbols written on paper. Each step involves the use of an
arithmetic fact or a knowledge of where to write a numeral on the page
in relation to other numerals. We shall call this view of arithmetic
knowledge the facts and algorithms view
.
Clearly, this view of the nature of arithmetical knowledge is a
limited one. It consists of an intricate system for merely starting
from some marks on paper and writing down some new marks. In theory,
it could be learned as an isolated body of knowledge because the sym-
bols with which it works need not have any meaningful interpretation -
it could operate without any connection whatsoever to our everyday
knowledge of the world. The expression '300 ^6', for example, could
simply be associated with a particular symbol manipulation algorithm
and the answer symbol it yields. Another kind of knowledge not admitted
in this view is a knowledge of relationships like '(3+5) = (5+3)' or
'if 3+5=8 then 8-5=3'. Nor is there a knowledge of the relationship
between 3+5=8 and counting operations with objects.
Almost all teachers and textbooks go beyond this view to some ex-
tent in the kinds of knowledge they try to develop in students. Count-
ing groups of real objects, for example, is an activity which can form
a rudimentary connection between number names and real world situations.
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Thus numbers will begin to have at least one interpretation in the
child's world. Word problems are assigned with the intention of form-
ing deeper connections between practical situations and arithmetic
knowledge, but many students seem to have difficulty making these con-
nections. Laws such as the commutative and associative laws are intro-
duced in order to tie related operations together, but when this is done
primarily via formal definitions, students may still fail to use these
principles in practice. So the extent to which students succeed in de-
veloping a knowledge of arithmetic that goes beyond the level of a col-
lection of facts and algorithms is currently not known. Part of the
problem is that although we feel that facts and algorithms approach is
inadequate by itself, we have difficulty pinning down a very precise
answer to the question: "What kinds of knowledge go significantly be-
yond this approach?"
Patterns in Joey's comments . An alternative to answering this
question by drawing on ideas from established mathematical theory is to
look for intuitive mathematical ideas that occur naturally in children.
The examples in this appendix are drawn primarily from protocols in-
volving arithmetic problems. In individual interviews a chiJd is asked
to do a problem 'in his head,' although he is always allowed to use
paper and pencil if needed. The student is encouraged to comment on
his thinking during the course of solving the problem and after a solu-
tion has been found. Analysis then proceeds on the assumption that
these comments are partial reflections of the cognitive processes used
to find the solution.
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The following passages are excerpts from a series of taped inter-
views with Joey, an eight year old child in the third grade. They have
been carefully transcribed and appear here without deletions or edit-
ing of any kind. These excerpts were chosen as interesting cases to
investigate the possibility that Joey's arithmetic ideas go signifi-
cantly beyond a facts and algorithms knowledge structure. To the ex-
tent that this occurs, one can begin to define other more intuitive
kinds of arithmetic knowlege that Joey uses.
A1 Interviewer:
Joey:
How much is 8 plus 9?
IT
I: Well how'd you get that so fast?
Joey: - Oh, -
I: Is that just easy?
Joey: Yeah, because 9 plus ah - 9 plus 8 is 17
because 10 plus 8 is 18 - now 9 is one
less than 10 so it's se- seventeen.
Here Joey comments on his answer and gives us some clues about how he
thinks about addition with numbers in this range. He makes similar
comments on two other problems:
I: How much is 7 plus 8?
Joey: 7 plus 8? - You said 7 plus 8.
I: Uh huh [yes]
Joey: - 15
I: Got that pretty fast too. How'd you
do that one?
Joey: I just went like this, it would be 10
plus 7 is 17 - o.k. - then 9 plus 7 is
16
,
and 9- oh and 8 plus 7 is 15-
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I: [how much is] 9 + 2?
Joey: 9+2? - ll
I: And how do you get 11?
Joey: 'Cause if there, 'cause
— 10 plus 2 it would be
ah, then that should be
if it was- 9 ah
12, now- it's 9,
11.
There are several similarities in these passages. In each Joey
solves a related problem where he adds one of the given numbers to 10.
Then he makes a series of inferences about other sums. The inferences
are made by repeatedly reducing the first addend and the sum of the re-
lated problem by one until the original problem is reached with its
solution. Adding a number to 10 appears to be something he can do
easily. He seems to prefer thinking of 10 as the 'starting point,’
and orients to the number in the problem closest to 10 as the first
addend. This choice minimizes the number of steps then required to
solve the problem. Notice also that in A1 and A2 Joey ends up with
the addends in reversed order — for example, when given the problem
8+9, Joey answers 17, then begins his comment by saying, "..ah, 9 plus
8 is 17 because..," He treats 9+8 as a problem with the same answer
as 8+9* Thus he spontaneously uses thought processes which produce be-
havior consistent with the commutative principle of addition.
V
We will also want to consider the domain of situations in which
this behavior appears, but we have too little data here to define this
domain carefully. For the moment we can estimate that this kind of be-
havior could occur at least in problems of the form A+B or B+A where
A=8 or 9 and 2<B<8. Where needed, one can obtain a more precise pic-
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ture of this kind of domain by selecting appropriate questions in sub-
sequent interviews
. Prom these observations, then, we think of Joey
being able to do sums of the form 10+A quickly and easily, and being
able to work backwards from them to solve other problems indirectly.
We will call this pattern 'decrementing from 10.' (See Note 1 for a
more formal analysis of this pattern.)
t^tern
_
s_i n_Toey's errors
. Joey's errors are often particularly
interesting. Consider the following passage:
— 8ow about 18 take away 7: [Misreads problem
from card.
]
Jr 18 take away 7*
I: Oh, I'm sorry,
J: Huh?
I: 18 take away 17 .
J: 18 take away -- 11 [is the answer].
I: How do you know?
J: I just know. 'Cause if there would be 8
take away 7 it would be 1.
I: So -
J: So, if it was like that it would be 11.
Since the interviewer misreads the problem at first, we would ordinarily
assume that Joey gives the number 11 as an answer to the problem 18-7
and ignores the interviewer's emphasized correction for some reason.
But then he makes a similar error in another situation. At one point
in the course of solving a word problem he decides to subtract l6 from
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17 and says the following:
J: 17 take away 16 is 11, right?
I: Well, show me that on paper.
J: Let
' s see
,
[writes] 17
-16
01 (writes the 1 first,
then the 0)
Uh oh -
I: It's not 11?
J : Nope
. It's one
.
This increase our suspicion that Joey has a non-standard way of think-
ing about certain subtraction problems. When Joey works on paper, it
appears that he deals with the problem differently than when he does it
in his head. ' But it’s hard to know whether his initial error in B2
is a 'slip of the tongue', a 'borrowing error', a random mistake, or
some other kind of error.
Some new clues show up later, however, when he is working on another
word problem. He is using some counting blocks, putting them into groups
of b to see how many groups of b it will take to make 20 blocks. He has
placed 3 groups of 1 on the table when the following exhange occurs:
B3 I: How many [blocks] do we have?
J: (Looks at one group) Four.
I: Where?
J: (Looks at all 3 groups) I mean 12 —
I: So we need some more?
J: Yeah, 18 more - l8 more 1'd be 20.
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Here again we find a result that is higher by 10 than it should be.
This contrasts with the following correct solution:
—
I: OK. How about l6 plus 5?
J : 16 plus 5 — 21
.
I: How'd you get 21 so fast?
J: How did I get 21 so fast - I just did like
6 plus 5, 6 plus 5 is 11, so ah, l6 plus 5
probably is 21.
In cases B1 and BU we see Joey referring to a related problem involving
the addition of two single digits. The numbers correspond to the digits
in the one's place of the numberals in the original problem. Joey seems
to infer that the answer to the original problem will be 10 higher than
the answer to his related problem. We will call this approach 'addition-
subtraction via digits.
' The pattern suggests an explanation for his
errors in B2 and B3 as well. In the case of 17-16, for example, we sus-
pect that he thinks about 7-6, calculates 7-6=1, then converts the 1 to
an 11. This works perfectly well in problems like 16+5 and 17-2. Thus
it is a perfectly reasonable approach for a certain range of numbers.
But in subtraction problems involving 2 numbers between 10 and 20, after
he calculates the answer to the related problem involving digits, he
converts the answer unnecessarily into a number 10 higher. Apparently
he gets into trouble because the domain of application of his method is
too broad.
So in addition to patterns in Joey's successful behavior one finds
patterns in the errors he makes as well. They suggest that his calcu-
lation errors, 17-l6=U, 'with 12 blocks, to get 20 one needs l8 more,'
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20-12=18, and 18-17=11, are not, just accidents. They are a consequence
of the quite consistent way in which Joey thinks about addition and sub-
traction problems with numbers in this range. 2
Subt^tJon_^^tiM. Another pattern can be defined from the
following passages:
—
I : How about 6 take away 3?
J: 3
I: How do you know that?
J: If it's - since 3 plus 3 is 6, well than
6 take away 3 is 3.
C2 I: OK. How about l6 take away 6?
J: 16 take away 6? - Hmm - l6 take away 6 -
aw - holy moly-
Aw! I should a been knowin' that, it's 10.
I: How'd you get 10?
J: Huh?
I: Wha - you suddenly realized you could do it -
why?
J : I should a been knowing it - Because 10 plus
6, is l6 - So l6 take away 6, is 10 - I just
didn’t think of it.
I: Well what made you think of the 10?
J: Huh?
I: What made you think of the 10 all of a sudden?
J: I just thought of it.
Here Joey refers to the inverse operation of addition in commenting on
his answers to subtraction problems. The additions are so closely tied
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to these subtract ions for him that they can stand alone as justifica-
tions of his answers
. It is almost as if Joey thinks about subtrac-
tion in terms of addition in this range of numbers. Notice that these
comments are spontaneous
- they are not responses to questions about
relating addition and subtraction problems. Another slightly more com-
plex example follows:
C3 I: And what
' s 9 take away 3?
J: 9 take away 3? - 6
I: How do you get 6?
J: Huh?
I: How do you get 6?
J: Uh - because, a, 6 plus 2
more, that's 9.
is 8, add one
I: You thought of all that?
J: Uh huh.
I: When you were doing it the first time?
J: Uh huh.
Here again Joey refers to the inverse operation, but this time he does
so in two steps. He refers to the additions 6+2=8 and 8+1=9, rather
than the expected 6+3=9. If we infer from the pattern in Cl and C2 that
Joey is also thinking about something like 6+3=9, then in each of the
3 passages Joey is adding the subtrahend of the original problem to the
answer to obtain the minuend as a sum. This pattern will be called
'subtraction via addition.' Notice also that Joey's comments in (13 are
consistent with the associative principle of addition if we paraphrase
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them as follows
:
6+2=8, +1=9 6+ 3 =9
(a+b) +c=d a + (b+c) = d
Now Piaget (1969) uses the arithmetic operations of addition and
its inverse, subtraction, as a prime example of his concept of rever-
sibility in mental operations. The reversibility idea implies a kind of
symmetry m two actions that have opposite effects - one can 'do' and
'undo' with equal facility. However, the author has never seen children
spontaneously use a subtraction calculation to support an addition cal-
culation. If we characterize pattern C as evidence for the spontaneous
involvement of a reversible operation we should qualify this point of
view by indicating that its application appears to be asymmetrical.
So far three patterns in Joey's comments on arithmetic problems
have been presented. To account for these patterns we have proposed
the theory that they are three different thought processes involved,
and we have made a small start on the task of modelling the individual
characteristics of these thought processes. We will move on now to
attempt to characterize some common characteristics shared by these pro-
cesses. But it should be noted that we could continue to analyze more
protocol data on Joey and continue to catalogue patterns in his re-
sponses. (From pilot work it appears that one can easily find six or
more such patterns with a typical student and that patterns vary from
student to student.) Thus an important direction for future research
would be to make a more complete catalogue of behavior patterns for a
student and to attempt to construct a complete cognitive map of the
student's system of arithmetic structures.
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Joey’s approach to arithmetic and the -
r r
--
Clearly we would be doing Joey an injustice by referring to the arith-
metic knowledge he demonstrates in these passages as being based on a
facts and algorithms approach. We can divide the previous problems in-
to two groups according to how they would be handled in a facts and al-
gorithms approach as follows:
Hypothetically Hypothetically
Remembered as a Fact Solved via Paper-Pencil Algorithm
Al 8+9 Bl 18-17
A2 7+8 B2 17-16
A3 9+2 B3 20-12
Cl 6-3 BU 16+5
C3 9-3 C2 16-6
The problems on the left would be remembered as rote facts with no oper-
ations needed of any kind. But in each of these cases we saw Joey
bringing in other numbers and operations. In each case he related these
to the original problem. Apparently he was not just remembering a fact.
The problems on the right would require a paper and pencil algor-
ithm, but Joey solves these by other means without using paper. It is
also unlikely that Joey solved these problems using paper and pencil-
based algorithms visualized 'in his head.' His comments in and C2 ,
and the fact that doing B2^ on paper led him to a different answer from
his first answer, all indicate that this was not the case. Apparently
he was not using paper pencil algorithms.
Could Joey have learned the approaches he uses from segments of
his school's curriculum that go beyond the facts and algorithms q.pproach?
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In pattern C, 'subtraction via addition,- the approach Joey uses is
compatible with activities in his textbook that relate problems like
8-3=5 and 5+3=8. Thus it is conceivable that the idea behind this pat-
tern developed in response to instruction given Jeoy in school. But
in the case of pattern A, the 'decrementing from 10 ' pattern, this is
unlikely — as a method it is far too unorthodox. The curriculum which
Joey used in school presents a different kind of method to students for
adding via ten. It encourages students to break a problem like 8+7=?
into two sums: 8+2=10 and 10+5+15. Joey, on the other hand, starts
with the sum 10+7+17 and then derives the sums 9+7=16 and 8+7 + 15 . So
Joey apparently did not learn the knowledge he exhibits in pattern A
from the school curriculum.
Pattern B also appears to not be a result of school-fostered know-
ledge. When Joey makes statements like: '17-16 is 11 ,' and, '(when
you have 12) 18 more'd be 20,' in the B examples, several interpreta-
tions are possible. We could assume that these are random, careless
mistakes. But the consistent pattern we observe in the errors leads
us to believe that they are caused by a stable thought process in Joey.
We would assume that this process is derived from a method that was
taught to Joey, but that was distorted by him in some way. But in Joey's
curriculum the only method that is taught for problems like those in
pattern B are standard paper and pencil algorithms. Since it appears
that Joey did not use anything resembling these algorithms, we conclude
that the process Joey uses here is one lie invented primarily on his own.
Characterizing Joey's knowledge . If Joey's knowledge of arithmetic
is partially self-invented and goes beyond a collection of facts and
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algorithms, then how can „e earacterUe it? In reading through the
transcripts the most distinctive aspect that emerges is the striking
~1111)1 11^ in th® he thinks about these problems. There are
three aspects of flexibility visible in the protocol segments.
The first aspect is fieneruUd^. By this we mean that each of the
three ideas of Joey's analysed here is a general scheme that assimilates
a whole domain of situations. For example, his 'decrementing from 10'
scheme can assimilate the problems 9+9, 7+8, 9+2, and, we expect, many
others. When arithmetic facts like 7+6=13 are assumed to be the only
available kind of knowledge, each unit applies to only one arithmetic
problem. The behavior patterns discussed here, however, suggest the
existence of units of knowledge in Joey that can each handle many
problems
.
Now this characteristic of generality is not unique to intuitive
arithmetic ideas like Joey's— it is also a characteristic of the stan-
dard symbol manipulation algorithms and structures of intelligence in
general. But a second aspect of flexibility in Joey's thinking that is
not an intrinsic characteristic of symbol manipulation algorithms is his
apparent awareness of interrela t ionships between number s and between
number operations
. In A1 (8+9=17) Joey says '10+8 is 18 - now 9 is one
less than 10
,
so it's se-seventeen. ' He refers explicitly to a 'one
less than' relationship between the numbers 9 and 10 and refers implicitly
to a corresponding relationship between the values of 9+8 and 10+8. Thus
the connection he makes between the two summed pairs seems to involve
a relationship between two numbers contained in the pairs. These are
some of the relationships Joey seems to be at home with.
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Joey expresses another kind of reiatlonship between particular
summed pairs in pattern B. In B1 (18-17=11) hc „ays: 'So if It's like
that it would be 11,' and In Bh (l6+5
-21)i 'I Just did like 6*5
He indicates that the problem 18-17 is 'like' 8-7 and that l6+5 is 'like'
6*5, but there is not enough evidence in these examples to nay whether
the relationship involves adding or subtracting 10, or the way 16 'sounds
like' or ’looks like' 6, or some other aspect.
In pattern C Joey again relates different problems, but this time
there are summed pairs and subtracted pairs such as 16-6-10 and 10+6=l6
He says little about why these are necessarily related for him, but the
relationships appear to be very strong for him, as if the reason were
so obvious that it needs no explanation.
So in each of the three patterns we see an aspect of the flexibil-
ity of Joey’s arithmetic knowledge in his ability to interrelate numbers
and number operations. This leads us directly to a third aspect of his
flexibility—that of redundancy
. In other interviews Joey has demon-
strated that he, like mo3t children his age, can also do addition and
subtraction problems by counting, often using his fingers for tallying.
So he has at least two ways of doing each problem discussed so far. And
in particular cases he may have other ways of operating as well— such
as the paper and pencil algorithm he uses In passage B2, sums he has
done often enough to be remembered by association, or' any of several
other interesting forms of arithmetic knowledge that will not, be dis-
cussed in this paper.
Although we have no clear-cut evidence in Joey's case it also is
quite conceivable that the thought processes underlying each behavior
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pattern can be 'stretched' to apply to a problem ordinarily thought about
in another way. For example, for 11+6, instead of relating the problem
to 6+1, Joey might relate it to 10+6. We should notice that such domain
overlaps are not guaranteed to occur in any single instance, however,
since Joey does say that 18-17 is 11, and apparently does not use the
thought process underlying the 'subtraction via addition’ pattern to
ask himself whether 17+11=18. Had he done this, he might have corrected
his answer. Or would he have? Notice that if his thinking corresponded
to the addition-subtraction via digits’ pattern when he added 17+11,
he would have related this to 7+1=8 and gotten 18 for the answer! So
here we have the possibility that Joey’s structures have been working
together redundantly, and reconfirming each other, even though they
don't always agree with the standard arithemetic facts.
Impl ications and a question
. Several interview passages have been
analyzed to show how Joey's arithmetic ideas go beyond a facts and al-
gorithms approach and beyond what he has been taught in school. These
ideas are characterized by three kinds of flexibility: each idea is
general in that it handles a range of number situations; each reflects
an awareness of interrelationships between numbers and between number
operations; and together these ideas imply a redundancy in the means
Joey has for thinking about arithmetic problems. However, since the
answers Joey obtains using his arithmetic ideas agree only part of the
time with the standard ones, his teacher may feel safer asking him to
forget his own approaches and to concentrate more on learning the num-
ber facts and standard algorithms. But since Joey has apparently con-
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St™ many Of these ideas on his own, it would seem tragic to simply
dismiss them as undesirable. In the long run, that would in effect be
telling him that his own creative efforts are undesirable. Unfortun-
ately , this may happen with many students in an inadvertant way, be-
cause teachers ordinarily lack training in ways of discovering the self-
constructed ideas their students have. Thus when they introduce or re-
view an arithmetic concept they may be unknowingly competing with an
idea that the student has already constructed. At the moment we do not
have data on the extent to which this occurs in schools, but it is in-
teresting to note in this regard that Joey is not an exceptional stu-
dent academically
—he comes from a lower income family and earns below
average grades in schoo]
.
So it seems important that educators pursue the question of how
the school can work with children like Joey to build on the arithmetic
ideas they have already constructed so that their creative instincts
are not suppressed. This problem is not likely to have any single
simple solution. But part of the solution will involve an increased
sensitivity on the part of teachers to the self-constructed ideas of
students. In this study an attempt has been made to expose some of
these self-constructed ideas as a first step toward the development
of this kind of sensitivity.
Note 1 :
We can make this informal analysis of these first "A" passages
more rigorous in the following way. Consider these statements from
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analysis. Joey... adds one of the given numbers to 10 and then
makes a series of inferences about other sums. The Inferences are made
by reducing the first addend and the sum..." Here and throughout the
analysis there is no careful distinction between Joey's snoken
on the one hand and the flow, of his ideas on the other. The word 'Infer-
ence' above, for example, slurs these two categories together because
it can be taken to mean a verbal statement In a certain form or to mean
3. certain kind, of thought process
.
This problem stems in part from a natural but misleading tendency
to identify human ideas with verbal statements - a tendency which in-
volves treating human thoughts as static objects. But here we take the
point of view that verbal statements are expressions derived from thought
processes of the speaker that flow in time. These thoughts are pro-
cesses, not static objects. And verbal statements must be interpreted
by the listener in terms of the listener's knowledge. We therefore have
two potentially distorting transformations occurring along the path from
the thoughts of the subject to the thoughts - the 'communicated meanings'
in the listening observer. So it does not make sense to identify verbal
statements with thought patterns in the speaker, and we can claim no
direct access to another person's thoughts through language.
The best we can do in talking about someone else's cognitive pro-
cesses is to try to model those processes. This involves making an
educated guess, but it is possible to become more and more 'educated'
as one becomes more familiar with the particular person's behavior.
In that case the model of the person's cognitive processes can be re-
fined to fit more and more observations. In order to do this system-
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atically it is necessary to make explicit the steps by „hlch ^
the characteristics of another person's thought from his verbal and
non-verbal behavior.
We can take a more rigorous approach by separating as clearly as
possible our observations of external behavior from our statements
about internal thought processes that can account for the behavior. To
do this we can list observed features of A1
,
A2, and A3 that make them
appear to be similar types of solutions. We call this list a behavior
£-attern for Joey- Here the word 'pattern' refers both to observed
similarities in Joey’s actions at different times and observed similar-
ities in the situations in which these actions occur. An observed be-
havior pattern, once established, suggests the presence of an internal
mental organization - it suggests that the subject is going through a
similar kind of cognitive process in each case. For the passages
labeled A above these two entities will be referred to as the 'decre-
menting from 10 behavior pattern' and the 'decrementing from 10 thought
process,' respectively.
To begin analysis, we first attempt to define the behavior pattern
by singling out 'surface' similarities between the passages that are
relatively independent of our own interpretations of Joey's thought
processes as follows:
Behavior patterns : 1. In each comment Joey refers to adding one
of the original addends to 10 in the form '10 + M is N. ' 2. The smaller
of the two addends appears at M. 3- He verbally relates the summation
involving 10 to the original problem in a single sentence, h . He re-
lates '10 + A = B' to '9 + A = (B-l)," then to '8 + A = (B-2 ) , ' and
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continues in this fashion until the original problem, or the same prob-
lem with addends reversed, is stated with its solution.
Similarities between the situations in which Joey behaves this way
include: 5. the fact that he is asked to comment on his answer to an
addition problem done 'in his head' (without paper or manipulatives)
,
6. he is responding to a question like "how did you do that (problem)?";
7. the pairs to be added consist of the digit 9 or 8 and another digit.
As one defines this behavior pattern one can begin to model the
vay Joey conceptualizes these 3 problems by characterizing thought pro-
cesses that can explain his behavior - these will be called thought
process characteristics : 1. the fact that he sometimes restates a prob-
lem with addends reversed indicates that he does not distinguish between
problems of the form a+b=? and b+a=? as having different answers;
2. the fact that he brings in sums of the form 10+a and the fact that
he treats them as givens (he does not feel a need to justify the answer
to 10+a) indicates that a familiar sub-process is involved in doing
summations of this form.
3* His statement in A1
,
Now 9 is one less than 10 so it's se—
seventeen," along with the sequential order in which he states related
sums in A2
,
indicates the existence of another thought process which
relates the summation 10+A to the original problem via a sequence of
intermediate sums.
The behavior pattern and the thought process characteristics given
above constitute a more rigorous analysis of the behavior in question
by maintaining a distinction between observations and theory. To be
sure, as in all scientific work, the observations reported depend on
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the particular aspects the observer attends to. And as in any science
there is no way to logically deduce theoretical models (of cognitive
processes in this, case) from observations
- the models are always hypo-
thetical models. But the separation of observation and theory allows
US in principle to agree on observed phenomena to be explained. Alter-
nate theoretical models can then be evaluated on the basis of how well
and how much of these phenomena are accounted for. In addition, the
separation of observations and theory has heuristic value in that it
gives the analyst two levels at which to work. New findings at one
level can trigger a breakthough at the other level, in either direction.
Note 2 :
A more rigorous analysis here would be:
1. In each of the ^ passages Joey reports an answer 10 higher
than the sum or difference of the digits in the one's places of the
numbers in the original addition or subtraction problem. 2. Joey's
comments in B1 and both refer to a related problem - an addition or
subtraction of single digits. These digits correspond to the digits in
the one's place of the numerals in the original problem (we do not
at this point infer that Joey is thinking about written numerals or
the one's place, but these concepts are used to give us a preliminary
way to describe the pattern in his behavior). 3- The numbers in the
single digit problem are given in the same corresponding order as the
initial problem - as in BU: "6+5 is 11 so l6+5 probably is 21."
Similarities in the situations in which Joey exhibits this be-
havior include: U. Joey is asked to comment on how he found the an-
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sver to a problem done 'in his head.' 5 . The pairs to be SUImned Qr sub_
tracted include one number in the teens and another number in the teens
or a digit.
Thought Process Characteristics
: From the fact that Joey brings in
the summed digit problems in B1 and BU and the fact that they are ex-
pressed as single phrases and related to the original problem with the
' causal ' expressions 'because' and 'so', we suspect that 1. Joey thinks
about 6+5=11 and 8-7=1 as independent calculations and that he has par-
ticular thought processes that deal with these calculations relatively
easily. 2 . Because the simpler related problems correspond to digits
in the one's place of the original problems we also suspect that Joey
has some process for relating the original problem (with answer S) to
the simpler problem (with answer T) that causes him to report an an-
swer S, where S—10+T. But in terms of the data we have here, it is un-
clear whether this process involves ideas of place value, or adding
and subtracting 10
,
or the way l6 'sounds like' or 'looks like' 6 for
example.
Note 3 :
Again we can proceed more rigorously as follows:
Behavior patterns : 1. In each case Joey is asked 'how he got' the
answer to a subtraction problem given orally. 2. The numbers involved
ranged from 3 to l6 .
3. In Cl and C2 his comments refer to a related addition problem
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where the subtrahend Is added to the difference to equal the minuend.
This summation is treated as a 'given' by him, that is, no Justifica-
tion is provided. In C3, we also find a summation, but in this case
it is a double summation (6+2=8, 8+1=9).
Thought process characteristics : 1. We infer that Joey has some
notion of ’adding 3 to 6’ in mind when he says '6+2 is 8, add one more,
that’s 9.* 2. Furthermore we infer that for Joey, thinking about these
subtraction problems somehow activates mental structures associated
with the inverse addition problem. In his responses to questions about
how he gets an answer, these structures tend to dominate any other ways
he may have for thinking about subtraction such as ’counting down' or
repeatedly removing 1 from the minuend.
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appendix II
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS
Complete transcripts are included in this appendix for those pro.
tocols which appeared previously in shortened form.
Barry -- "Sharing 15 Stones" 5/9/75
Full Transcript
1 B: (Roads from card) Jim and his I4 friends found a green paper
hag about 2 feet away from a rabbit hole. Inside they found
15 green stones. They want to share them equally. How many
green stones should each one get?"
2 Four [says this to himself] they’d have to have another
friend.
3 I: They would?
U B: Uh huh (i: Why?) There - there isn't the equally stones.
5 I: Show me why there isn't, why you think it isn't.
6 B: 15 isn't a equal number.
7 I: Isn't an equal number - what does that mean? I don't know what
you mean.
8 B: I could multiply.
9 I: Show me what you'd do on paper for that one. Were you ever in
that situation where you had to split up something with some
friends? (B: Uh huh.) So you each got an equal amount?
10 B: Un uh. I didn't have an equal amount.
11 I: Do you understand what they have to do? Or what they're try-
ing to do?
12 B: They have to have another friend (smiles).
13 I: OK now, show me - tell me why they have to have another friend
I don't know what you mean - I think I know what you mean but
I'm not sure.
ll4 B: (19 s.) Mmm - I could multiply - times 15-
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
2h
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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I:
B:
I:
B:
I:
B:
I:
B:
I:
B:
I:
B:
I:
B:
I:
B:
I:
You can? You think that would solve the problem for them?
15
times U equals
5 times ^ is 20 -
zero
carry the 2 -
^ times 1 is 1 (writes 6)
un uh -
15
x U
60
What’s wrong?
Too high a number.
Too high a number: Why? How do you know?
60? (Looks at I. and smiles
)
I could divide maybe.
Well, give that a try.
15 - divided by k (writes "15tU=") i5-:-U=
U divided by 1 -
What * d you say - i+?
Uh, it won't go into 1 so I have to go by 15.
4 divided by 15 -
Yeah -
3 times (writes 3).
How'd you get 3?
Cause - 1 doesn't go into 1.
OK
— by 15 (looks at worn
I could do it like thi
k - and divide by 15 -
But it doesn't go into
U divided by 15 equals
1) x 3 - minus - 12
equals - that'd be - 3
now get U —
and that's the answer.
t on paper )
._
5 (writes U 1 1 5
)
Which is?
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32 B: That (points to 3 underneath the 12).
33 I: Where?
34 B: Right here
- points again to the 3 underneath the 12) the 3.
35 I: OK now, how do you know that's the answer?
36 B: I always do that in math.
37 I: And what - do you think that's a good answer? I mean willthat solve their problem? What is their problem?
38 B: To get rid of one of their friends (laughs).
39 I: They have a problem - why do they have to get rid of a friend?
4o B: Or gain a friend.
4l I: Or gain a friend? Why? I don't - I want you to tell me why
you think that will help.
42 B: Mmm - 4, 5, 6 (staring at wall) - there's (looks at text) 15
green stones.
43 I: OK.
44 B: They could leave one.
45 I: They could leave one stone? Is that what you mean?
46 B: Uh huh.
47 I: Then what would happen?
48 B: Then there 'd be equally stones.
49 I: Oh, show me how that works.
50 B: Here's the stones - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, l4, 15 - (draws 15 circles)
51 I: OK - they're green, right.
52 B: 15 take away 4 - (writes) 15
15, l4, 13, 12, 11 (puts out 4 fingers on - 4
1. hand as he counts).
53 I: Is that what you were thinking of before or did you just think
of that?
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5b B: I just - I was thinking it before.
55 I: That's what you were thinking of before? 15 take away - ?I thought you were doing dividing before -
56 B: I was, but I was thinking that (points to subtraction work).
57 I: Did you use that?
58 B: I was thinking of that too.
59 I: OK, show me what you were thinking.
6o B: One (writes 1 )
. ^(Writes 1 to left of first one).
_ t
Ahhh
- YT
6i I: What happened?
62 B: I goofed - that was 11.
63 I: Yeah is that what you thought it was going to -
6b B: Uh huh.
65 I: Yeah - now - what else?
66 B: Hmmm -
67 I: We were thinking about, a, why - you said they - they might
need to get an extra friend -
68 B: Uh huh.
69 I: Or get rid of one? Does this (written subtraction) have some-
thing to do with that or is this something else?
70 B: Hmmm - (speaking to himself) What can I do now?
71 I: Well, why don’t you read the problem again and just make sure
So far you answer is what?
72 B: A, 11.
(Rereads problem)
(7 s.) (clicks fingers) Got it.
15
plus U
Just now - 15
5 plus U is 9- + 1
U plus 1 is — 5. 59
Un uh, un uh, un uh.
73
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I:
B:
I:
B:
I
B
I
B
I
B
I
B:
What
' s wrong?
Too high.
Too high? Now how do you know it's too high
thing wrong? is there some-
( Corrects answer to read 19) 15
+ ii
19
Made a mistake?
Uh huh.
19? - Does that look right?
Un uh (shakes head).
How come?
Cause 19
' s too high of a number.
i this is a problem. We can multiply, or divide, or
subtract, or add. Or maybe something else, I don't know. And
how do you decide which one to do? — How can you decide that,
Barry?
I don't know.
28 ]
Roy - "Sharing, Six Candies" Protocol
Full Transcript
11/21/7*4
R: (Reads from card) Jim got 6 candies from his
mother to - to share with his 2 sisters, Kim and
Marla. At - at school Marla already had some candies
and Kim was very hungry because she has missed lunch.
He gave 1 candy to Kim and 2 to Marla. Do you think
that was fair?"
R: Yeah.
I: You do?
R:
I:
R:
Uh huh - it was 6 and he gave 2 to Kim and 2 to Marla
and then - *4 take away 6 is 2 and they each got 2.
OK — What happened? Jim had — tell me again why you
think it's fair - I didn't get all your reasons.
Like here's Kim and here is - how do you spell Marla?
(looks back at text for spelling) - Marla, and here is
Jim (writes the 3 names in a row on paper), and urn -
Jim had *4 (writes "1" under "Jim") and he gave 2 to
Marla (writes "2" under "Marla") and 2 to Kim (writes
"2" under "Kim") and then 4 take away - no - he had 6
8 and he gave 2 to Marla and he had 14 and he gave 2 to
Kim and he'd have 2 back (writes " 2" under "Jim") and
9 then take away (crosses out "V under "Jim ") and then
they each got 2.
10 I: How did they get 2? Kim Marla Jim
2 2 K
11 R: Because a - urn. 2
12 I: No, I see what you're saying, but I don't — I want
you to tell —
13 R: Urn
1*4 I: Anyway it was fair?
15 R: Uh huh
16 I: And what makes it fair?
R:17 I just told you right here.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
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I: Because they each got 2.
R : Uh huh
I. Want to check it? Or are you sure?
R: I wanna check it.
R. (Reads problem again silently, then begins to read aloud )
—1 to Kim and 2 to Marla — " No
way! (raises voice) He gave 1 to Kim and 2 to Marla.
I: So you read it wrong?
R: I read it wrong.
I: So now you have a new problem. What do you think
about that now?
R: (No response)
I: You think he gave 2 to Kim?
R: No - I thought he did but he didn't.
I: What'd he do?
R: He gave 1^ to Kim and he gave two to Marla and Marla
got 2 more - than Kim, and, oh, how much did Jim have
left (move lips, whispers "take away"). He took away -
he took away 3 so he had 6. He had 3 left. Marla had
2 and Kim had 1, and 3-3 plus 2 plus 1 is 6.
I: So does that tell you anything?
R : Uh huh
I: What?
R : Huh - forgot
.
I: It's a hard problem isn't it? I mean - a - different
people could have different opinions on this, I think.
There isn't always just one answer. Depends on what you
think. So why don't you read it to me again and tell
me what you think is fair. It's an interesting problem.
R: (Rereads silently) (Bangs pen down and smiles) I read
it wrong again! Marla already had some candies and that's -
that '
s
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38 I
39 R
1*0 I
1*1 R
b2 R
b3 I
bb R
1*5
U6. I
1*7 R
1+8 I
1*9 R
50 I
51 R
52 I
53 R
5 1* I
55 R
56 I
57 R
Marla already had some candies?
Uh huh - so (writes new row of the 3 names)
Did you know that before?
Uh uh. [no]
Mm, and how many candies did Marla have? And he
gave something to 2 - and
Something to -
He gave 2 to Marla, and then See Marla had 3+2
is 5 (writes 5 under Marla's name). Jim only had -
he had - he had - 3 left (writes 3 under "Jim”)
Kim only had one (writes 1 under "Marla") and that's
not fair - cause Marla got the most.
So you think it wasn't fair?
I don't think it was fair.
How come?
Because um, if - if Marla' d already brung some candy
to school he should 'a - Jim should 'a gave - should've
gave - gave a -
_3 to Kim, but it's never be fair because -
That's what you think - OK - Never be fair?
It's never be fair because Jim had 6, Marla had 5
and Kim had - had only one. And if Jim gave b to
Marla, then she '
d
have 5 and he'd have - Jim'd only
have 2 - and then you keep on going and you'd never
make it fair.
It'd be hard to be fair, I guess.
Uh huh.
How did Marla get 5?
Cause her - she probably had bought some before
they got to school.
And Jim gave her — one candy - he gave 2 to Marla,
so she got 5*
Uh huh.
Roy - "Up Tangerines" Protocol
Full Transcript
11/21/7**
28U
1 I:
2 R:
3
k
5
6 I:
7 R:
8 I:
9 R:
10
11
12
13
lU 1:
15 R:
16
17
18
19
20 1:
21 R:
22
23 I:
2k R:
25
26
27
28 I:
Let’s try this one.
(Reads ) "A truck driver loads Uo tangerines in 5 boxes,l^ach box holds an equal number of tangerines."
(Says softly to himself) Oh, I bet I know —
(Continues reading) "Each tangerine - "
What?
I bet I know what I'm gonna do, I'm gonna see how - how much thereis m each box.
Oh, OK.
(Reads) Each box holds an equal number of tangerines.
Each tangering weighs - 3 ounces
and each box - box measures 6" x 5" by 8"
.
How many tangerines are in each box?"
I knew.
You did know, right.
Uh huh. So 5. boxes, !(} tangerines - oh boy.
It couldn 1 t be (shakes head) equal - equal large numbers because -
if it was boxes it'd be 10_ in each —
and 5. boxes it'd be —
it'd have to be, it'd have to be 50.
It couldn't — (interrupts)
There 'd have to be 50 tangerines?
It's thirty-fi
—
(points to "10" on page) thirty — no thirty —
wait (interrupts)— how many are in each box (continues to look
at text )
.
What are you looking at now?
On this (points to first 2 sentences of written problem) -
hO tangerines in 5 boxes (stretches).
1|0 - take away -
35 in each box.
35?
R: No (shakes head) it couldn't be 35-29
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3o I:
31 R:
32 I:
33 R:
3h I:
35 R:
36 I:
37 R:
38 I:
39 R:
1*0
1*1
1*2 I:
1*3 R:
UU
1*5
1*6
1*7
1*8
1*9
50 I:
51 R:
52
53
5l* I:
55 R:
56
57 I:
58 R:
59
Why couldn't it be?
(Asks) 15 in each box? (Looks at I.)
Mow'd you get 15?
Because uh, I don't know.
It's OK to
But I'd be
guess, T mean, this is a hard problem for 3rd grade,interested in how you guess.
I don't know, I just -
oo 15 is a guess? Or do you have some way of
Uh huh.
15 is a guess.
Could you check it? See if it's right?
OK. Uo tanger — (begins to draw)-
I'm gonna go - there's a - (whispers) box (draws 5 large
squares )
.
(Drawing boxes) One, two.
What's that?
Those are the boxes - three, four, five.
OK. - and there's 1*0 tangerines -
one, two (puts 2 dots next to first box) -
oh, wait - (Interrupts)
Let's see, if there's -
(Points to each box as if counting)
(Points again to first box and I think T hear him whisper ”50".)
Fifty wha/t?
15 (points to first box) -
32 (points to second box) -
No, it's 30, 15 and 30 -
15 and 15 are 30, yes.
And forty-five (separate wordsO - (points to 3rd box).
Nope, it's too over.
What happened?
It's equals 35 plus 15 -
35 plus 5 is 1*0
6o
6l
62
63
61*
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
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and there's - there wouldn't
there's be like 1
,
2
, 3 , 4 ,
in first box).
be the equal amount -
5 * 6, f, 8, 9, 10 (puts 10 dots
1
’ l’ >!’ I' !’ o’
9 ’ 10 (puts 10 dots in s«°nd box).1,2, 3, U, 5, 6, T, 8, 9 , 10 (10 In third).
Thirty (sweeps pen over 3 boxes).
1> 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 , 10 (10 dots in 4th box).
iffourth^x)''-'
11 '1"' 1 ^ tHere
’
(Cr°5SeS °Ut 10
there ’d only be 1
,
2
, 3, 4, 5 (puts 5 more dots in fourth box)
and 5 tangerines, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (puts 5 dots in fifth box) -
and 5 tangerines in that one -
that makes 40 -
10, 20, 30, 40, 50 (points to each box).
I: OK - Fifty?
R. 10, 20, 30 - 35 , 40 (points to each box).
It'd be five - if that'd be -
It d be right if it was 4_ boxes but — not five.
I: What would happen if there were 4?
R: Then - if we took away that one (crosses out fourth box) -
10
,
20
, 30, 40 (points to boxes 1
,
2
, 3 , 5 ).
and we put 10 (puts 5 more dots in box 5 , whispering " 1
,
2
, 3 ,
4, 5-") - and we put 10 in that one (points fourth box),
and 10
,
20
, 30, k0_ (points boxes),
and 40 in there, that means 4 boxes.
I: Does this help you down here? The other stuff? (points to
sentence in written problem: "Each tangerine weighs 3 ounces
and each box measures 6" by 5" by 8"."
R Uh uh.
I
R
I
R
I
R
I
R
Think that's extra: or —
( inaudible
)
What if we had a - 15 tangerines instead of 40?
- Uh - there 'd be 3 boxes and 5 in each.
Would that work?
Uh uh (no) - yeah.
But what if we really had 15 tangerines and we had 5 boxes?
Ya couldn't do that.
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93
94
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
I: Couldn't split 'em up?
R: Ya couldn't split 'em up.
I: Yeah.
What if we put uh - 4 in each of these boxes - how many would
we have (points to drawn boxes)? If I put 1 here (points box l),
4 (points to box 2) -
R: 4 - 4, 8 (points to boxes 1, 2).
I: In all 5 -
R: 8, 12, - 16
,
- 20 (points to each square) -
it's be 20 - in each box.
I: 20 in each -
R: (Shakes head) Five in each box. It'd -
it'd be 20 in all the boxes if there was one big box together.
I: OK. So if I had 15 and I wanna put 'em - I wanna divide 'em up
into 5 boxes - is there any way to do that?
R: (Whispers "15 divided up into 5 boxes.") No. It wouldn't be
equal —
wait - (picks up pen) if they could go by two '
s
(get new sheet
of paper to draw on). (Stares at written problem.)
(Draws 4 squares [smaller])
2, 4, 6, 8 (puts 2 dots in each).
(Draws 5th square and 2 dots) 12, that'd -
(Draws 6th and 2 dots) l4, that'd never be right
(Draws 7th square and a dot) 15, one -
that'd be one to make 15-
I: Kay. So this would be 2 - (points 1st square)
R: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 — (points squares),
(Puts 2nd dot in 7th square), (draws 8th square and 1 dot in
it)
.
I: ’Kay. - What if we put 3 in each?
R: Um - 5? (Draws 5 squares)
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (puts 3 dots in 1st), 6 - a or 3, 6, 9, 12,
15 (putting 3 dots in each square)
that'd be right.
(Pause 1 sec.) (looks up) Oh boy. So there 'd be - there'd be 15
in each box.
I: What happened?
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
l4o
R: There - (pause 4 sec.) oh (blank look).
I : What
' s wrong?
R: I forget. I can't -
I:
that?
^ ^ 15 tangerines in 5 boxes? We could - could we do
Uh buh. Kay.
.
Let s see: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (Draws 5 squares)
Vruts 13 dots in first square, counting)
I. (Interrupts) No, I said I - if we had 15 altogether could we put
em into 5 boxes - could we split 'em up?
R: (Pause 2 sec.) No. (Pause 2 sec.)
Yes, By 3's.
I : By 3's?
R: Yeah.
I: Where?
R: Like there's - is 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 (pointing to squares )
.
I: What'd you think I meant before when you said "no"?
R: I donknow.
I: Or you just didn't think of it? OK.
Why did you say "no" before?
R: I donknow - I was guessing.
I: You for-got, OK.
R: There 'd. be 15 in each box.
I: OK, we better go up to get lunch.
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Fig. 27 Roy's Drawing #2
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Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies "
Full Transcript
Section A
11/7/75
1 I* Here's one about um, sharing.
2 K: Hmm?
3 I: Sharing.
h K: Sharing a cake?
I What's her name (referring to drawing of a girl on a bike) the
girl on the bike — what shall we name her? (pause) What's her
name?
6 K: Alicia.
7 I: Alicia — Alicia has some candy. In a box, ok? — She has -
here's Alicia- and here are her 3 friends (draws 3 circles)
8 K: But that's only 2 friends.
9 I: I mean her 2 friends, ok, so they're 3 of them. OK?— and
she wants to urn,
—
10 K: How many pieces of candy are there in it?
11 I: And they - and they each - how much do they weigh?
12 K: (Pause) About 55 pounds.
13 I: OK. They each weigh 55 pounds, ok? (Writes "55" next to each
lU K: What does that matter? How many pounds are they gonna weigh
after they eat all that candy? (Laughs)
15 I: No - the question is— oh, and how old are they? Eight, right?
16 K: Right.
17 I: They're all eight years old. (Writes "8" next to each circle)
18 K: That means they're exactly the same. Same, same, same. (point-
ing to each drawn circle).
19 I: They want to split up the candy - to make it fair.
K: How many pieces of candy are there?20
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21 I: How many should they each - how many should they
22 K: How many pieces of candy are there?
23 I: There ' re 15.
Section B
2b K: Mmmm, this is gonna be hard. (Draws 15
vertical lines on paper)
1,2,3,!+, 5, 6, 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,1)4,15 -
and, you put 3, no that wouldn't work,
(taps finger quickly in air over "A"
3 times and pauses; repeats over "B"
and C
,
counting aloud as she reaches
group "C") 1,2,3- that wouldn't work.
get— for each?
55
8
25 I* You're going to put 3? What do you mean?
26 K: That wouldn't work.
27 I: Why wouldn't it work? Tell me what you were going to try
28 K: Cause you'd have- you're gonna- each one would get 3, and that
wouldn't work because there would be candy left over.
29 I : There would? How do you know?
30 K: 'Cause I tried it.
31 I: Oh, you marked off 3?
32 K: (puts 3 check marks over first 3 lines
and over 2 more groups of 3 lines)
1,2,3; 1,2,3; 1,2,3
33 I: What were those little things on top?
3*4 K: Candies ,
35 I: Oh, but you were drawing- these are checks?
36 K: Yeah, checks so-
37 I: Oh, ok, so you have some left over?
38 K: Yeah
I: So you can't give 3 to each.
v/ j jJj J /
/
39
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Section C
Uo K: (Draws a new row of 15 lines)
1>2,3,^,5,6,7 ,8,9,10,11,12,13,114 ,15
(I. counts them as well)
Now we'll try 5, we're gonna skip I4
.
bi I: What makes you think 5?
h2 K: Nothing- (laughs)
b3 I: Well why skip 4, hoy, you sure are mean to I4 .
kb K: Because— well maybe— I don't know.
Section D
b5 I: OK, see if you can figure it out in your head first and
then if you can't, we'll do it on paper. Is there any
way-to figure it out in your head?
b6 K: We have to fraction something, but I don't even know how-
have to do some fraction.
bl I: What's that?
bQ K: When ya,- how much — fractioning is—is like— one
of a pound— is some fraction.
third
b9 I: You think we have to fraction here?
50 K: No, but I don't know what you have to do. What you
do is make little marks on paper and figure it out.
have
51 I: OK, go ahead; what were you going to try?
Section E
52 K: Well, I'll try U since you convinced me.
(Draws a new group of 15 lines.)
(Puts 3 groups of U checks over new line of 15-
)
(Moving lips)
53 I: Say it out loud.
5l+ K: — 3,^; 1,2,3,U.
see, I should have skipped and made 5.
Section F
55 I: How many are - why 5?
29b
56 K: Maybe it would have been fi- four and a half. ( laughs
)
57 I: Can you tell ahead of time whether 5 will work?
58 K: Yes- no it won't— yes it will - 'cause there
3 more candies, so it will work.
s
59 I: Left over at the end?
60 K: Yeah.
6l I: Why should 5 work just because of that?
62 K: 'Cause there's 3 people and 3 more candies,
and so that if you did 5 there 'd be 1 more
candy for each person and 5 would work.
Section G
So
,
.
(counts to 15 while drawing new set of 15 marks)
(Writes 3 groups of 5 check marks over the 15 lines)
1*2, 3, ^,5; 1*2,3, ^,5; 1,2, 3, ^,5, it worked!
Far out.
So each of them would get 5 (points to lines) 5,5,5
(writes "5" in each circle) And there's the answer
right there, 55 lbs. (points to " 55 " written next to
one circle) (laughs)
55- what's the real answer?
5
OK.
63
6b I:
65 K:
66 I:
67 K:
I:68
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